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投稿者 Foreign Affairs January / February 2001 日時 2001 年 1 月 07 日 10:43:49:
回答先: The Tiananmen Papers 投稿者 Foreign Affairs January / February 2001 日時 2001 年 1 月 07 日 10:42:16:
(continued)
Following are excerpts from some of the key documents:
THE STANDING COMMITTEE MEETS IN EMERGENCY
On May 13, the demonstrating students announced a hunger strike. On
the evening of May 16 the members of the Politburo Standing
Committee -- Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin
-- held an emergency meeting. Party elders Yang Shangkun and Bo
Yibo also attended. The hunger strike had evoked a strong, broad
response in society, and the leaders were under pressure to find a
solution.
Excerpts from Party Central Office Secretariat, "Minutes of the May 16
Politburo Standing Committee meeting":
Zhao Ziyang: ... The students' hunger strike in the square has gone on
for four days now. ... We've had dialogues with their representatives
and have promised we'll take them seriously and keep listening to their
comments, asking only that they stop their fast, but it hasn't worked.
The Square is so crowded -- all kinds of excited people milling about
with their slogans and banners -- that the student representatives
themselves say they have no real control of things.
Yang Shangkun: These last few days Beijing's been in something like
anarchy. Students are striking at all the schools, workers from some
offices are out on the streets, transportation and lots of other things are
out of whack -- it's what you could call anarchy. We are having a
historic Sino-Soviet summit and should have had a welcoming
ceremony in Tiananmen Square, but instead we had to make do at the
airport. ...
Zhao Ziyang: ...When I got back from North Korea I learned that the
April 26 editorial had elicited a strong reaction in many parts of society
and had become a major issue for the students. I thought it might be
best simply to skirt the most sensitive issue of whether the student
movement is turmoil, hoping it would fade away while we gradually turn
things around using the methods of democracy and law. But then on
May 13 a few hundred students began a hunger strike, and one of their
main demands was to reverse the official view of the April 26 editorial
[that was published in People's Daily]. So now there's no way to avoid
the problem. We have to revise the April 26 editorial, find ways to
dispel the sense of confrontation between us and the students, and get
things settled down as soon as possible.
Li Peng: It's just not true, Comrade Ziyang, that the official view in the
April 26 editorial was aimed at the vast majority of students. It was
aimed at the tiny minority who were using the student movement to
exploit the young students' emotions and to exploit some of our
mistakes and problems in order to begin a political struggle against the
Communist Party and the socialist system and to expand this struggle
from Beijing to the whole country and create national turmoil. These are
indisputable facts. Even if a lot of the student demonstrators
misunderstood the April 26 editorial, still it served an important purpose
in exposing these truths.
Zhao Ziyang: As I see it, the reason why so many more students have
joined the demonstrations is that they couldn't accept the editorial's label
[of 'turmoil'] for the movement. The students kept insisting that the party
and government express a different attitude and come up with a better
way of characterizing the movement. I think we have to address this
problem very seriously because there's no way around it. ...
Li Peng: Comrade Ziyang, the key phrases of the April 26 editorial
were drawn from Comrade Xiaoping's remarks on the 25th: "This is a
well-planned plot," it is "turmoil," its "real aim is to reject the Chinese
Communist Party and the socialist system," "the whole Party and nation
are facing a most serious political struggle," and so on are all Comrade
Xiaoping's original words. They cannot be changed.
Zhao Ziyang: We have to explain the true nature of this student
movement to Comrade Xiaoping, and we need to change the official
view of the movement.
ZHAO ZIYANG LOSES GROUND
On the morning of May 17 the Standing Committee of the Politburo met
at Deng Xiaoping's home. Besides Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu
Qili, and Yao Yilin, elders Yang Shangkun and Bo Yibo also attended.
Excerpts from Party Central Office Secretariat, "Minutes of the May 17
Politburo Standing Committee meeting," document supplied to Party
Centr
al Office Secretariat for its records by the Office of Deng
Xiaoping:
Zhao Ziyang: The fasting students feel themselves under a spotlight that
makes it hard for them to make concessions. This leaves us with a
prickly situation. The most important thing right now is to get the
students to de-link their fasting from their demands and then to get them
out of the Square and back to their campuses. Otherwise, anything
could happen, and in the blink of an eye. Things are tense.
Yang Shangkun: ... Can we still say there's been no harm to the national
interest or society's interest? This isn't turmoil? If anybody here takes
the position that this isn't turmoil, I don't see any way to move ahead
with reform and opening or to pursue socialist construction. ...
Li Peng: I think Comrade Ziyang must bear the main responsibility for
the escalation of the student movement, as well as for the fact that the
situation has gotten so hard to control. When he was in North Korea
and the Politburo asked Comrade Ziyang's opinion, he sent back a
telegram clearly stating that he was "in complete agreement with
Comrade Xiaoping's plan for dealing with the unrest."
After he came back on April 30 he again said at a Politburo meeting
that he endorsed Comrade Xiaoping's remarks as well as the word
"turmoil" that appeared in the April 26 editorial.
But then, just a few days later, on the afternoon of May 4 at the Asian
Development Bank meetings -- and without consulting anybody else on
the Standing Committee -- he gave a speech that flew in the face of the
Standing Committee's decisions, Comrade Xiaoping's statement, and
the spirit of the April 26 editorial.
First, in the midst of obvious turmoil, he felt able to say, "China will be
spared any major turmoil."
Second, in the presence of a mountain of evidence that the aim of the
turmoil was to end Communist Party rule and bring down the socialist
system, he continued to insist the protesters "do not oppose our
underlying system but demand that we eliminate the flaws in our work."
Third, even after many facts had clearly established that a tiny minority
was exploiting the student movement to cause turmoil, he said only that
there are "a
lways going to be people ready to exploit" the situation. This
explicitly contradicts Party Central's correct judgment that a tiny
minority was already manufacturing turmoil. ...
Yao Yilin: ... I don't understand why Comrade Ziyang mentioned
Comrade Xiaoping in his talk with Gorbachev yesterday. Given the way
things are right now, this can only have been intended as a way to
saddle Comrade Xiaoping with all the responsibility and to get the
students to target Comrade Xiaoping for attack. This made the whole
mess a lot worse.
Zhao Ziyang: Could I have a chance to explain these two things? The
basic purposes of my remarks at the annual meeting of the directors of
the [Asian Development Bank] were to pacify the student movement
and to strengthen foreign investors' confidence in China's stability. The
first reactions I heard to my speech were all positive, and I wasn't
aware of any problems at the time. Comrades Shangkun, Qiao Shi, and
Qili all thought the reaction to the speech was good; Comrade Li Peng
said it was a good job and that he would echo it when he met with the
ADB representatives. ...
Now, about my comments to Gorbachev yesterday: Ever since the
Thirteenth Party Congress, whenever I meet with Communist Party
leaders from other countries I make it clear that the First Plenum of our
Thirteenth Central Committee decided that Comrade Xiaoping's role as
our Party's primary decision-maker would not change. I do this in order
to make sure the world has a clearer understanding that Comrade
Xiaoping's continuing power within our Party is legal in spite of his
retirement. ...
Deng Xiaoping: Comrade Ziyang, that talk of yours on May 4 to the
ADB was a turning point. Since then the student movement has gotten
steadily worse. Of course we want to build socialist democracy, but we
can't possibly do it in a hurry, and still less do we want that
Western-style stuff. If our one billion people jumped into multiparty
elections, we'd get chaos like the "all-out civil war" we saw during the
Cultural Revolution. ...
I know there are some disputes among you, but the question before us
isn't how to settle all our different views; it's whether we now should
back off or not. ...To back down would be to give in to their values; not
backing down means we stick steadfastly to the April 26 editorial.
The elder comrades -- Chen Yun, [Li] Xiannian, Peng Zhen, and of
course me, too -- are all burning with anxiety at what we see in Beijing
these days. Beijing can't keep going like this. We first have to settle the
instability in Beijing, because if we don't we'll never be able to settle it in
the other provinces, regions, and cities.
Lying down on railroad tracks; beating, smashing, and robbing; if these
aren't turmoil then what are they? If things continue like this, we could
even end up under house arrest.
After thinking long and hard about this, I've concluded that we should
bring in the People's Liberation Army [PLA] and declare martial law in
Beijing -- more precisely, in Beijing's urban districts. The aim of martial
law will be to suppress the turmoil once and for all and to return things
quickly to normal. This is the unshirkable duty of the Party and the
government. I am solemnly proposing this today to the Standing
Committee of the Politburo and hope that you will consider it.
Zhao Ziyang: It's always better to have a decision than not to have one.
But Comrade Xiaoping, it will be hard for me to carry out this plan. I
have difficulties with it.
Deng Xiaoping: The minority yields to the majority!
Zhao Ziyang: I will submit to Party discipline; the minority does yield to
the majority.
BACKLASH TO MARTIAL LAW
When martial law was declared, it applied to only five urban districts of
Beijing. But it elicited fierce opposition throughout the capital,
nationwide, and internationally. Troops from 22 divisions moved toward
the city, but many were stopped in the suburbs or blocked in city streets
and failed to reach their destinations. In the first of what would be many
similar instructions, on May 20 Yang Shangkun ordered that the
soldiers should never turn their weapons on innocent civilians, even if
provoked.
Provincial authorities voiced the requisite support for Beijing while
taking actions locally to try to assure that nothing spectacular happened
in their own bailiwicks. On May 21, student
leaders in the square voted
to declare victory and withdraw but reversed their decision under
pressure of widespread sentiment among new recruits in the square to
continue the strike.
Many students had come from universities outside Beijing to camp. On
the eve of martial law, the Railway Ministry reported to Zhongnanhai
that a total of 56,888 students had entered the city on 165 trains
between 6 pm on May 16 and 8 pm on May 19. The flood of students
had stressed the already overstretched system. Most of the students
had demanded to ride without tickets, took over the trains'
public-address systems, asked passengers for contributions, hung
posters in and on the cars, and even demanded free food.
Of some 50,000 students in Tiananmen Square on May 22, most were
from outside Beijing, and many of the Beijing students had returned to
their campuses or gone home. Official records showed that at least 319
different schools were represented in the square.
題名には必ず「阿修羅さんへ」と記述してください。