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(回答先: イスラエル軍の苦戦の責任をとらされて司令官が解任された(低気温のエクスタシーbyはなゆー)【軍と政府(文官)との亀裂も】 投稿者 gataro 日時 2006 年 8 月 10 日 22:56:19)
イスラエルが閣議でいったん決定した、レバノンへの攻撃拡大を停止、と報じられるなか、その後も依然としてイスラエルのレバノン侵攻は続けられている。
イスラエル、レバノンへの攻撃拡大を停止=地元紙(ロイター通信)
http://www.asyura2.com/0601/war83/msg/551.html
投稿者 田中大也 日時 2006 年 8 月 10 日 13:48:49
イスラエル、レバノンへの攻撃拡大を停止=地元紙(ロイター)//停戦決議合意(毎日新聞)・・??
http://www.asyura2.com/0601/war83/msg/550.html
投稿者 rand 日時 2006 年 8 月 10 日 13:47:41
しかし英紙「ガーディアン」が伝えるように、イスラエル政府内では閣僚間の亀裂・ひび割れが目立つようである。イスラエルの英字紙「ハーレツ」(8月10日付)は「オルメルトは紛争終結の方途に確信もてぬ」として、イスラエル政府内部の意見対立を次のように報じている。
イスラエル国防軍のレバノンでの作戦を拡大するという国防軍側の提案は、水曜日大多数の閣僚に賛成された。9人の大臣が支持したのに対し、3人が棄権した。だが閣議出席者によれば、投票結果は閣僚たちの本心を反映していない。「もしみんなが発言どおりに投票すれば、提案反対が多数となっているだろう」ある閣僚はそう言った。では、なぜ誰も提案に反対しなかったのか。政府内に亀裂があり、国防軍の支持層にひび割れが入っているのを、国民とヒズボラに、明らかになるのを我々は恐れたのだとその閣僚は説明した。
問題は、そのようなひび割れがあるのに、もはや誰も本当に隠そうと務めないことだ。エフード・オルメルト首相とアミル・ペレツ国防相との亀裂。ツィーピ・リブニ外相とダン・ハルツ国防軍参謀長との亀裂。そしてメイル・ダガン、モサド長官とアモス・ヤドリン情報部長との亀裂。そしてペレツとその先任者シャウル・モファズとの亀裂、そしてモファズとアヴィ・デヒテルとの亀裂。出席者の1人が状況をまとめてこう言った「みんなが少なくとも一回は口論に巻き込まれた」
首相は、今週かかって首相のためにペレツとハルツが用意した基本計画が気に入らない。南部レバノンという敵領に数個師団を1ヶ月、ことによると2ヶ月の間作戦のために送ることが、多数の犠牲や引き続く占領を伴い、イスラエルへのすでに先細りしている国際的支援をそれでなくともかじりとってしまうのではないかと、首相は恐れたのだ。そのような作戦の後でも、北部イスラエルの町へのカチューシャ砲弾を止められるかどうかは疑わしい。いつもすすんで、しかも平然とガリラヤへロケット弾を打ち上げるヒズボラ兵が誰かいる。丁度カッサムロケット発射台がガザでもそうしているのと同じように。
(以下略)
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ANALYSIS: Olmert is unsure on how to bring conflict to an end
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/749023.html
By Aluf Benn, Haaretz Correspondent
The defense establishment's proposal to expand the Israel Defense Forces operation in Lebanon was approved by a large majority of cabinet ministers on Wednesday: Nine ministers backed the proposal, while three abstained. But according to some attendees, the results of the vote do not reflect the ministers' true opinions. "If everyone voted the way they spoke, there would be a majority opposing the proposal," one minister said. So why didn't anyone vote against the proposal? We were afraid, the minister explained, of showing the public and the Hezbollah that there are rifts within the government and cracks in its support for the IDF.
The problem is that such cracks exist and no one is really making an effort to hide them anymore. Rifts between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz. Rifts between Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz. And those between the head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan and Head of the Imtelligence Corps, Amos Yadlin. And between Peretz and his predecessor, Shaul Mofaz and between Mofaz and Avi Dichter. One of those present summed the situation up by saying, "everyone was involved in at least one quarrel."
The prime minister does not like the master plan prepared for him this week by Peretz and Halutz. He feared that sending in several divisions to operate for a month, possibly two, in the hostile territory of southern Lebanon would entail multiple casualties, an ongoing occupation and would gnaw at the already dwindling remnants of Israel's international support. It is doubtful whether the Katyusha fire on northern Israeli towns would cease, even after such an operation. There will always be some Hezbollah man on donkey-back, poised and ready to launch a rocket into the Galilee, just like the Palestinian Qassam launchers are doing in Gaza.
But Olmert's reservations clash with his original position, that the political echelon should not interfere with operational decisions, and that it should follow the army's recommendations. What should he do? Olmert found two ways to solve this dilemma - he allowed Mofaz to present before the ministers his plan for a swift, limited operation, a plan that would enable Israel to announce victory quickly and with a minimal casualties. Mofaz met with Olmert on Tuesday and presented his plan. According to one version of the story, he also told the chief of staff about it before the meeting.
The ministers reacted enthusiastically to the plan, and Peretz realized he had been ambushed. It was an obvious trick: The minister who has the most military experience in the government, Lieutenant General (res.) Shaul Mofaz, proposes an elegant and mischievous scheme, to counter the weighty, clumsy and danger-riddled plan proposed by his heir. If there are any complications, the public will know there was a simpler, cheaper solution.
Then Peretz burst reminding that Mofaz had been the one who neglected to deal with Hezbollah's massive arming during his tenure in the past few years. When the meeting was over, the accusations continued - on the one hand, voiced claimed that even if you have a new operational plan, you shouldn't wave it at a cabinet meeting just to demonstrate your superiority. Others counterclaimed that Mofaz had been opposed to Israel's unilateral pullout from Lebanon in the spring of 2000, and had also warned Israel of the dangers of the rocket arsenal there.
Olmert made efforts to restore calm in the meeting and explained that since he must maintain authority and responsibility, he can only bring the defense establishment's proposal up to a vote.
In the end, his salvation came from Condoleezza Rice. The U.S. Secretary of State called to inform the cabinet of expected progress in talks over a UN resolution which have so far been unfruitful. Livni had earlier conditioned her support for the proposal on a "timeout" to pursue a diplomatic resolution first before going ahead with the operation. As a result of Rice's news, Olmert and Livni managed to convince Peretz that the operation should be postponed for at least 48 hours.
And so the cabinet meeting ended in a rather predictable compromise: Approval of an outline of the operation in principle, while postponing its implementation to allow for development in the UN talks. Troops, however, will take up positions in preparation for the operation. Israel is telling the UN "hold me back," in efforts to prevent itself from getting swept up in any one decision and hoping for the best. Olmert's moment of truth has been postponed, at least until Friday.