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(回答先: 【産経までもが共同を引用する意味は？】国防長官が特殊尋問を承認 イラク虐待で米誌報道 投稿者 木田貴常 日時 2004 年 5 月 16 日 16:05:57)
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THE GRAY ZONE
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib.
Issue of 2004-05-24
Posted 2004-05-15
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040524fa_fact
The roots of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal lie not in the criminal inclinations of a few Army reservists but in a decision, approved last year by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to expand a highly secret operation, which had been focussed on the hunt for Al Qaeda, to the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq. Rumsfeld’s decision embittered the American intelligence community, damaged the effectiveness of élite combat units, and hurt America’s prospects in the war on terror.
Abu Ghraib刑務所スキャンダル嘘の根、高度に隠密行動(それはイラクの囚人の質問にアルQaedaの捜索に集中した)を拡張するために昨年国防長官ドナルドRumsfeldによって承認されて、数人の軍隊予備兵の犯罪の傾向でではなく決定で。Rumsfeld’s決定は有効性を破損されて、アメリカの知能コミュニティーを憤激させました?ライト戦闘部隊および傷America’恐怖との戦いにおけるs見込み。
According to interviews with several past and present American intelligence officials, the Pentagon’s operation, known inside the intelligence community by several code words, including Copper Green, encouraged physical coercion and sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in an effort to generate more intelligence about the growing insurgency in Iraq. A senior C.I.A. official, in confirming the details of this account last week, said that the operation stemmed from Rumsfeld’s long-standing desire to wrest control of America’s clandestine and paramilitary operations from the C.I.A.
数人の過去と現在のアメリカの情報当局とのインタビューによって、Pentagon’銅の緑を含?ﾞいくつかのコード名によって知能コミュニティーの内部で知られていたsオペレーションは、イラクで成長している暴動に関するより多くの知能を生成するようにイラクの囚人の物理的な高圧および性の屈辱を促進しました。C.I.A.高官は、先週このアカウントの詳細を確認する際に、オペレーションがRumsfeld’から生じたと言いました;America’のコントロールをねじるsの長年の望み;C.I.A.からのsの秘密と準軍事的なオペレーション。
Rumsfeld, during appearances last week before Congress to testify about Abu Ghraib, was precluded by law from explicitly mentioning highly secret matters in an unclassified session. But he conveyed the message that he was telling the public all that he knew about the story. He said, “Any suggestion that there is not a full, deep awareness of what has happened, and the damage it has done, I think, would be a misunderstanding.” The senior C.I.A. official, asked about Rumsfeld’s testimony and that of Stephen Cambone, his Under-Secretary for Intelligence, said, “Some people think you can bullshit anyone.”
外観先週中に、Abu Ghraibに関して証明することを議会の前で法律によってRumsfeldが未分類のセッションの高度に秘密の問題に明示的に言及することを排除されました。しかし、彼は、物語に関して知っていたものすべてを公に伝えていたというメッセージを伝えました。彼は言いました、“起こったことの十分な深い意識がないというどんな暗示、およびそれが行った損害も誤解になるだろうと私は思います。”C.I.A.高官、Rumsfeld’に関して尋ねた;s証言、およびスティーヴンCambone(知能のための彼のアンダー秘書)のそれは言いました、“何人かの人々は考えます、あなたはできる、ナンセンスだ、誰でも。”
The Abu Ghraib story began, in a sense, just weeks after the September 11, 2001, attacks, with the American bombing of Afghanistan. Almost from the start, the Administration’s search for Al Qaeda members in the war zone, and its worldwide search for terrorists, came up against major command-and-control problems. For example, combat forces that had Al Qaeda targets in sight had to obtain legal clearance before firing on them. On October 7th, the night the bombing began, an unmanned Predator aircraft tracked an automobile convoy that, American intelligence believed, contained Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban leader. A lawyer on duty at the United States Central Command headquarters, in Tampa, Florida, refused to authorize a strike. By the time an attack was approved, the target was out of reach. Rumsfeld was apoplectic over what he saw as a self-defeating hesitation to attack that was due to political correctness. One officer described him to me that fall as “kicking a lot of glass and breaking doors.” In November, the Washington Post reported that, as many as ten times since early October, Air Force pilots believed they’d had senior Al Qaeda and Taliban members in their sights but had been unable to act in time because of legalistic hurdles. There were similar problems throughout the world, as American Special Forces units seeking to move quickly against suspected terrorist cells were compelled to get prior approval from local American ambassadors and brief their superiors in the chain of command.
Abu Ghraib物語は、アフガニスタンのアメリカの爆撃から、2001年9月11日の攻撃のわずか数週間後に、ある意味では始まりました。ほとんどスタート(Administration’)から;交戦地帯のアルQaedaメンバーのs捜索およびテロリストのその世界的な捜索、大きなコマンドとコントロール問題に直面しました。例えば、光景にアルQaeda目標を持っていた格闘軍隊はそれらに発砲する前に法的なクリアランスを得なければなりませんでした。10月7日の、爆撃始まった夜、無人捕食動物航空機は自動車警護を追跡しました、それ、アメリカの情報機関は信じました、穏やかなムッラー・ムハンマド・オマル(タリバン・リーダー)。弁護士は、タンパ(フロリダ)で、アメリカ・セントラル・コマンド本部で当番でストライキを認可することを拒絶しました。攻撃が承認された時までに、目標は手の届かないところにありました。Rumsfeldは、政治的正当さによった攻撃する自滅的な躊躇として、彼が見たものの上に卒中でした。1人のオフィサーはその秋私に彼を“と評しました;多くのグラスを蹴りドアを壊すこと。
”11月に、10月に前半、空軍が操縦するので、ワシントンポストはそれを10回も報告しました、they’を信じた;dはそれらの姿に上級のアルQaedaおよびタリバン・メンバーを持っていたが、法律を重んじるハードル競争のためにそのうちに作用することができませんでした。テロ容疑者セルに対して速く移動するように努力するアメリカの特殊部隊ユニットが地方の米国大使から事前認可制度を得ることを強いられ簡潔だったので、世界の至る所で同様の問題がありました、命令系統中のそれらの目上。
Rumsfeld reacted in his usual direct fashion: he authorized the establishment of a highly secret program that was given blanket advance approval to kill or capture and, if possible, interrogate “high value” targets in the Bush Administration’s war on terror. A special-access program, or sap—subject to the Defense Department’s most stringent level of security—was set up, with an office in a secure area of the Pentagon. The program would recruit operatives and acquire the necessary equipment, including aircraft, and would keep its activities under wraps. America’s most successful intelligence operations during the Cold War had been saps, including the Navy’s submarine penetration of underwater cables used by the Soviet high command and construction of the Air Force’s stealth bomber. All the so-called “black” programs had one element in common: the Secretary of Defense, or his deputy, had to conclude that the normal military classification restraints did not provide enough security.
Rumsfeldは彼の通常の直接の方法の中で反応しました:彼は、殺すか捕らえる毛布進歩承認を与えられ、可能な場合、“を質問する、高度に秘密のプログラムの設立を認可しました;高いvalue”ブッシュAdministration’の中の目標;恐怖とのs戦い。特別のアクセスプログラム、あるいは—を衰弱させる;防御Department’に従う;s、security—の最も厳格なレベル;ペンタゴンの安全なエリアのオフィスとセット・アップされました。プログラムはオペレイティヴを補充し、航空機を含む必要な設備を得て、その活動を隠しておくでしょう。America’冷戦中の最も成功した知能オペレーションが元あったsは、Navy’を含むsを衰弱させます;空気Force’のソ連の最高指揮権および構築によって使用される水面下のケーブルのs潜水艦浸透;sステルス爆撃機。すべてのいわゆる“black”プログラムは1つの要素を共通に持っていました:国防長官(すなわち彼の代理人)は、正常な軍事の分類制約が十分なセキュリティを提供しないと結論を下さなければなりませんでした。
“Rumsfeld’s goal was to get a capability in place to take on a high-value target—a standup group to hit quickly,” a former high-level intelligence official told me. “He got all the agencies together—the C.I.A. and the N.S.A.—to get pre-approval in place. Just say the code word and go.” The operation had across-the-board approval from Rumsfeld and from Condoleezza Rice, the national-security adviser. President Bush was informed of the existence of the program, the former intelligence official said.
“Rumsfeld’sゴールは高価値target—を引き受けるために適所に能力を得ることでした;速く打つ立っているグループ、”元ハイ・レベルの情報当局員は私に伝えました。“彼は機関together—をすべて得ました;C.I.A.およびN.S.A.—適所に前承認を得ること。コード名とただ言って行ってください。”オペレーションは、Rumsfeldからの、およびCondoleezzaライス、国家安全アドバイザーからの全面的な承認を持っていました。プログラムの存在がブッシュ大統領に通知された、と元情報当局員は言いました。
The people assigned to the program worked by the book, the former intelligence official told me. They created code words, and recruited, after careful screening, highly trained commandos and operatives from America’s élite forces—Navy seals, the Army’s Delta Force, and the C.I.A.’s paramilitary experts. They also asked some basic questions: “Do the people working the problem have to use aliases? Yes. Do we need dead drops for the mail? Yes. No traceability and no budget. And some special-access programs are never fully briefed to Congress.”
本によって動かされたプログラムに人々が割り当てた、と元情報当局員は私に伝えました。それらはコード名を作成し、America’からの注意深い遮り、高度に訓練されたゲリラ隊およびオペレイティヴの後に補充しました;s?ライトforces—海軍シールs、Army’sデルタ・フォースおよびC.I.A.’sの準軍事的なエキスパート。さらに、彼らはいくつかの根本問題をしました:“その問題を動かす人々は別名を使用しなければなりませんか。はい。私たちは、メイル用の連絡の隠し場所を必要としますか。はい。追跡可能性と予算はありません。また、いくつかの特別のアクセスプログラムは、議会に完全には要約されません。”
In theory, the operation enabled the Bush Administration to respond immediately to time-sensitive intelligence: commandos crossed borders without visas and could interrogate terrorism suspects deemed too important for transfer to the military’s facilities at Guantánamo, Cuba. They carried out instant interrogations—using force if necessary—at secret C.I.A. detention centers scattered around the world. The intelligence would be relayed to the sap command center in the Pentagon in real time, and sifted for those pieces of information critical to the “white,” or overt, world.
理論上、ブッシュ政権は、時間敏感な知能にオペレーションによって直ちに応答することができました:ゲリラ隊は、ビザのない境界を横断し、military’へのトランスファーにとって重要すぎると考えられたテロリズム容疑者を質問することができました;Guant?namo(キューバ)のs設備。それらは即時のinterrogations—を実行しました;力の使用、場合、necessary—世界中で散在した秘密のC.I.A.少年院で。知能はリアル・タイムのペンタゴン?ﾅ樹液コマンド・センターに中継され、“に重大な情報のそれらの部分のために入り込みました;白、”あるいは公然、世界。
Fewer than two hundred operatives and officials, including Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were “completely read into the program,” the former intelligence official said. The goal was to keep the operation protected. “We’re not going to read more people than necessary into our heart of darkness,” he said. “The rules are ‘Grab whom you must. Do what you want.’”
RumsfeldおよびGeneralリチャード・マイヤーズ(統合参謀本部の議長)を含む200未満のオペレイティヴ、および職員が、“でした;完全にプログラム、”を見抜いてください;元情報当局員は言いました。ゴールはオペレーションを保護しておくことでした。“We’暗さの私たちの心、”へ必要であるというより多くの人々を読むためには行かないre;彼は言いました。“規則は‘です;しなければならない略奪。あなたが望むことを行ってください。’”
One Pentagon official who was deeply involved in the program was Stephen Cambone, who was named Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in March, 2003. The office was new; it was created as part of Rumsfeld’s reorganization of the Pentagon. Cambone was unpopular among military and civilian intelligence bureaucrats in the Pentagon, essentially because he had little experience in running intelligence programs, though in 1998 he had served as staff director for a committee, headed by Rumsfeld, that warned of an emerging ballistic-missile threat to the United States. He was known instead for his closeness to Rumsfeld. “Remember Henry II—‘Who will rid me of this meddlesome priest?’” the senior C.I.A. official said to me, with a laugh, last week. “Whatever Rumsfeld whimsically says, Cambone will do ten times that much.”
深くプログラムに関係していた1人のペンタゴンの職員スティーヴンCambone(この人は2003年3月に知能のためにアンダー-国防長官と命名された)でした。オフィスは新しかった;それはRumsfeld’の一部として作成されました;ペンタゴンのs再編成。Rumsfeld(それは、アメリカに対する新興の弾道ミサイル脅威を注意した)によって率いられて、1998?Nには、委員会のスタッフ管理者を務めましたが、彼が知能プログラムを実行した経験をほとんど持たなかったので、Camboneはペンタゴンで軍事と民間の知能官僚に本質的に人気がありませんでした。彼は、Rumsfeldへの接近で代わりに知られていました。“ヘンリーII—を思い出す;‘この人はこのおせっかいな聖職者を私から除去するだろう?’”C.I.A.高官は笑い、先週と共に私に言いました。“Camboneが10倍のその多くをするだろうと気まぐれに言う、すべてのRumsfeld。”
Cambone was a strong advocate for war against Iraq. He shared Rumsfeld’s disdain for the analysis and assessments proffered by the C.I.A., viewing them as too cautious, and chafed, as did Rumsfeld, at the C.I.A.’s inability, before the Iraq war, to state conclusively that Saddam Hussein harbored weapons of mass destruction. Cambone’s military assistant, Army Lieutenant General William G. (Jerry) Boykin, was also controversial. Last fall, he generated unwanted headlines after it was reported that, in a speech at an Oregon church, he equated the Muslim world with Satan.
Camboneはイラクとの戦いのための強い主張者でした。彼はRumsfeld’を共有しました;sは軽蔑します、分析および評価のために、C.I.A.によって提供された、用心深すぎこすられたものとしてC.I.A.’で、Rumsfeldを行ったようにそれらを見ること;s無力、それを決定的に述べるためにイラクの戦争の前に、多量破壊のサダム・フセインに保護された武器。Cambone’さらに、sの軍事の助手(軍隊中将ウィリアムG.(ジェリー)Boykin)が論争好きでした。昨秋、オレゴン教会でのスピーチでは、彼がイスラム教界をサタンと等しくしたことが報道された後、彼は望まれないヘッドラインを生成しました。
Early in his tenure, Cambone provoked a bureaucratic battle within the Pentagon by insisting that he be given control of all special-access programs that were relevant to the war on terror. Those programs, which had been viewed by many in the Pentagon as sacrosanct, were monitored by Kenneth deGraffenreid, who had experience in counter-intelligence programs. Cambone got control, and deGraffenreid subsequently left the Pentagon. Asked for comment on this story, a Pentagon spokesman said, “I will not discuss any covert programs; however, Dr. Cambone did not assume his position as the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence until March 7, 2003, and had no involvement in the decision-making process regarding interrogation procedures in Iraq or anywhere else.”
初期に、彼の保有では、Camboneは、彼が恐怖との戦いに適切だった、すべての特別のアクセスプログラムのコントロールを与えられるべきであると主張することにより、ペンタゴン内の官僚的な戦いを刺激しました。それらのプログラム(神聖なものとしてそれらはペンタゴンで多数によって見られた)は、ケネスdeGraffenreid(この人は反知能プログラムの経験を持っていた)によってモニターされました。Camboneはコントロールを得ました。また、deGraffenreidは続いてペンタゴンを去りました。この物語に関するコメントを求められて、ペンタゴン・スポークスマンは言いました、“私は隠密のプログラムについて議論しないでしょう;しかしながら、Cambone博士は2003年3月7日まで知能のためのアンダー-国防長官として彼の位置を仮定せず、イラクで質問手続きに関する意志決定プロセスへの関与を持っていませんでした、あるいは他のいかなる場所でも。”
In mid-2003, the special-access program was regarded in the Pentagon as one of the success stories of the war on terror. “It was an active program,” the former intelligence official told me. “It’s been the most important capability we have for dealing with an imminent threat. If we discover where Osama bin Laden is, we can get him. And we can remove an existing threat with a real capability to hit the United States—and do so without visibility.” Some of its methods were troubling and could not bear close scrutiny, however.
2003年中頃には、特別のアクセスプログラムがペンタゴンで恐怖との戦いのサクセスストーリーのうちの1つと見なされました。“それは活発なプログラム、”でした;元情報当局員は私に伝えました。“It’s、私たちが切迫した脅威への対処のために持っている、最も重要な能力です。オサマ・ビン・ラディンがどこにいるか発見すれば、私たちは彼を得ることができます。また、私たちは、結合したStates—を打つ実際の能力を備えた既存の脅威を削除することができます;そして、視界なしでそのようにやっていってください。”その方法のうちのいくつかは心配しており、しかしながら、綿密な調査に耐えることができませんでした。
By then, the war in Iraq had begun. The sap was involved in some assignments in Iraq, the former official said. C.I.A. and other American Special Forces operatives secretly teamed up to hunt for Saddam Hussein and—without success—for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But they weren’t able to stop the evolving insurgency.
その時までに、イラクの戦争は始まりました。樹液がイラクのいくつかの割り当てに関係していた、と元職員は言いました。サダム・フセインand—の捜索まで秘密に結び付けられたC.I.A.、および他のアメリカン特殊部隊オペレイティヴ;success—なしで;多量破壊のイラクの武器のために。しかしそれら、weren’発展する暴動を止めることができるt。
In the first months after the fall of Baghdad, Rumsfeld and his aides still had a limited view of the insurgency, seeing it as little more than the work of Baathist “dead-enders,” criminal gangs, and foreign terrorists who were Al Qaeda followers. The Administration measured its success in the war by how many of those on its list of the fifty-five most wanted members of the old regime—reproduced on playing cards—had been captured. Then, in August, 2003, terror bombings in Baghdad hit the Jordanian Embassy, killing nineteen people, and the United Nations headquarters, killing twenty-three people, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the head of the U.N. mission. On August 25th, less than a week after the U.N. bombing, Rumsfeld acknowledged, in a talk before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, that “the dead-enders are still with us.” He went on, “There are some today who are surprised that there are still pockets of resistance in Iraq, and they suggest that this represents some sort of failure on the part of the Coalition. But this is not the case.” Rumsfeld compared the insurgents with those true believers who “fought on during and after the defeat of the Nazi regime in Germany.” A few weeks later—and five months after the fall of Baghdad—the Defense Secretary declared,“It is, in my view, better to be dealing with terrorists in Iraq than in the United States.”
バグダッドの秋の後の最初の数か月に、Rumsfeldおよび彼の助手は、Baathist“の仕事と大差ないものとしてそれを見て、暴動の制限のある視界をまだ持っていました;死んでいる完了する人、”アルQaeda追随者だった犯罪の暴力団および外国人テロリスト。局は、戦争におけるその成功を測定しました、によって、どのように、古いregime—の55人の最多の求められるメンバーのそのリスト上のもののうちの多数;cards—をすることについて再生された;捕らえられました。その後、2003年8月に、セルジオ・ビエイラde Mello(国連の使命の長)を含む23人が死亡して、バグダッドの恐怖爆撃ヨルダンの大使館、19人を殺すこと国連の本部を襲いました。8月25日に、国連の爆撃(Rumsfeld)の後の1週未満が認めました、海外戦争復員兵協会の前で話で、その“死んでいる完了する人は、私たちとまだあります。”彼は進みました、“今日いくらかがあります、誰が抵抗のポケットがイラクにはまだあることに驚きそれら、これが連合の側ではある種の失敗を表わすことを示唆します。しかし、これはそうではありません。
”Rumsfeldはそれらの心からの信仰者と反政府運動家を比較しました、誰“ドイツでナチ政権打破中に、およびその打破の後に戦い続けた。”数later—そしてBaghdad—の落下の5か月後に;公言された国防長官、“アメリカよりイラクでテロリストと取り引きしているために、それは、私の視界に、よりよくあります。”
Inside the Pentagon, there was a growing realization that the war was going badly. The increasingly beleaguered and baffled Army leadership was telling reporters that the insurgents consisted of five thousand Baathists loyal to Saddam Hussein. “When you understand that they’re organized in a cellular structure,” General John Abizaid, the head of the Central Command, declared, “that . . . they have access to a lot of money and a lot of ammunition, you’ll understand how dangerous they are.”
ペンタゴンの内部に、戦争が悪く行ったという成長している認識がありました。ますます囲まれ妨げられた軍隊リーダーシップは、サダム・フセインに忠実な5000のBaathistsから反政府運動家が成ったとリポーターに伝えていました。“そのthey’を理解する場合;セルの構造、”で組織されたre;ジョンAbizaid将軍(中央のコマンドのヘッド)は宣言しました、“それ。。。それらは多くの金銭および多くの弾薬(you’)にアクセスします;ll、それらがどれくらい危険か理解する。”
The American military and intelligence communities were having little success in penetrating the insurgency. One internal report prepared for the U.S. military, made available to me, concluded that the insurgents’“strategic and operational intelligence has proven to be quite good.” According to the study:
米軍および知能コミュニティーは、暴動への浸透における成功をほとんどしていませんでした。1つの内部報告書は米軍の準備をしました、作った、私に利用可能、次のことを結論を下した、insurgents’“戦略と運用上の知能は、全くよいと分かりました。”研究によって:
Their ability to attack convoys, other vulnerable targets and particular individuals has been the result of painstaking surveillance and reconnaissance. Inside information has been passed on to insurgent cells about convoy/troop movements and daily habits of Iraqis working with coalition from within the Iraqi security services, primarily the Iraqi Police force which is rife with sympathy for the insurgents, Iraqi ministries and from within pro-insurgent individuals working with the CPA’s so-called Green Zone.
警護、他の脆弱な目標および特別の個人を攻撃するそれらの能力は、丹念な監視および偵察の結果でした。内部情報は、イラクの安全保障機関の内部からの連合を用いて仕事をするイラク人の警護/群れ動作および毎日の習慣に関する反政府のセルへ第1に渡されました、反政府運動家に対する同情がおびただしい、イラクの警察、イラクの省、そしてCPA’を用いて仕事をする反政府支持の個人の内部から;sのいわゆる緑のゾーン。
The study concluded, “Politically, the U.S. has failed to date. Insurgencies can be fixed or ameliorated by dealing with what caused them in the first place. The disaster that is the reconstruction of Iraq has been the key cause of the insurgency. There is no legitimate government, and it behooves the Coalition Provisional Authority to absorb the sad but unvarnished fact that most Iraqis do not see the Governing Council”—the Iraqi body appointed by the C.P.A.—“as the legitimate authority. Indeed, they know that the true power is the CPA.”
終えられた研究、“政治上、米国は日付を持っていません。暴動は、まず第1にそれらを引き起こしたものへの対処により固定するか改善することができます。イラクの再建である災害は暴動の重要な原因でした。合法の政府はありません。また、それは、ほとんどのイラク人が管理するCouncil”を見ないという悲しいが率直な事実を吸収する連合の臨時の権威を必要です;—C.P.A.—によって任命されたイラクの身体;“正当な権威として。確かに、それらは、真実の力がCPAであることを知っています。”
By the fall, a military analyst told me, the extent of the Pentagon’s political and military misjudgments was clear. Donald Rumsfeld’s “dead-enders” now included not only Baathists but many marginal figures as well—thugs and criminals who were among the tens of thousands of prisoners freed the previous fall by Saddam as part of a prewar general amnesty. Their desperation was not driving the insurgency; it simply made them easy recruits for those who were. The analyst said, “We’d killed and captured guys who had been given two or three hundred dollars to ‘pray and spray’”—that is, shoot randomly and hope for the best. “They weren’t really insurgents but down-and-outers who were paid by wealthy individuals sympathetic to the insurgency.” In many cases, the paymasters were Sunnis who had been members of the Baath Party. The analyst said that the insurgents “spent three or four months figuring out how we operated and developing their own countermeasures. If that meant putting up a hapless guy to go and attack a convoy and see how the American troops responded, they’d do it.” Then, the analyst said, “the clever ones began to get in on the action.”
落下までに、軍事評論家は私(Pentagon’の範囲)に伝えました;政治的と軍事であるs、誤った判断、明らかでした。ドナルドRumsfeld’s“死んでいるenders”今、well—としてBaathistsだけでなく多くの欄外の図も含んでいました;何千もの囚人の10年代の中にいた暴漢および犯罪者は戦前の全面恩赦の一部としてサダムによって前の落下を解放しました。それらの絶望は暴動を運転していませんでした;それは、単にそれらのためにそれらを容易な新人にしました、誰がいましたか。アナリストは言いました、“We’dは、‘に2あるいは300ドル与えられた奴を殺し捕らえました;祈る、そしてspray’”—すなわち、任意に放つ、また最上に対する望み。“それら、weren’t、実際に反政府運動家だが暴動に共感的な裕福な個人によって支払われた落ちぶれた人。”多くの場合では、会計係がバース党のメンバーだったスンニ派でした。アナリストは次のように言いました、反政府運動家“私たちがどのように作動したか考えて、かつ、自分の対抗策を開発して、3あるいは4か月を過ごしました。
それが行き、かつ警護を攻撃するために不幸なガイを上げることを意味した場合、またアメリカの軍隊がどのように答えたか確かめる、they’d、それを行う。”その後、アナリストは言いました、“利口なものはアクションに加わり始めました。”
By contrast, according to the military report, the American and Coalition forces knew little about the insurgency: “Human intelligence is poor or lacking . . . due to the dearth of competence and expertise. . . . The intelligence effort is not coördinated since either too many groups are involved in gathering intelligence or the final product does not get to the troops in the field in a timely manner.” The success of the war was at risk; something had to be done to change the dynamic.
対照的に、軍事の報告書によれば、アメリカ・連合軍は、暴動のことをほとんど知りませんでした:“人知は貧弱かあるいは欠けています。。。能力と専門知識の欠乏に予定されています。。。。あまりにも多いグループが知能を集めることに関係するか、最終生産物が適時のやり方で分野での軍隊に到着しないので、知能努力はco?rdinatedされません。”戦争の成功は危険にひんしていました;何かが動的なものを変更するために終わらなければなりませんでした。
The solution, endorsed by Rumsfeld and carried out by Stephen Cambone, was to get tough with those Iraqis in the Army prison system who were suspected of being insurgents. A key player was Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander of the detention and interrogation center at Guantánamo, who had been summoned to Baghdad in late August to review prison interrogation procedures. The internal Army report on the abuse charges, written by Major General Antonio Taguba in February, revealed that Miller urged that the commanders in Baghdad change policy and place military intelligence in charge of the prison. The report quoted Miller as recommending that “detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation.”
Rumsfeldによって支持され、スティーヴンCamboneによって実行された解決は、反政府運動家だった疑いをかけられた軍隊刑務所システムでのイラク人に対して態度が強硬になることでした。主要選手は少将ジェフリー・ミラー、拘留の指揮者およびGuant?namo(この人は刑務所質問手続きを調査するために8月後半にバグダッドに呼び出された)の質問センターでした。2月に少将アントニオTagubaによって書かれた乱用罪に関する内部軍隊報告書は、バグダッドの指揮者が刑務所のチャージの中で政策および場所軍事情報部を変更するようミラーが主張することを明らかにしました。その報告書はミラーがその“を推奨すると報道しました;拘留オペレーションは、質問用のイネブラーの役割をするに違いありません。”
Miller’s concept, as it emerged in recent Senate hearings, was to “Gitmoize” the prison system in Iraq—to make it more focussed on interrogation. He also briefed military commanders in Iraq on the interrogation methods used in Cuba—methods that could, with special approval, include sleep deprivation, exposure to extremes of cold and heat, and placing prisoners in “stress positions” for agonizing lengths of time. (The Bush Administration had unilaterally declared Al Qaeda and other captured members of international terrorist networks to be illegal combatants, and not eligible for the protection of the Geneva Conventions.)
Miller’s概念は、それが最近の上院ヒアリングの中で出現したとともに、“にありました;Gitmoize”Iraq—の中の刑務所システム;それをもっと作ることは質問に注目しました。さらに、彼は、Cuba—の中で使用される質問方法上のイラクで軍司令官に事前に説明しました;“に睡眠剥奪、寒いことの極端および熱への接触および置く囚人を含むことができる(特別の承認で、)方法;ストレスpositions”時間の長さの苦悶のために。(ブッシュ政権は、アルQaedaおよび国際テロリストネットワークの他の捕らえられたメンバーを不法な格闘者であると一方的に宣言しました、そしてジュネーブ条約の保護に有資格でない)
Rumsfeld and Cambone went a step further, however: they expanded the scope of the sap, bringing its unconventional methods to Abu Ghraib. The commandos were to operate in Iraq as they had in Afghanistan. The male prisoners could be treated roughly, and exposed to sexual humiliation.
しかしながら、RumsfeldとCamboneは1ステップさらに行きました:それらは、Abu Ghraibにその略式な方法をもたらして、樹液の範囲を拡張しました。ゲリラ隊はそれらがアフガニスタンで持っていたとともに、イラクで作動する予定でした。男性の囚人を荒く扱い、性の屈辱にさらすことができるかもしれません。
“They weren’t getting anything substantive from the detainees in Iraq,” the former intelligence official told me. “No names. Nothing that they could hang their hat on. Cambone says, I’ve got to crack this thing and I’m tired of working through the normal chain of command. I’ve got this apparatus set up—the black special-access program—and I’m going in hot. So he pulls the switch, and the electricity begins flowing last summer. And it’s working. We’re getting a picture of the insurgency in Iraq and the intelligence is flowing into the white world. We’re getting good stuff. But we’ve got more targets”—prisoners in Iraqi jails—“than people who can handle them.”
“それら、weren’イラク、”の拘留者から本質的な何でも得るt;元情報当局員は私に伝えました。“名前はありませんそれらが帽子を掛けることができる無。Camboneは言います、I’veは、このものおよびI’を割るようになりました;正常な命令系統によって働くことに飽きていたm。I’veはこの装置を(up—)しました;黒い特別のアクセスprogram—またI’m、行くこと、の中で、熱いしたがって、彼はスイッチを引きます。また、電気はこの前の夏流れ始めます。またit’sを動かすこと。We’イラクおよび知能で暴動の写真を得るreは、白い世界に流れ込んでいます。We’よい材料を得るre。しかしwe’veはより多くのtargets”を得ました;—イラクのjails—の中の囚人;“それらを扱うことができる人々より。”
Cambone then made another crucial decision, the former intelligence official told me: not only would he bring the sap’s rules into the prisons; he would bring some of the Army military-intelligence officers working inside the Iraqi prisons under the sap’sauspices. “So here are fundamentally good soldiers—military-intelligence guys—being told that no rules apply,” the former official, who has extensive knowledge of the special-access programs, added. “And, as far as they’re concerned, this is a covert operation, and it’s to be kept within Defense Department channels.”
その後、Camboneは別の重大な決定を下しました。元情報当局員は私に伝えました:だけでなく、でしょう、彼、樹液’をもたらす;刑務所の中へのs規則;彼は、樹液’の下のイラクの刑務所の内部で働く軍隊軍事情報部オフ?Bサーのうちの数人を連れて来るでしょう;s保護。“および、また、ここに、基本的によいsoldiers—もあります;軍事情報部guys—規則が適用されないと伝えられること、”元職員(この人は特別のアクセスプログラムについての広範囲な知識を持っている)は付け加えました。“そして、they’まで;関係のあるre、これは秘密工作です、またit’国防省のチャンネル内に維持されるs。”
The military-police prison guards, the former official said, included “recycled hillbillies from Cumberland, Maryland.” He was referring to members of the 372nd Military Police Company. Seven members of the company are now facing charges for their role in the abuse at Abu Ghraib. “How are these guys from Cumberland going to know anything? The Army Reserve doesn’t know what it’s doing.”
憲兵隊刑務所ガードマンが“を含んだと元職員は言いました;カンバーランド(メリーランド)からの再利用された田舎者。”彼は、第372の憲兵隊会社のメンバーに言及していました。会社の7メンバーが、今Abu Ghraibで乱用におけるそれらの役割のための容疑を科せられています。“知りにカンバーランドが行くことからのこれらのガイはどのように何かですか。軍隊蓄えdoesn’t、知っている、どんなit’s行う。”
Who was in charge of Abu Ghraib—whether military police or military intelligence—was no longer the only question that mattered. Hard-core special operatives, some of them with aliases, were working in the prison. The military police assigned to guard the prisoners wore uniforms, but many others—military intelligence officers, contract interpreters, C.I.A. officers, and the men from the special-access program—wore civilian clothes. It was not clear who was who, even to Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, then the commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, and the officer ostensibly in charge. “I thought most of the civilians there were interpreters, but there were some civilians that I didn’t know,” Karpinski told me. “I called them the disappearing ghosts. I’d seen them once in a while at Abu Ghraib and then I’d see them months later. They were nice—they’d always call out to me and say, ‘Hey, remember me? How are you doing?’” The mysterious civilians, she said, were “always bringing in somebody for interrogation or waiting to collect somebody going out.” Karpinski added that she had no idea who was operating in her prison system. (General Taguba found that Karpinski’s leadership failures contributed to the abuses.)
誰がAbu Ghraib—を担当していましたか;憲兵隊も軍事のintelligence—も;もはや重要だったただ一つの質問でありませんでした。中核を成す特別のオペレイティヴ、それらのうちのいくつか、別名で、刑務所で働いていました。囚人を保護するために割り当てられた憲兵隊は制服を着ていました、しかし多くのothers—特別のアクセスのprogram—からの軍事情報部オフィサー、契約インタープリター、C.I.A.オフィサーおよび人;着用していた民間人衣服。誰がいたかは明らかではありませんでした、誰、担当して准将ジャニスKarpinski、次に第800憲兵隊旅団の指揮者およびオフィサーにさえ表面上。“私は、ほとんどの民間人を思いました、インタープリターがありました、しかし、何人かの民間人がいました、それ、私、didn’t、知っている、”Karpinskiは私に伝えました。“私はそれらを消えるゴーストと呼びました。I’見られたd、それら、Abu Ghraibそして次にI’で時々;d、数か月後にそれらを見ます。
それらはnice—でした;they’d、常に私および発言権、‘に大声で呼ぶ;おい、私を思い出す?どのように、行って、あなたである?’”不思議な民間人が“であると彼女は言いました;質問のために誰かを常に引き入れるか外出している誰かを集めるのを待つこと。”Karpinskiは、誰が彼女の刑務所システムで作動しているか、彼女が分からないと付け加えました。(Taguba将軍はそれがKarpinski’と分かりました;sリーダーシップ失敗は乱用に寄与しました。)
By fall, according to the former intelligence official, the senior leadership of the C.I.A. had had enough. “They said, ‘No way. We signed up for the core program in Afghanistan—pre-approved for operations against high-value terrorist targets—and now you want to use it for cabdrivers, brothers-in-law, and people pulled off the streets’”—the sort of prisoners who populate the Iraqi jails. “The C.I.A.’s legal people objected,” and the agency ended its sap involvement in Abu Ghraib, the former official said.
落下までに、元情報当局員によれば、C.I.A.の上級のリーダーシップは十分に持ちました。“彼らは言いました、‘方法はない。私たちはAfghanistan—の中の中核プログラムの手続きをしました;あらかじめ高価値テロリストtargets—に対するオペレーションのために承認した;また、今、あなたはタクシーの運転手、義理の兄弟および人々のためにそれを使用したい、streets’を取り外した;”—イラクの刑務所に住む種の囚人。“C.I.A.’法的な人々が反対したs、”また、機関がAbu Ghraibへのその樹液関与を終了した、と元職員は言いました。
The C.I.A.’s complaints were echoed throughout the intelligence community. There was fear that the situation at Abu Ghraib would lead to the exposure of the secret sap, and thereby bring an end to what had been, before Iraq, a valuable cover operation. “This was stupidity,” a government consultant told me. “You’re taking a program that was operating in the chaos of Afghanistan against Al Qaeda, a stateless terror group, and bringing it into a structured, traditional war zone. Sooner or later, the commandos would bump into the legal and moral procedures of a conventional war with an Army of a hundred and thirty-five thousand soldiers.”
C.I.A.’s苦情は知能コミュニティーの全体にわたって反復されました。イラク(価値のあるカ?oー・オペレーション)の前で、Abu Ghraibの状況が秘密樹液の発見に結びつき、そのために、あったものに終止符を打つだろうという恐れがありました。“これは愚鈍、”でした;政府コンサルタントは私に伝えました。“You’re、プログラムをとること、それはアルQaeda、無国籍の恐怖グループおよび構造化して従来の交戦地帯へそれをもたらすことに対するアフガニスタンの混乱で作動していました。遅かれ早かれ、ゲリラ隊は、よく、たくさんの100人および3万5000人の兵士との在来型戦いの法的とモラルの手続きにぶつかりました。”
The former senior intelligence official blamed hubris for the Abu Ghraib disaster. “There’s nothing more exhilarating for a pissant Pentagon civilian than dealing with an important national security issue without dealing with military planners, who are always worried about risk,” he told me. “What could be more boring than needing the coöperation of logistical planners?” The only difficulty, the former official added, is that, “as soon as you enlarge the secret program beyond the oversight capability of experienced people, you lose control. We’ve never had a case where a special-access program went sour—and this goes back to the Cold War.”
元上級の情報当局員はAbu Ghraib災害のために傲慢を非難しました。“There’s、無、多くの、軍事の計画者との取り引きのない重要な国家安全問題への対処よりpissantペンタゴンの民間人のために活気づけること、誰、常に危険(”)を心配する;彼は私に伝えました。“ロジスティックスの計画者のco?perationを必要とするより多くのボーリングでありうるもの?”ただ一つの困難がそれであると元職員は付け加えました、“経験を積んだ人々の見落とし能力の向こうの秘密プログラムを拡大させると直ちに、コントロールを失います。We’veは、特別のアクセスプログラムが行った場合を持っていませんでした、sour—また、これは冷戦に戻ります。”
In a separate interview, a Pentagon consultant, who spent much of his career directly involved with special-access programs, spread the blame. “The White House subcontracted this to the Pentagon, and the Pentagon subcontracted it to Cambone,” he said. “This is Cambone’s deal, but Rumsfeld and Myers approved the program.” When it came to the interrogation operation at Abu Ghraib, he said, Rumsfeld left the details to Cambone. Rumsfeld may not be personally culpable, the consultant added, “but he’s responsible for the checks and balances. The issue is that, since 9/11, we’ve changed the rules on how we deal with terrorism, and created conditions where the ends justify the means.”
特別のアクセスプログラムに直接関連した彼の経歴の多くを費やした、個別のインタビュー(ペンタゴン・コンサルタント)では、非難を広げてください。“ホワイトハウスはペンタゴンへこれを下請けしました。また、ペンタゴンはCambone、”にそれを下請けしました;彼は言いました。“これはCambone’です;sは扱います。しかし、Rumsfeldとマイヤーズはプログラムを承認しました。”それがAbu Ghraibで質問オペレーションに来た時、彼はRumsfeldがCamboneに詳細を残したと言いました。Rumsfeldが個人的に有責ではないかもしれないとコンサルタントは付け加えました、“しかしhe’抑制と均衡の原因であるs。問題は9/11年以来、それです?Awe’veは、私たちがどのようにテロリズムに対処するかに関する規則を変更し、目的が手段を正当化する条件を作成しました。”
Last week, statements made by one of the seven accused M.P.s, Specialist Jeremy Sivits, who is expected to plead guilty, were released. In them, he claimed that senior commanders in his unit would have stopped the abuse had they witnessed it. One of the questions that will be explored at any trial, however, is why a group of Army Reserve military policemen, most of them from small towns, tormented their prisoners as they did, in a manner that was especially humiliating for Iraqi men.
先週、7つの告訴されたM.P.のうちの一人によって発表された声明、SpecialistジェレミーSivits(この人は有罪を認めると予想される)、リリースされました。それらでは、彼が、彼のユニットの上級の指揮者が乱用を止めているだろうと主張しました、持っていた、それらはそれを目撃しました。しかしながら、どんな裁判でも調査される質問のうちの1つは、それらが、イラクの人のために特に恥をかかせていた方法で行ったように、なぜ軍隊の蓄えの軍事の警官の中で小さな町からそれらの中でほとんどのグループが、それらの囚人を苦しめたかです。
The notion that Arabs are particularly vulnerable to sexual humiliation became a talking point among pro-war Washington conservatives in the months before the March, 2003, invasion of Iraq. One book that was frequently cited was “The Arab Mind,” a study of Arab culture and psychology, first published in 1973, by Raphael Patai, a cultural anthropologist who taught at, among other universities, Columbia and Princeton, and who died in 1996. The book includes a twenty-five-page chapter on Arabs and sex, depicting sex as a taboo vested with shame and repression. “The segregation of the sexes, the veiling of the women . . . and all the other minute rules that govern and restrict contact between men and women, have the effect of making sex a prime mental preoccupation in the Arab world,” Patai wrote. Homosexual activity, “or any indication of homosexual leanings, as with all other expressions of sexuality, is never given any publicity. These are private affairs and remain in private.” The Patai book, an academic told me, was “the bible of the neocons on Arab behavior.” In their discussions, he said, two themes emerged—“one, that Arabs only understand force and, two, that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation.”
アラビア人が性の屈辱に特に弱いという概念はMarch(2003)の前の月で戦争支持ワシントンの保守主義者の間の議論ポイント(イラクの侵入)になりました。頻繁に引用された1冊の本は“でした;アラビア人の心、”アラビア人の文化および心理学に関する研究、最初にラファエルPatai、コロンビアを教えた(他の大学中に)文化人類学者およびプリンストンによって、1973年に公表された、そしてこの人は1996年に死にました。本は、タブーが恥と抑制で祭服をつけたとともに性別を描いて、アラビア人と性別についての25ページの章を含んでいます。“性別、女性をベール用布地の分離。。。また、男性と女性の間の接触を管理し制限する他のすべての分規則は、アラブ世界、”の中で性別を第1の精神の先入観にする効果があります;Pataiは書きました。同性愛の活動(“)あるいは同性愛の傾向のどんな表示も、セクシュアリティの他のすべての表現でのように、どんな周知も与えられません;これらは私事で、私的に残ります。
”Patai本、1つの、学術的、私に伝えた、“だった;アラビア人の振る舞い中の新反対意見の聖書。”彼らの議論では、彼が言いました、2のテーマemerged—“1、アラビア人は力を単に理解します、そして、2、アラビア人の中で最も大きな弱さは恥と屈辱です。”
The government consultant said that there may have been a serious goal, in the beginning, behind the sexual humiliation and the posed photographs. It was thought that some prisoners would do anything—including spying on their associates—to avoid dissemination of the shameful photos to family and friends. The government consultant said, “I was told that the purpose of the photographs was to create an army of informants, people you could insert back in the population.” The idea was that they would be motivated by fear of exposure, and gather information about pending insurgency action, the consultant said. If so, it wasn’t effective; the insurgency continued to grow.
政府コンサルタントは、重大なゴールが性の屈辱および持ち出された写真の後ろに最初にあるかもしれないと言いました。何人かの囚人が行うだろうことは考えられました、anything—する;それらのassociates—の上でスパイ行為をすることを含んでいること;家族と友達への恥ずべき写真の普及を回避するために政府コンサルタントは言いました、“私は、写真の目的がたくさんの報告者(人口に後ろに挿入することができる人々)を作ることだったと聞いていました。”その考えが、それらが発見の恐れによって動機づけられ、未決の暴動アクションに関する情報を集めるだろうということだった、とコンサルタントは言いました。そうならば、それ、wasn’有効なt;暴動は成長し続けました。
“This shit has been brewing for months,” the Pentagon consultant who has dealt with saps told me. “You don’t keep prisoners naked in their cell and then let them get bitten by dogs. This is sick.” The consultant explained that he and his colleagues, all of whom had served for years on active duty in the military, had been appalled by the misuse of Army guard dogs inside Abu Ghraib. “We don’t raise kids to do things like that. When you go after Mullah Omar, that’s one thing. But when you give the authority to kids who don’t know the rules, that’s another.”
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In 2003, Rumsfeld’s apparent disregard for the requirements of the Geneva Conventions while carrying out the war on terror had led a group of senior military legal officers from the Judge Advocate General’s (jag) Corps to pay two surprise visits within five months to Scott Horton, who was then chairman of the New York City Bar Association’s Committee on International Human Rights. “They wanted us to challenge the Bush Administration about its standards for detentions and interrogation,” Horton told me. “They were urging us to get involved and speak in a very loud voice. It came pretty much out of the blue. The message was that conditions are ripe for abuse, and it’s going to occur.” The military officials were most alarmed about the growing use of civilian contractors in the interrogation process, Horton recalled. “They said there was an atmosphere of legal ambiguity being created as a result of a policy decision at the highest levels in the Pentagon. The jag officers were being cut out of the policy formulation process.” They told him that, with the war on terror, a fifty-year history of exemplary application of the Geneva Conventions had come to an end.
The abuses at Abu Ghraib were exposed on January 13th, when Joseph Darby, a young military policeman assigned to Abu Ghraib, reported the wrongdoing to the Army’s Criminal Investigations Division. He also turned over a CD full of photographs. Within three days, a report made its way to Donald Rumsfeld, who informed President Bush.
The inquiry presented a dilemma for the Pentagon. The C.I.D. had to be allowed to continue, the former intelligence official said. “You can’t cover it up. You have to prosecute these guys for being off the reservation. But how do you prosecute them when they were covered by the special-access program? So you hope that maybe it’ll go away.” The Pentagon’s attitude last January, he said, was “Somebody got caught with some photos. What’s the big deal? Take care of it.” Rumsfeld’s explanation to the White House, the official added, was reassuring: “‘We’ve got a glitch in the program. We’ll prosecute it.’ The cover story was that some kids got out of control.”
In their testimony before Congress last week, Rumsfeld and Cambone struggled to convince the legislators that Miller’s visit to Baghdad in late August had nothing to do with the subsequent abuse. Cambone sought to assure the Senate Armed Services Committee that the interplay between Miller and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, had only a casual connection to his office. Miller’s recommendations, Cambone said, were made to Sanchez. His own role, he said, was mainly to insure that the “flow of intelligence back to the commands” was “efficient and effective.” He added that Miller’s goal was “to provide a safe, secure and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence.”
It was a hard sell. Senator Hillary Clinton, Democrat of New York, posed the essential question facing the senators:
If, indeed, General Miller was sent from Guantánamo to Iraq for the purpose of acquiring more actionable intelligence from detainees, then it is fair to conclude that the actions that are at point here in your report [on abuses at Abu Ghraib] are in some way connected to General Miller’s arrival and his specific orders, however they were interpreted, by those MPs and the military intelligence that were involved.. . .Therefore, I for one don’t believe I yet have adequate information from Mr. Cambone and the Defense Department as to exactly what General Miller’s orders were . . . how he carried out those orders, and the connection between his arrival in the fall of ’03 and the intensity of the abuses that occurred afterward.
Sometime before the Abu Ghraib abuses became public, the former intelligence official told me, Miller was “read in”—that is, briefed—on the special-access operation. In April, Miller returned to Baghdad to assume control of the Iraqi prisons; once the scandal hit, with its glaring headlines, General Sanchez presented him to the American and international media as the general who would clean up the Iraqi prison system and instill respect for the Geneva Conventions. “His job is to save what he can,” the former official said. “He’s there to protect the program while limiting any loss of core capability.” As for Antonio Taguba, the former intelligence official added, “He goes into it not knowing shit. And then: ‘Holy cow! What’s going on?’”
If General Miller had been summoned by Congress to testify, he, like Rumsfeld and Cambone, would not have been able to mention the special-access program. “If you give away the fact that a special-access program exists,”the former intelligence official told me, “you blow the whole quick-reaction program.”
One puzzling aspect of Rumsfeld’s account of his initial reaction to news of the Abu Ghraib investigation was his lack of alarm and lack of curiosity. One factor may have been recent history: there had been many previous complaints of prisoner abuse from organization like Human Rights Watch and the International Red Cross, and the Pentagon had weathered them with ease. Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had not been provided with details of alleged abuses until late March, when he read the specific charges. “You read it, as I say, it’s one thing. You see these photographs and it’s just unbelievable. . . . It wasn’t three-dimensional. It wasn’t video. It wasn’t color. It was quite a different thing.” The former intelligence official said that, in his view, Rumsfeld and other senior Pentagon officials had not studied the photographs because “they thought what was in there was permitted under the rules of engagement,” as applied to the sap. “The photos,” he added, “turned out to be the result of the program run amok.”
The former intelligence official made it clear that he was not alleging that Rumsfeld or General Myers knew that atrocities were committed. But, he said, “it was their permission granted to do the sap, generically, and there was enough ambiguity, which permitted the abuses.”
This official went on, “The black guys”—those in the Pentagon’s secret program—“say we’ve got to accept the prosecution. They’re vaccinated from the reality.” The sap is still active, and “the United States is picking up guys for interrogation. The question is, how do they protect the quick-reaction force without blowing its cover?” The program was protected by the fact that no one on the outside was allowed to know of its existence. “If you even give a hint that you’re aware of a black program that you’re not read into, you lose your clearances,” the former official said. “Nobody will talk. So the only people left to prosecute are those who are undefended—the poor kids at the end of the food chain.”
The most vulnerable senior official is Cambone. “The Pentagon is trying now to protect Cambone, and doesn’t know how to do it,” the former intelligence official said.
Last week, the government consultant, who has close ties to many conservatives, defended the Administration’s continued secrecy about the special-access program in Abu Ghraib. “Why keep it black?” the consultant asked. “Because the process is unpleasant. It’s like making sausage—you like the result but you don’t want to know how it was made. Also, you don’t want the Iraqi public, and the Arab world, to know. Remember, we went to Iraq to democratize the Middle East. The last thing you want to do is let the Arab world know how you treat Arab males in prison.”
The former intelligence official told me he feared that one of the disastrous effects of the prison-abuse scandal would be the undermining of legitimate operations in the war on terror, which had already suffered from the draining of resources into Iraq. He portrayed Abu Ghraib as “a tumor” on the war on terror. He said, “As long as it’s benign and contained, the Pentagon can deal with the photo crisis without jeopardizing the secret program. As soon as it begins to grow, with nobody to diagnose it—it becomes a malignant tumor.”
The Pentagon consultant made a similar point. Cambone and his superiors, the consultant said, “created the conditions that allowed transgressions to take place. And now we’re going to end up with another Church Commission”—the 1975 Senate committee on intelligence, headed by Senator Frank Church, of Idaho, which investigated C.I.A. abuses during the previous two decades. Abu Ghraib had sent the message that the Pentagon leadership was unable to handle its discretionary power. “When the shit hits the fan, as it did on 9/11, how do you push the pedal?” the consultant asked. “You do it selectively and with intelligence.”
“Congress is going to get to the bottom of this,” the Pentagon consultant said. “You have to demonstrate that there are checks and balances in the system.” He added, “When you live in a world of gray zones, you have to have very clear red lines.”
Senator John McCain, of Arizona, said, “If this is true, it certainly increases the dimension of this issue and deserves significant scrutiny. I will do all possible to get to the bottom of this, and all other allegations.”
“In an odd way,” Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, said, “the sexual abuses at Abu Ghraib have become a diversion for the prisoner abuse and the violation of the Geneva Conventions that is authorized.” Since September 11th, Roth added, the military has systematically used third-degree techniques around the world on detainees. “Some jags hate this and are horrified that the tolerance of mistreatment will come back and haunt us in the next war,” Roth told me. “We’re giving the world a ready-made excuse to ignore the Geneva Conventions. Rumsfeld has lowered the bar.”
題名には必ず「阿修羅さんへ」と記述してください。