投稿者 佐藤雅彦 日時 2001 年 12 月 01 日 19:09:48:
(回答先: Re: ビンラディン氏の金に依存 タリバン幹部が初証言 投稿者 あっしら 日時 2001 年 11 月 30 日 21:35:20)
●一昨日あたりからメディアでは“亡命して北部同盟支持に転向
した元タリバン幹部”のモハメッド・ハクサルという人物の、タリバン
の腐った内情暴露というのが盛んに宣伝されています。
その暴露発言によれば、ウサマ・ビン・ラディンはいつでも大金を
持ち歩いていて、これでタリバンの幹部を籠絡したのだとか……。
●この暴露ネタをさかんに報じていたNHK――なぎら健壱の名曲
「悲惨な闘い」のなかの表現をかりれば“さすが天下の犬エチケー”
――ニュースを見ながら、ハクサル氏の“暴露”とやらが、いかにも
アメリカ人の狭隘な善悪感を刺激しそうなファンタジックな中身だった
ので、なんだかとってもアヤシイなと思っていたんですが、案の定、
『ワシントン・ポスト』はこの男が、タリバンの重要ポストについていた
当時、マスード派やCIAとの連絡をとっていたことを暴露しました。
●ハクサル氏はタリバンでは諜報部長や副内務大臣を務めていた
そうです。ナチスがシオニストと協議を行ないながらユダヤ人排撃
政策を進めていたことや米国とソ連が冷戦時代に秘密連絡をとって
いたことなど、我々からみれば“信じられない”ことだって権力維持の
ためには「必要な連絡調整活動」として行なっているのでしょうから、
ハクサル氏がこうしたつながりを維持していたことは不思議ではない
かもしれません。
●しかし、そうであればこそ、たとえばパキスタン軍事情報部や米国
CIAなど、ある意味で“タリバンにとって利用価値があった”勢力に
逆に操られていた可能性は高いでしょうし、逃亡してきた以上、現在
のハクサル氏が、タリバン打倒の逆宣伝看板として、打倒を望む
米国などに教示されたとおりのウソを吹聴している可能性も高い
でしょう。
●ハクサル氏は、ウサマ・ビン・ラディンがタリバン幹部を金品で
籠絡していたといいます。タリバンへの資金援助は間違いなく
行なわれたでしょうし、贈収賄もあったかも知れません。しかし
それがウサマ・ビン・ラディン勢力とタリバンとを結びつけていた
決定的な要因だったのか？ そして、ハクサル氏のこの物言い
が、アラブ世界にどこまで説得力を持つのか？
●アメリカ的感性からすれば、「ウサマ・ビン・ラディンがタリバン
幹部を贈賄やプレゼント攻勢で籠絡した。だからこれは神聖な
同盟ではない」という物言いはディズニーアニメのようにわかり
やすいですが、案外、アラブの人々は、この主張の嘘臭さに
辟易とし、「またアメちゃんとそれになびいたコウモリ野郎が
ウソついてるぜ」と呆れているかもしれません。
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Taliban defector was a CIA informant for years
http://www.khilafah.com/1421/category.php?DocumentID=2745&TagID=2
KABUL, Afghanistan, Nov. 29 -- Within the secretive Taliban hierarchy that
ran this country for five years, it was not hard to figure out how Osama bin
Laden derived much of his influence. When the Saudi-born heir to a
construction fortune called on Taliban officials, according to a former
minister, he often brought wads of cash and distributed it freely --
sometimes taking out $50,000, even $100,000 at a time.
"He had money in his pocket," recalled Mohammed Khaksar, who served as the
Taliban's deputy interior minister. "Any time he wanted, he would just pull
it out and give it to them."
What bin Laden got for all this largess was equally clear -- the freedom to
operate his al Qaeda terrorist network from Afghanistan without
interference. "There wasn't anybody wo had power over Osama," Khaksar said.
"He did whatever he wanted."
For the first time, a former senior Taliban official has emerged publicly to
provide a glimpse inside the militia that created perhaps the world's most
repressive Islamic state and a haven for international terrorists blamed for
the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington. Once a close friend of the
Taliban's supreme leader, Mohammad Omar, Khaksar broke with his compatriots
when they fled Kabul earlier this month and last week declared his support
for the Northern Alliance now in charge in the capital, becoming the
highest-ranking defector from the Taliban inner circle.
In an interview today at the comfortable Kabul compound where he still lives
with his wife and tends his garden, Khaksar portrayed a regime bought and
paid for by bin Laden's millions. The alleged terrorist lavished gifts on
Taliban leaders -- cash, fancy cars and other valuables. If the Taliban was
planning an attack in the years-long civil war with Northern Alliance
guerrillas, he said, bin Laden would have 50 pickup trucks delivered to
ferry fighters to the front.
"Al Qaeda was very important for the Taliban because they had so much
money," Khaksar said without offering any precise figures. "They gave a lot
of money. And the Taliban trusted them."
The relationship between bin Laden and the Taliban leadership clearly also
had roots in an ideological convergence: their common belief in radical
Islam and their anti-Western views. But Khaksar said he was struck by the
primary role that money came to play in recent years. While his account of
his own actions is impossible to confirm and may be colored by his desire to
distance himself from the Taliban, reports by U.S. intelligence agencies
have described in detail how bin Laden bankrolled the Taliban, providing an
estimated $100 million in cash and military assistance since 1996.
A bearish man with searching eyes, a long beard streaked with white and a
weather-worn face making him look older than his 41 years, Khaksar played an
important role in the Taliban from the beginning. An ethnic Pashtun like
most members of the Taliban, he was one of the early key figures in the
movement, which emerged in 1994 and swept to power in Kabul in 1996.
He served first as intelligence chief of the movement and later as deputy
interior minister, supervising security in the capital, where brutal tactics
were often used to enforce restrictions on women and modern life. While Omar
remained in his home base in Kandahar, much of the rest of the government
operated out of Kabul, and Khaksar had a place at the table through many of
its most controversial decisions.
Over the years, however, he became disenchanted, particularly by the arrival
of bin Laden and his foreign fighters. He complained off the record to
reporters as early as 1999 and kept up a regular secret dialogue with the
top military commander on the other side, Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was
assassinated in September, allegedly by bin Laden operatives.
Abdullah, the Northern Alliance foreign minister, said the information
provided by Khaksar was particularly valuable. "It was enough to make him an
exception to all the Taliban leadership," he said, noting that for years,
"Commander Massoud was in constant contact with him."
Khaksar said today that he also served as a clandestine contact for U.S.
intelligence services while serving the Taliban. Agents disguised as
journalists visited him to solicit inside information, he said. "They came
two or three times, and they knew about my policy and about my opinion," he
said.
In Washington, CIA spokesman Tom Crispell said the agency does not comment
on such matters but that CIA policy is to not use American media
organizations as cover for clandestine operations.
Khaksar has provided enough intelligence to the Northern Alliance to win him
continued freedom despite his prominent position in the Taliban. While the
alliance has vowed to imprison or kill other senior Taliban leaders, Khaksar
remains in his own home, able to travel at will, still guarded by some of
the same fighters who surrounded him while he was a Taliban official. He
denied any complicity in "actions against humanity."
Spared from retribution by his onetime enemies, Khaksar probably has more to
worry about from his former friends. He would be an obvious target for any
Taliban operatives or sympathizers still hiding out in the city, but he
brushes off concern, placing his trust in his well-armed guards and even
declining an offer to relocate him to a safer location in Golbahar, about 50
miles to the north.
In his second-floor office, sitting in front of a bookcase filled with
religious texts, Khaksar described his transformation from Taliban security
enforcer to lonely dissenter.
"From the beginning, I was against Arabs and other foreigners coming to
Afghanistan but the other Taliban told me I must not say that," Khaksar
said. "At that time, I felt when foreigners come to our country, our country
would be destroyed. And now you see what's happened."
Khaksar said he met bin Laden once, in 1996, and the two did not hit it off.
"I told him, 'Now there's no jihad in Afghanistan. Afghanistan can solve our
own problems. We don't need you,' " he recalled. "He got very upset and I
never saw him again."
Khaksar became one of the Taliban's most persistent skeptics of the
increasingly close relationship with bin Laden. As time wore on, bin Laden
tried to win him over, but Khaksar said he never accepted money or cars.
Once bin Laden had intermediaries contact him to seek a truce. "I told them
to tell Osama bin Laden that I had the same opinion as before: Just leave
our country."
Besides Omar, who enjoys a close relationship with bin Laden, the al Qaeda
leader had several strong champions within the Taliban, according to
Khaksar, including interior minister Abdul Razaq, defense minister
Obaidullah, information and culture minister Amir Khan Mutaqqi, security
chief Qari Ahmadullah, eastern regional leader Abdul Kabir and prominent
commander Jalaluddin Haqqani.
Khaksar became especially disgruntled in March when the Taliban leadership
decided to destroy two ancient Buddha sculptures at Bamian, saying they
offended Islam. Documents unearthed since the Taliban's retreat from Kabul
suggested that al Qaeda pushed the Taliban into the action that earned
international opprobrium.
"It's a historic sculpture; they should not have destroyed it," Khaksar
said. "I felt like I lost a member of my family when they destroyed this
sculpture."
Khaksar said he had no warning about the Sept. 11 operation to crash
airplanes in Washington and New York and did not know if Omar or any other
top leaders did. But like many Americans, he immediately had no doubt in his
mind who was responsible. The day after the attacks, senior Taliban
officials, except for Omar, met in a palace in Kabul to discuss what to do.
"I told the other ministers, 'I told you before the guy would do something
bad, and now it will have a bad effect on Afghanistan,' " Khaksar said.
"They told me: 'You're going crazy. You shouldn't speak so much.' They said
Osama hasn't done such a thing, but if he has done it, it's a good thing
that he did. I told them these civilian people who died and these two
buildings, they were God's creation. They weren't military soldiers; they
were civilians. God will be angry that this was done."
But his colleagues refused to turn over bin Laden, leading to the U.S.
bombing campaign that began Oct. 7 and helped weaken Taliban defenses enough
to enable the Northern Alliance to overrun the north and finally Kabul.
Facing imminent defeat, the Taliban ministers met again on the night of Nov.
12 and agreed to flee the city. Khaksar decided to stay and take his chances
with the enemy.
"I told them it's my country, I want to live here."
Source: The Washington Post
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題名には必ず「阿修羅さんへ」と記述してください。