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投稿者 CIA報告書 日時 2000 年 8 月 11 日 16:52:25:
回答先: 中国などの「ミサイル取引」を報告 ＣＩＡ（朝日新聞） 投稿者 FP親衛隊國家保安本部 日時 2000 年 8 月 10 日 17:52:12:
Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
1 July Through 31 December 1999
Scope Note
Acquisition by Country:
Iran
Iraq
North Korea
Libya
Syria
Sudan
India
Pakistan
Egypt
Key Suppliers:
Russia
North Korea
China
Western Nations
Trends
Scope Note
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a Congressionally directed action in
Section 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:
"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on
(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology
useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons,
chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."
At the DCI's request, the DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the
Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does
not present the details of the Intelligence Community's assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced
conventional munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.
Acquisition by Country:
As required by Section 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are summaries by country of
acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 1999. We excluded
countries that already have substantial WMD programs, such as China and Russia, as well as countries that
demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern.
Iran
Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD and ACW technology from abroad. In doing so,
Tehran is attempting to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of weaponsﾑnuclear, chemical, and
biologicalﾑand their delivery systems. Duri
ng the reporting period, the evidence indicates increased reflections of
Iranian efforts to acquire WMD- and ACW- related equipment, materials, and technology primarily on entities in Russia,
China, North Korea and Western Europe.
For the second half of 1999, entities in Russia, North Korea, and China continued to supply the largest amount of
ballistic missile-related goods, technology, and expertise to Iran. Tehran is using this assistance to support current
production programs and to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran
already is producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the
Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which had its initial flight test in July 1998. In addition, Iranﾕs Defense
Minister last year publicly acknowledged the development of the Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic
missile than the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iranﾕs
Defense Minister also has publicly mentioned plans for a "Shahab 5." Such statements, made against the backdrop of
sustained cooperation with Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities, strongly suggest that Tehran intends to
develop a longer-range ballistic missile capability in the near future.
For the reporting period, Tehran expanded its efforts to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment,
and expertise from abroadﾑprimarily from entities in Russia and Western Europeﾑostensibly for civilian uses. Iran
began a biological warfare (BW) program during the Iran-Iraq war, and it may have some limited capability for BW
deployment. Outside assistance is both important and difficult to prevent, given the dual-use nature of the materials, the
equipment being sought, and the many legitimate end uses for these items.
Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) party, already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons,
including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. During the second
half of 1999, Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as
precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from entities in Russia and China. It also acquired or attempted
to acquire indirectly through intermediaries in other countries equipment and material that could be used to create a
more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure.
Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia,
during the second half of 1999. Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-meg
awatt nuclear power reactor in
Bushehr, Iran, that will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In addition, Russian entities
continued to interact with Iranian research centers on various activities. These projects will help Iran augment its nuclear
technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development. The
expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts establishedﾑeven from cooperation
that appears strictly civilian in natureﾑcould be used to advance Iranﾕs nuclear weapons research and developmental
program.
Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a number of steps to increase its oversight of entities involved
in dealings with Iran and other states of proliferation concern. In 1999, it pushed a new export control law through the
Duma. Russian firms, however, faced economic pressures to circumvent these controls and did so in some cases. The
Russian Government, moreover, failed in some cases regarding Iran to enforce its export controls. Following repeated
warnings, the US Government in January 1998 and January 1999 imposed administrative measures against Russian
entities that had engaged in nuclear- and missile-related cooperation with Iran. The measures imposed on these and
other Russian entities (which were penalized in 1998) remain in effect, although sanctions against two entitiesﾑPolyus
and Inorﾑare being lifted.
China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but said it would complete
cooperation on two ongoing nuclear projects, a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that
Iran will use to produce cladding for reactor fuel. The pledge appears to be holding. As a party to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required
for the zirconium plant or its products.
Iran claims that it is attempting to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it
seeks to obtain whole facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility, that, in fact, could be used in any number of ways
in support of efforts to produce fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite international efforts to curtail the
flow of critical technologies and equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile material and technology for weapons
development and has set up an elaborate system of military and civilian organizations to support its effort.
On the ACW side, Iran (which has acknowledged a need for Western military equipment and spare parts) continues to
acquire Western equipment, such as attac
k helicopters, but also is developing indigenous production capabilities with
assistance from countries such as Russia, China, and North Korea. Indigenous efforts involve such systems as tanks,
TOW missiles, fighter aircraft, Chinese-designed SAMs and anti-ship missiles, and attack helicopters.
Iraq
Since Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as
required by Security Council Resolution 687. Although UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1284, adopted in
December 1999, established a follow-on inspection regime to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM) in the form of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), there have
been no UN inspections during this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring system installed by the
UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq has been dismantled by the Iraqis. Having lost this on-the-ground
access, it is difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraqﾕs WMD programs.
Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial
use, as well as its missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the
guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipmentﾑin principle subject to UN scrutinyﾑalso could be diverted for WMD
purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased.
Following Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing,
to include several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, it
appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be
converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.
UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its CW
and BW programs. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by
UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s as
had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have an additional 6,000 CW munitions
hidden.
We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs,
although given its past behavior, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. We assess that since the suspension of
UN inspections in December of 1998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate both its CW
and BW programs within
a few weeks to months, but without an inspection monitoring program, it is difficult to determine if Iraq has done so. We
know, however, that Iraq has continued to work on its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting
L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. These modified and refurbished L-29s are believed to be
intended for delivery of chemical or biological agents.
Iraq continues to pursue development of two SRBM systems which are not prohibited by the United Nations: the
liquid-propellant Al-Samoud, and the solid-propellant Ababil-100. The Al-Samoud is essentially a scaled-down Scud,
and the program allows Baghdad to develop technological improvements that could be applied to a longer range
missile program. We believe that the Al-Samoud missile, as designed, is capable of exceeding the UN-permitted
150-km-range restriction with a potential operational range of about 180 kilometers. Personnel previously involved with
the Condor II/Badr-2000 missileﾑwhich was largely destroyed during the Gulf war and eliminated by UNSCOMﾑare
working on the Ababil-100 program. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would attempt to
convert these efforts into longer range missile systems, regardless of continuing UN monitoring and continuing
restrictions on WMD and long-range missile programs.
North Korea
Pﾕyongyang continues to acquire raw materials from out-of-country entities to produce WMD and ballistic missiles.
During the reporting period, there were increased reflections of North Korean procurement of raw materials and
components for its ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources, especially through firms in China. North
Korea produces and is capable of using a wide variety of chemical and possibly biological agents, as well as their
delivery means.
During the second half of 1999, Pyongyang sought to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its
nuclear program, but we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the nuclear weapons program. We assess
that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. The United
States and North Korea are nearing completion on the joint project of canning spent fuel from the Yongbyon complex for
long-term storage and ultimate shipment out of the North in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework. That reactor
fuel contains enough plutonium for several more weapons.
Pﾕyongyang continues to seek conventional weapons via the gray market. In 1999, for example, North Korea acquired
MiG-21 fighter aircraft from Kazakhstan.
Libya
Libya has continued its efforts to obt
ain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from
foreign sources. One example is the attempt last year to ship Scud-related parts as "auto parts" from a firm in Taiwan to
Libya which were intercepted in the UK. Outside assistance is critical to its ballistic missile development programs, but
Libyaﾕs current capability remains limited to its aging Scud B missiles. We expect that the suspension of UN sanctions
last year will allow Libya to expand its procurement effort.
Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW-related equipment.
Following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, it wasted no time in re-establishing contacts with sources of
expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Clearly, Tripoli has not given up its goal
of establishing its own offensive CW capability and continues to pursue an indigenous production capability for the
weapons.
Libya continues to develop its nascent and still rudimentary nuclear research and development program but still
requires significant foreign assistance to advance to a nuclear weapons option. In the latter half of 1999, Tripoli and
Moscow resumed discussions on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center and on a potential power reactor
deal. Should this civil-sector work come to fruition, Libya could gain opportunities to conduct weapons related R&D.
In the past, Libya has sought to obtain major weapon systems, spare parts, and other support for its military forces from
traditional sources in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe, as well as from Iran. During the reporting
period, Libya actively assessed both acquisition and repair/upgrade options not previously available, and ACW supplier
countries openly offered to negotiate arms deals.
Syria
Syria sought CW-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already
has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and apparently is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria
remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key
production equipment.
During the second half of 1999, Damascus continued work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development
and production capability with help from outside countries. Foreign equipment and assistance to its liquid-propellant
missile program, primarily from North Korean entities, but also from firms in Russia, also have been and will continue to
be essential for Syriaﾕs effort. Damascus also continued its efforts to assembleﾑprobably with considerable North
Korean assistanceﾑliquid-fueled
Scud C missiles.
As to Syriaﾕs embryonic nuclear research and development program, we will continue to monitor the potential for this
program to expand. Moscow and Damascus agreed in 1999 to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a wide
area of disciplines.
In addition, sales of ACW to Syria continued, albeit at a lesser pace, during this reporting period. The vast majority of its
arsenal consists of weapons from the FSU. Russia in particular wants to restore its predominant position as the key
supplier of arms to Damascus. Syria purchased from Russia anti-tank guided munitions, tanks, and missile production
capability, according to Russian and Syrian announcements.
Sudan
During the reporting period, Sudan sought to acquire a variety of military equipment from various sources. Khartoum is
seeking older, less expensive weapons that nonetheless are advanced compared with the capabilities of the weapons
possessed by its opponents and their supporters in neighboring countries in the long-running civil war.
In the WMD arena, Sudan has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this
pursuit, it has obtained help from entities in other countries, principally Iraq. Given its history in developing CW and its
close relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well.
India
While striving to achieve independence from foreign suppliers, India's ballistic missile programs still benefited from the
acquisition of foreign equipment and technology. India sought items for these programs during the reporting period
primarily from Russia and Western Europe. New Delhi successfully flight-tested its newest MRBM, the Agni-2, in April
1999 after months of preparations and continued apace with its SRBM program.
India continues to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, and its underground nuclear tests in May 1998 were a
significant milestone. The acquisition of foreign equipment could benefit New Delhi in its efforts to develop and produce
more sophisticated nuclear weapons. India obtained some foreign nuclear-related assistance during the second half of
1999 from a variety of sources worldwide, including in Russia and Western Europe.
Indiaﾕs ACW acquisition efforts during this reporting period focused on Russian-provided aircraft: Russia was in the
process of upgrading older MiG-21 fighters with more current aircraft capabilities, leased India an AWACS aircraft, and
delivered several new SU-30 fighters during the reporting period. India and Russia also seriously discussed the leasing
of several long-range bombers, which would provide significantly longer-range aircraft bombing capability.
Pakistan
Chinese entities provided i
ncreased assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program during the second half of 1999.
North Korea continued to provide important assistance as well. Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to
produce ballistic missiles. In April 1998, for example, Pakistan flight-tested the Ghauri MRBM, which is based on North
Korea's No Dong missile. As a result, the US imposed sanctions against Pakistani and North Korean entities in April
1998 for their role in transferring Missile Technology Control Regime Category I ballistic missile-related technology. In
April 1999, Islamabad flight-tested another Ghauri MRBM and the Shaheen-1 SRBM and can be expected to respond to
another successful Indian missile test (e.g., Agni-II or Prithvi-II) with a new test flight of a Ghauri or Shaheen missile.
Pakistan continued to acquire nuclear-related and dual-use equipment and materials from various sourcesﾑprincipally
in Western Europeﾑduring the second half of 1999. Islamabad has a well-developed nuclear weapons program, as
evidenced by its first nuclear weapons tests in late May 1998. Acquisition of nuclear-related goods from foreign sources
will be important if Pakistan chooses to develop more advanced nuclear weapons. China, which has provided extensive
support in the past to Islamabadﾕs WMD programs, in May 1996 promised to stop assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear
facilitiesﾑbut we cannot rule out ongoing contacts.
On ACW, Pakistan purchased fighter aircraft and anti-ship missiles from China. France delivered the last two of four
submarines contracted and continued to deliver Mirage aircraft.
Egypt
Egypt continues its effort to develop and produce ballistic missiles with the assistance of North Korea. This activity is part
of a long-running program of ballistic missile cooperation between these two countries.
Key Suppliers:
Russia
Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical
know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and Libya. Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from
Russian entities accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, which was first flight-tested in July 1998.
Russian entities during the second six months of 1999 have provided substantial missile-related technology, training,
and expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue to accelerate Iranian efforts to develop new ballistic missile
systems.
During the second half of 1999, Russia also remained a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily
focused on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project. With respect to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance
enhances Iran's ability t
o support a nuclear weapons development effort. By its very nature, even the transfer of civilian
technology may be of use in Iran's nuclear weapons program. We remain concerned that Tehran is seeking more than a
buildup of its civilian infratructure, and the IC will be closely monitoring the relationship with Moscow for any direct
assistance in support of a military program. In addition, Russia supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear
program during this reporting period.
Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and chemicals for Iran. Russia's world-leading expertise
in biological and chemical weapons would make it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and
training on BW and CW agent production processes.
Russia (along with its sister republics in the FSU) also remains an important source of conventional weapons and
spare parts for Iran, which is seeking to upgrade and replace its existing conventional weapons inventories.
Following intense and continuing engagement with the US, Russian officials took some positive steps to strengthen the
legal basis of export controls. President Yelﾕtsin in July 1999 signed a federal export control law, which formally makes
WMD-related transfers a violation of law and codifies several existing decreesﾑincluding catch-all controlsﾑyet may
lessen punishment for violators. Russian export enforcement and prosecution still remains weak, however. The export
law is still awaiting completion of implementing decrees and its legal status is unclear. Public comments by the head of
Russiaﾕs security council indicate that Russia obtained only three convictions for export control violations involving WMD
and missile technology during 1998-99.
Nonetheless, the Russian government's commitment, willingness, and ability to curb proliferation-related transfers
remain uncertain. Moreover, economic conditions in Russia continued to deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian
entities to circumvent export controls. Despite some examples of restraint, Russian businesses continue to be major
suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and technology to Iran. Specifically, Russia continues to provide Iran with
nuclear technology that could be applied to Iranﾕs weapons program. Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior,
therefore, will remain a very high priority.
North Korea
Throughout the second half of 1999, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment and
missile components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.
Pﾕyongyang attaches a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology
.
Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which fuel
continued missile development and production.
China
The Chinese have taken a very narrow interpretation of their nonproliferation commitment and in the case of the MTCR
do not accept the key annex.
Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during this reporting period. In addition, firms in
China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation
concernﾑsuch as Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
Chinese entities have provided extensive support in the past to Pakistanﾕs nuclear programs. In May 1996, Beijing
promised to stop assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, but we cannot preclude ongoing contacts. Chinaﾕs
involvement with Pakistan will continue to be monitored closely.
Chinaﾕs 1997 pledge not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran has apparently held, but work associated
with two remaining nuclear projectsﾑa small research reactor and a zirconium production facilityﾑcontinues. The
Intelligence Community will continue to monitor carefully Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran.
Prior to the reporting period, Chinese firms had supplied CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran. The
US sanctions imposed in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW
program remain in effect. Evidence during the current reporting period suggests Iran continues to seek such assistance
from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to what extent these efforts have succeeded. In June 1998, China announced that
it had expanded its chemical export controls to include 10 of the 20 Australia Group chemicals not listed on the CWC
schedules.
Western Countries
As was the case in 1998, entities in Western countries in 1999 were not as important as sources for WMD-related goods
and materials as in past years ﾑwith the exceptions of Iran and Libya, where entities in Western European countries in
particular remain significant suppliers for their WMD programs. Increasingly rigorous and effective export controls and
cooperation among supplier countries have led the other foreign WMD programs to look elsewhere for many controlled
dual-use goods. Machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific
equipment, and specialty metals were the most common items sought. In addition, several Western countries
announced their willigness to negotiate ACW sales to Libya.
Trends
As in previous reports, countries determined to maintain WMD and missile programs over the long term have been
placing significant emphasis on insulating their programs against interdiction and disruption, and trying to reduce their
dependence on imports by developing indigenous production capabilities. Although these capabilities may not always
be a good substitute for foreign importsﾑparticularly for more advanced technologiesﾑin many cases they may prove to
be adequate. In addition, as their domestic capabilities grow, traditional recipients of WMD and missile technology could
emerge as new suppliers of technology and expertise. Many of these countriesﾑsuch as Iran and Pakistanﾑdo not
adhere to the export restraints embodied in supplier groups such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
On the ACW side, notwithstanding a trend toward developing capabilities for indigenous production, many countries are
buying both production rights and after-sale assistance. They also are pursuing upgrades, which tend to be cheaper and
often circumvent Wassenaar Arrangement and/or US legislative constraints. In addition, some countries are acquiring a
small number of high-technology systems for key military units.
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