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投稿者 雷酢 日時 2001 年 1 月 04 日 17:43:35:
回答先: ロシアと包括的安保対話を＝ＮＭＤ配備へ環境整備−ライス次期米補佐官 投稿者 らいす＠そりでもやるのか 日時 2001 年 1 月 04 日 17:41:32:
Redefining U.S.-Russia Relationship
Condoleezza Rice, Foreign Affairs
Wednesday, January 3, 2001
THE UNITED STATES has found it exceedingly
difficult to define its "national interest" in the
absence of Soviet power.
That we do not know how to think about what
follows the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is clear
from the continued references to the "post-Cold
War period."
Yet such periods of transition are very important
because they offer strategic opportunities. During
these fluid times, one can affect the shape of the
world to come. The enormity of the moment is
obvious.
The Soviet Union was more than just a traditional
global competitor. It strove to lead a universal
socialist alternative to markets and democracy.
The Soviet Union quarantined itself and many of
its often unwitting captives and clients from the
rigors of international capitalism. In the end, it
sowed the seeds of its own destruction, becoming
in isolation an economic and technological
dinosaur.
America has emerged as both the principal
benefactor of this revolution and the beneficiary.
American values are universal. Their triumph is
most assuredly easier when the international
balance of power favors those who believe in
them. But sometimes that favorable balance of
power takes time to achieve, both internationally
and within a country, and in the meantime, it is
simply not possible to ignore and isolate other
powerful states.
The Cold War is a good example. Few would deny
that the collapse of the Soviet Union profoundly
transformed the picture of democracy and human
rights in eastern and central Europe and the
former Soviet territories. Nothing improved
human rights as much as the collapse of Soviet
power.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States
pursued a policy that promoted political liberty,
using every instru
ment from the Voice of
America to direct presidential intervention on
behalf of dissidents. But it lost sight neither of
the importance of the geopolitical relationship
with Moscow nor of the absolute necessity of
retaining robust American military power to
deter an all- out military confrontation.
In the 1980s, President Reagan's challenge to
Soviet power was both resolute and well timed. It
included intense substantive engagements with
Moscow across the entire range of issues
captured in a classic "four-part agenda" -- arms
control, human rights, economic issues and
regional conflicts.
The Bush administration then focused greater
attention on rolling back Soviet power in central
and eastern Europe. As the Soviet Union's might
waned, it could no longer defend its interests and
gave up peacefully (thankfully) to the West -- a
tremendous victory for Western power and also
for human liberty.
Although the United States is fortunate to count
among its friends several great powers, it is
important not to take them for granted.
Today, Russia presents a different challenge. It
still has many of the attributes of a great power:
a large population, vast territory and military
potential. But its economic weakness and
problems of national identity threaten to
overwhelm it.
Moscow is determined to assert itself in the
world and often does so in ways that are at once
haphazard and threatening to American interests.
The picture is complicated by Russia's own
internal transition -- one that the United States
wants to see succeed.
The old Soviet system has broken down, and some
of the basic elements of democratic development
are in place. People are free to say what they
think, vote for whom they please, and (for the
most part) worship freely. But the democratic
fragments are not institutionalized -- and with
the exception of the Communist Party, political
parties are weak.
Of cours
e, in his last months as president, few
paid attention to Boris Yeltsin's decrees.
Arguably, the Russian government has been mired
in inaction and stagnation.
Russia's economic troubles and its high-level
corruption have been widely discussed. Its
economy is not becoming a market but is
mutating into something else. Widespread barter,
banks that are not banks, billions of rubles
stashed abroad and in mattresses at home, and
bizarre privatization schemes that have enriched
the so-called reformers give Moscow's economy a
medieval tinge.
The problem for U.S. policy is that the Clinton
administration's ongoing embrace of Yeltsin and
those who were thought to be reformers around
him quite simply failed. Clearly, the United
States was obliged to deal with the head of state,
and Yeltsin was Russia's president.
But U.S. support for democracy and economic
reform became support for Yeltsin. His agenda
became the American agenda.
The United States certified that reform was
taking place in Russia where it was not,
continuing to disburse money from the
International Monetary Fund in the absence of any
evidence of serious change.
Thus, some curious privatization methods were
hailed as economic liberalization; the looting of
the country's assets by powerful people either
went unnoticed or was ignored. The realities in
Russia simply did not accord with the
administration's script about Russian economic
reform.
The United States should not be faulted for trying
to help. But, as the Russian reformer Grigori
Yavlinsky has said, the United States should have
"told the truth" about what was happening. Now
we have a dual credibility problem -- with
Russians and with Americans.
There are signs of life in the Russian economy.
The financial crash of August 1998 forced import
substitution, and domestic production has
increased as the resilient Russian people have
taken matters into their own
hands. Rising oil
prices have helped as well.
But these are short-term fixes. There is no longer
a consensus in America or Europe on what to do
next with Russia.
Russia's economic future is now in the hands of
the Russians. The country is not without assets.
It is up to Russia to make structural reforms,
particularly concerning the rule of law and the
tax codes, so that investors will provide the
capital needed for economic growth.
But the cultural changes ultimately needed to
sustain a functioning civil society and a
market-based economy may take a generation.
Western openness to Russia's people, particularly
its youth, through exchange programs, contact
with the private sector and educational
opportunities, can help that process. It is also
important to engage the leadership of Russia's
diverse regions, where economic and social
policies are pursued independently of Moscow.
In the meantime, U.S. policy must concentrate on
the important security agenda with Russia.
-- First, it must recognize that American
security is threatened less by Russia's strength
than by its weakness and incoherence. This
suggests immediate attention to the safety and
security of Moscow's nuclear forces and
stockpile.
The Nunn-Lugar program (the centerpiece of the
U.S. effort to assist Russia in ensuring the
security of nuclear weapons and materials)
should be funded fully and pursued aggressively.
(Because American contractors do most of the
work, the risk of the diversion of funds is low.)
-- Second, Washington must begin a
comprehensive discussion with Moscow on the
changing nuclear threat. Much has been made by
Russian military officials about their increased
reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of their
declining conventional readiness.
The Russian deterrent is more than adequate
against the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and vice versa.
But that fact need no longer be enshrined in a
treaty t
hat is almost 30 years old and is a relic
of a profoundly adversarial relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was intended to
prevent the development of national missile
defenses in the Cold War security environment.
Today, the principal concerns are nuclear threats
from the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world and
the possibility of unauthorized releases as
nuclear weapons spread.
Moscow, in fact, lives closer to those threats
than Washington does. It ought to be possible to
engage the Russians in a discussion of the
changed threat environment, their possible
responses and the relationship of strategic
offensive-force reductions to the deployment of
defenses.
In addition, Moscow should understand that any
possibilities for sharing technology or
information in these areas would depend heavily
on its record -- problematic to date -- on the
proliferation of ballistic-missile and other
technologies related to weapons of mass
destruction.
It would be foolish in the extreme to share
defenses with Moscow if it either leaks or
deliberately transfers weapons technologies to
the very states against which America is
defending.
-- Finally, the United States needs to recognize
that Russia is a great power, and that we will
always have interests that conflict as well as
coincide.
As prime minister, Vladimir Putin used the
Chechnya war to stir nationalism at home while
fueling his own political fortunes. The Russian
military has been uncharacteristically blunt and
vocal in asserting its duty to defend the integrity
of the Russian Federation -- an unwelcome
development in civil- military relations.
The long-term effect of the war on Russia's
political culture should not be underestimated.
This war has affected relations between Russia
and its neighbors in the Caucasus, as the Kremlin
has been hurling charges of harboring and
abetting Chechen terrorists against states as
diverse as Saudi Arabia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
The war is a reminder of the vulnerability of the
small, new states around Russia and of America's
interest in their independence. If they can become
stronger, they will be less tempting to Russia.
But much depends on the ability of these states
to reform their economies and political systems
-- a process, to date, whose success is mixed at
best.
Meanwhile, America can exercise power without
arrogance and pursue its interests without
hectoring and bluster. That has been America's
special role in the past, and it should be again as
we enter the new century.
Condoleezza Rice, former Stanford University
provost, has been picked by President-elect
George W. Bush to become his national security
adviser. A full-length version of this article
appeared in the January-February 2000 issue of
Foreign Affairs magazine.
題名には必ず「阿修羅さんへ」と記述してください。