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投稿者 IISS 日時 2000 年 10 月 20 日 14:22:28:
回答先: 世界の紛争、今年に入って増加傾向＝シンクタンク（ロイター） 投稿者 ＦＰ親衛隊國家保安本部 日時 2000 年 10 月 20 日 11:55:56:
The Military Balance 2000-2001
Remarks by Dr John Chipman, IISS Director, at the The Military Balance Press Conference
19 October 2000, 10:30 A.M. Welcome to the launch of The Military Balance 2000/2001. As usual, this is a densely packed product, providing its
users with the best available information on military forces and defence budgets of 169 countries. The book also provides a host of tables and analyses
that highlight important military trends. We know that the book is used extensively, and we hope that as often as possible it is used in conjunction with
our many other publications. I want to take the opportunity of this press conference to remind everyone of a new product that the Institute launched a few
weeks ago called Strategic Pointers. These are brief essays of about 300 words that explain breaking news. They appear on our web page
www.iiss.org two or three times a week and we are working to bring it up to a rate of one a day. Recent pointers have covered violence in Gaza,
China and the WTO, the fall of Milosovic, the grenade attack on MI6 headquarters and many other issues. Newspapers that have Strategic Comments
contracts with us are free to reproduce complete Strategic Pointers in their newspapers ﾐ all articles are signed by an IISS member ﾐ other newspapers
are free to use them for background or to quote from them selectively. All of our publications, except The Military Balance, will be available full text, as
soon as they are published in the members' area of our web page as from January. I would urge all of you who are members of the IISS or whose news
organisations are members, to get a password from our staff so that you can access the members area daily and follow our products as they come out.
Here, today, we are concentrating on The Military Balance and I am delighted that joining me today to answer your questions are the Editor of The
Military Balance and Assistant Director, Terry Taylor; Steve Simon, Assistant Director; Klaus Becher, Senior Fellow; Yezid Sayigh, Consulting Senior
Fellow; James Miles Editor of Strategic Comments; Dana Allin, Editor of Survival, Jonathan Stevenson, Deputy Editor of Strategic Survey; and
Oksana Antonenko, Research Fellow. Also available is the team that compiled The Military Balance: Andrew Brookes, Philip Mitchell, Joanna Kidd
and Mark Stoker.
IISS Chart of Armed Conflict 2000
The reason that The Military Balance remains such a vital publication is that armed conflict continues and the threat of the use of force remains an
elemental part of diplomatic arsenals. Our Chart of Armed Conflict this year displays information relating to 27 internal conflicts and nine international
conflicts. Off our list of internal conflicts this year are Turkey/PKK and East Timor. Back on are Chechnya, Sierra Leone and the Philippines. Off our
list of international conflicts is Eritrea and Ethiopia. T
he Chart continues to make grim viewing.
At least 100,000 deaths world-wide have been directly caused by armed conflict over the past year, with 60% of them in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The persistence of considerable internal and international conflict has intensified the international debate on the right conditions for military intervention
and the proper methods for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
Peacekeeping
In September the UN released the so-called Brahimi report on peacekeeping. It points to well-known weaknesses in the UN machinery for mounting and
sustaining field operations. It remains the case that the UN continues to overreach, approving ambitious mandates and deploying inadequately supported
forces in volatile situations. Operations in both Sierra Leone and the Congo, for example, breach many of the principles advanced in the Brahimi report.
The long-term aim of the UN operation in Sierra Leone is unclear, and the capacity of the UN to make a sensible contribution to what is a hugely
unstable situation in the Congo is questionable. Member states are incapable of producing the sometimes very large contingents that a proper operation
would require. Equally, the quality of cease-fires, truces, military disengagements and peace arrangements is often too poor to support UN deployments
in peacekeeping mode.
The practice of UN peacekeeping remains uncomfortably divorced from the now well-developed theory of how it should be done.
European defence
The Military Balance duly records the declaratory steps taken to improve the defence capacities of EU states, and this is another area where theory is too
far removed from likely practice. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the EU made a commitment to develop an autonomous capacity to take
decisions and to conduct EU-led operations, with a headline goal of an independent rapid-reaction force of 50,000-60,000 troops by 2003.
But Europe's defence expenditure, in constant US dollars has continued to fall sharply. Spending on defence procurement in NATO-Europe is at an
historic low. Since 1995, this figure has gone up 6.5% in the US; in NATO-Europe it has gone down 2.2%. There is little sign that European treasuries
and parliaments will be willing to give the necessary financial support to the European defence enterprise. Our conclusion is that The EU-wide
rapid-reaction force advertised in Helsinki is unlikely to be available because of the slow pace of force restructuring and the absence of a fiscal
commitment to strengthening defence capabilities.
Given the emphasis that European politicians have placed on building defence capacities, their failure to commit adequate resources to this task may well
lead to another round of burden-sharing debates with the US, if European weaknesses are again exposed in some future crisis.
Yugoslavia
Much of the political impetu
s for the attempt to repair European defence weaknesses came from the crisis in Yugoslavia. There is little doubt that the
election of Ko?tunica to the federal presidency improves the prospects for a long-term peace in the Balkans.
With his election, the Montenegrin crisis has been usefully defused. Until a few weeks ago, there was a real prospect of a military conflict again
potentially drawing in NATO military intervention. With Ko?tunica's election, that danger has all but vanished. While Montenegro faces difficult
decisions about how to manage the relationship with Serbia, it can now take decisions without fear of military provocation from the Yugoslav army or a
Belgrade inspired coup.
The situation in Kosovo remains very delicate. Kosovo's minority Serbs may still be threatened by Albanian extremists, and a permanent political
settlement acceptable to a broad range of Kosovars is still not on the table. This means that KFOR will have to stay put in its present numbers. It is also
far too early to contemplate a withdrawal of the American contingent. A joint Euro-American deployment remains necessary to ensure a joint diplomatic
approach to the many remaining political questions that need to be resolved for a settlement to take shape.
The fall of Milosovic should inspire the leadership in Europe and the US, acting where possible in concert with Russia, to redouble its efforts to find a
comprehensive solution to the many Balkan issues that remain open. Too great an investment has been made in the region for it to be left to sort things
out without outside encouragement.
Russia
After a period during which the Russian political-military leadership under Yeltsin gave increasing importance to the centrality of nuclear weapons in the
Russian force posture, this has now changed under Putin. He has concluded that the defence ministry's previous emphasis on nuclear weapons,
highlighted in various documents, has not served Russia's actual needs. Funding for land forces will go up and the number of permanent-readiness units
will be increased.
During the latest Chechen campaign, the Russian armed forces were able to achieve a better coordination between army, air force and interior forces.
Deployed forces, that had a higher professional component than in the 1994-1996 campaign, operated with greater effectiveness, though excessive force
was used and the number of civilian casualties was unacceptably high by any standard. Once the conflict took on a more low intensity character, the
futility of seeking a military solution to this problem was painfully exposed.
Against this background, the general staff concluded that Russia needs to improve the readiness of its armed forces and improve their equipment. On 11
August 2000, the Russian Security Council took the decision to give priority to conventional forces that have been significantly weakened
by ill-planned
reforms attempted in the 1990s.
At the same time, the Russian Security Council in August took the decision not to replace ICBMs that have reached the end of their operational life. Over
time strategic nuclear warheads will be reduced to between 1,000 and 1,500 in number. Russia is unlikely to invest resources in maintaining its nuclear
forces at START II levels. A degree of unilateral disarmament will take place, whatever progress is made on START III. These facts will naturally
continue to play in to Russia's attitudes towards NMD.
National Missile Defence
Indeed, in the military strategic field, many months of the past year were marked by simmering US-European tensions over American NMD research and
potential deployment. The announcement by President Clinton that he would postpone a decision on development and leave a decision to his successor
means just that.
A Gore administration will, after a brief review, likely commit itself to the Clinton plan, which in the Democrats' view does little damage to the ABM
Treaty. They will work with Russia and European allies to seek the necessary revisions.
A Bush administration would initiate a major review of NMD options and would likely consider other approaches like boost phase intercept. Most Bush
advisors believe the ABM treaty to be a relic of the Cold War that would be worth scrapping to pave the way for a technologically ambitious system with
broad coverage.
Either way, there will be moves towards NMD deployment, though in all likelihood, technological challenges will remain high. The political issue of
NMD will remain on the agenda. Whatever plan is adopted, Europeans will insist on a degree of negotiated Russian acquiescence to US plans. This may,
but need not, take the form of a renegotiated ABM treaty. Whatever route is taken, the key will be to avoid a clash with the Russians by close
consultations with them.
China and East Asia
The PRC issued another White Paper on 16 October 2000. In it, China, asserts the need modestly to increase its military capability in light of what it calls
the further development of hegemonism and power politics: a clear reference to the US. It also repeats the threat to use force against Taiwan if the island
should refuse indefinitely to engage in reunification talks.
Because of its clear statements on Taiwan and its references to the need to counter 'hegemonism and power politics', this White Paper will be seized on
by those in the US and elsewhere who are concerned about China's rising power. It is bound to reinforce the view among some that Chinese military
policies and deployments require a robust response in the interests of deterrence. This is so, despite the many assurances in the paper about the purely
defensive character of Chinese policy because of the fact that it remains silent on sensitive issues.
The paper s
ays very little about China's military acquisition programme or about China's build-up of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Both of
these issues have caused concern in Taiwan and Japan. China's diffidence on these issues is bound to lead to misunderstandings. It will become
increasingly important, especially in light of the political developments on the Korean peninsula, for the three East Asian powers, China, Japan and
Korea, to find more ways to promote military transparency between themselves. China will be very reluctant to entertain such discussions, but outside
powers should continue to press China to open up more lines of discussion on military doctrine and holdings, precisely to allay the many fears held in
the region about Chinese intentions.
The Middle East
Over the last few weeks the Israelis and the Palestinians have exchanged instincts for martyrdom and instincts for punishment and served to prove one of
the many paradoxes of the Middle East peace process, namely that the process is animated and sustained by insecurity and stagnates and dies during
extended periods of quiescence. Perhaps, in two weeks time, Israelis and Palestinians will return to the negotiating table. But many of the assumptions
of the earlier Camp David process have been severely challenged by the present difficulties. Security cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian police
forces; the provision of security for each other's holy sites, the prospect of Palestinian refugees living within Israeli borders, or of Israeli settlements
continuing under Palestinian sovereignty: all of these have been thrown into question by the recent events. The fact of violence has brought American
pressure on the parties to re-start a dialogue, but it will take a special effort of imagination to create confidence in the terms on which the previous process
was conducted.
Conclusion
Political leaders acting in the political-military sphere spent another year caught trying to align theory with practice, treaties with reality and rhetoric with
facts. The UN produced a useful report on the principles that should guide the organisation of peacekeeping, but these are more likely to be honoured in
the breach than in the observance. Effective peacekeeping in complex cases will rarely take place, except outside of the UN context when one or more
powers decide that it is in their strategic interests to impose peace. Many continue to argue for the integrity of the CFE, ABM and NPT treaties and yet
new security perceptions and the rules of practical politics invite leaders to accept the circumvention of these treaty norms and to work with the results.
Arms control is going to take place more by active measures and diplomatic arrangements than by treaty negotiation. European leaders speak of a
European defence capacity, but have not voted the funds to finance it. European defence i
n all but the most trivial of cases will remain a transatlantic
affair. The IISS will continue to do its best, through the realities depicted in The Military Balance, and the analyses provided in our many other
publications, to distinguish, for the wider public, strategic theory and strategic reality. Thank you.
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