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件名：MH17撃墜 オランダ安全委員会の報告書 PDF279頁 要約抜粋(英語)
出所：http://cdn.onderzoeksraad.nl/documents/report-mh17-crash-en.pdf
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SUMMARY
The crash of flight MH17 raised many questions. What happened exactly? Why was the aeroplane flying across an area where an armed conflict was being fought? The Dutch Safety Board answers these questions in this report; it does not address questions of blame and liability.
Causes of the crash
On 17 July 2014, at 13.20(15.20 CET) a Boeing 777-200 with the Malaysia Airlines nationality and registration mark 9M-MRD disappeared to the west of the TAMAK air navigation waypoint in Ukraine. A notification containing this information was sent by the Ukrainian National Bureau of Air Accident Investigation (NBAAI) on 18 July 2014, at approximately 06.00 (08.00 CET). The NBAAI was notified by the Ukrainian State Air Traffic Service Enterprise (UkSATSE) that communication with flight MH17 had been lost. A signal from the aeroplane ́s Emergency Locator Transmitter had been received and its approximate position had been determined.The aeroplane impacted the ground in the eastern part of Ukraine. The wreckage was spread over several sites near the villages of Hrabove, Rozsypne and Petropavlivka. Six wreckage sites were identified, spread over about 50 km2. Most of the wreckage was located in three of these sites to the south-west of the village of Hrabove. This is about 8.5 km east of the last known position of the aeroplane in flight. At two sites, post-impact
fires had occurred.
All 298 persons on board lost their lives.
The in-flight disintegration of the aeroplane near the Ukrainian/Russian border was the result of the detonation of a warhead. The detonation occurred above the left hand side of the cockpit. The weapon used was a 9N314M-model warhead carried on the 9M38-series of missiles, as installed on the Buk surface-to-air missile system.Other scenarios that could have led to the disintegration of the aeroplane were considered, analysed and excluded based on the evidence available.The airworthy aeroplane was under control of Ukrainian air traffic control and was operated by a licensed and qualified flight crew.
Flight route over conflict zone
Flight MH17 was shot down over the eastern part of Ukraine, where an armed conflict broke out in April 2014. At first this conflict took place mainly on the ground, but as from the end of April 2014 it expanded into the airspace over the conflict zone: Ukrainian armed forces’ helicopters, transport aeroplanes and fighters were downed.On 14 July, the Ukrainian authorities reported that a military aeroplane, an AntonovAn-26, had been shot down above the eastern part of Ukraine. On 17 July, the authorities announced that a Sukhoi Su-25 had been shot down over the area on 16 July. According
to the authorities, both aircraft were shot down at an altitude that could only have been reached by powerful weapon systems. The weapon systems cited by the authorities, a medium-range surface-to-air missile or an air-to-air missile, could reach the cruising altitude of civil aeroplanes. Consequently they pose a threat to civil aviation.Although (Western) intelligence services, politicians and diplomats established the intensification of fighting in the eastern part of Ukraine, on the ground as well as in the air, it was not recognised that as a result there was an increased risk to civil aeroplanes flying over the conflict zone at cruising altitude. The focus was mainly on military
activities, and the geopolitical consequences of the conflict.
Ukraine’s airspace management
With regard to airspace management Ukraine is responsible for the safety of aeroplanes in that airspace. On 6 June 2014, the airspace above the eastern part of Ukraine was restricted to civil aviation from the ground up to an altitude of 26,000 feet (FL260). This enabled military aeroplanes to fly at an altitude that was considered safe from attacks from the ground and eliminated the risk that they would encounter civil aeroplanes, which flew above FL260. The authorities automatically assumed that aeroplanes flying at a higher altitude than that considered safe for military aeroplanes, were also safe.
On 14 July 2014, the Ukrainian authorities increased the upper limit of the restricted airspace imposed on civil aviation to an altitude of 32,000 feet (FL320). The exact under-lying reason for this decision remains unclear.
The Ukrainian authorities did not consider closing the airspace over the eastern part of Ukraine to civil aviation completely. The statements made by the Ukrainian authorities on 14 and 17 July 2014, related to the military aeroplanes being shot down, mentioned the use of weapon systems that can reach the cruising altitude of civil aeroplanes. In the judgment of the Dutch Safety Board, these statements provided sufficient reason for closing the airspace over the conflict zone as a precaution.
Choice of flight route by Malaysia Airlines and other airlines
Malaysia Airlines assumed that the unrestricted airspace over Ukraine was safe. The situation in the eastern part of Ukraine did not constitute a reason for reconsidering the route. The operator stated that it did not possess any information that flight MH17, or other flights, faced any danger when flying over Ukraine.10 of 279Not only Malaysia Airlines, but almost all airlines that used routes over the conflict zone continued to do so during the period in which the armed conflict was expanding into the airspace. On the day of the crash alone, 160 flights were conducted above the eastern part of Ukraine
-until the airspace was closed.
Other states and the state of departure (the Netherlands)
The Chicago Convention provides states with the option of imposing a flight prohibition or restrictions on airlines and issuing recommendations related to the use of foreign airspace. Some states, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, use this option with regard to their resident airlines. Although flight MH17 took off from Dutch soil the Netherlands did not bear any formal responsibility for the flight, because it concerned a non-Dutch airline. The fact that Malaysia Airlines was operating the flight as KLM’s code share partner did not provide any legal authority either.During the period in which the conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine expanded into the
airspace over the conflict zone, from the end of April 2014 up to the crash of flight MH17, not a single state or international organisation explicitly warned of any risks to civil aviation and not a single state prohibited its airlines or airmen from using the airspace over the area or imposed other restrictions.
At the Dutch Safety Board’s request, the Dutch Review Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) examined whether the Dutch intelligence and security services possessed any information that could have been important for the safety of flight MH17. The services had no indication that the warring factions intended to shoot down civil aeroplanes. The services did not have any information that the groups that were fighting against the Ukrainian government in the eastern part of Ukraine possessed medium or long-range surface-to-air missiles.
Possibilities for improvement
The crash of MH17 demonstrates than an unrestricted airspace is not, by definition, safe if the state managing that airspace is dealing with an armed conflict. The reality is that states involved in an armed conflict rarely close their airspace. This means that the principle of sovereignty related to airspace management can give rise to vulnerability. In the Board’s opinion, states involved in armed conflicts should give more consideration to closing their airspace as a precaution. More effective incentives are needed to encourage them to do so.Airline operators may not assume in advance that an unrestricted airspace above a conflict zone is safe. The fundamental principle currently adopted by operators is that they use the airspace, unless doing so is demonstrably unsafe. In their risk analyses, operators should take greater account of uncertainties and risk-increasing factors, such as when a conflict expands into the airspace. The current regulations do not stipulate that operators shall assess the risks involved in overflying conflict areas.Operators themselves should gather more information to be able to perform an adequate risk assessment. This information can largely be acquired by consulting open sources, but in the case of conflict zones operators also need confidential information from states with intelligence capabilities. Vital in this respect is the sharing of information between states, between states and operators and between operators.Not only the gathering of information, but also combining information in the fields of safety and security, as well as on developments on the ground and in the air proves important. In this regard, international regulations (the Chicago Convention) are currently too divided across these different fields. It was established that there are gaps between
the various responsibilities, for which a solution should be found.
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//memo
私的な理由でもありますが、とりあえず要約だけでもパッと読めるように、貼り付けておきました。ＰＤＦのほうが、だんぜん読みやすいので、ぜひそちらをご覧ください。
*ロシア製ミサイルで撃墜と結論 マレーシア機最終報告
http://www.47news.jp/news/2015/10/post_20151013220201.html
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:2015/10/13 22:00 【共同通信】【ヒルゼ・レイエン空軍基地（オランダ）共同】ウクライナ東部で昨年７月起きたマレーシア航空機撃墜をめぐり、国際調査を主導したオランダ安全委員会は１３日、最終報告を発表、ロシア製の地対空ミサイルで撃墜されたと結論づけた。 安全委は、乗客乗員２９８人が犠牲となった悲劇の責任追及には関わらないとし、誰がミサイルを発射したかについては触れなかった。 同機が紛争地域の上空を飛行した問題については、他の民間機も飛行しており、ウクライナ当局が予防策として空域を閉鎖すべきだったとした。:
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