ハマス支持率が上昇／イスラエルの攻撃逆効果
「しんぶん赤旗」　2014年9月4日　日刊紙　７面

　【カイロ＝小泉大介】パレスチナの民間機関・「政策調査研究センター（PSR）」は２日、パレスチナ人の間でイスラム武装抵抗組織ハマスに対する支持が高まっていることを示す最新の世論調査結果を発表しました。

　ハマスをめぐってはこの間、イスラエル軍がロケット弾発射やトンネルの破壊を口実に７月８日から50日間にわたりパレスチナ自治区ガザを猛攻撃しました。しかし、2150人（大半は民間人）ものパレスチナ人を殺害した攻撃は、逆にハマスの活動基盤を強める結果となっているといえます。

　今回のPSRの世論調査は、イスラエル軍とハマスが長期停戦で合意した8月26日から５日間かけて実施し、ガザとヨルダン川西岸のパレスチナ人1270人が回答しました。

　「パレスチナ自治政府議長選挙が今日実施されたらどちらに投票するか」の問いに、ハマスのガザの最高指導者であるハニヤ氏に投票すると答えた人が61％に達し、前回６月の調査から20％増加しました。一方、現自治政府議長で、パレスチナ解放機構（PLO）主流派ファタハを率いるアッバス氏に投票するとしたのは32％で21％減となりました。

　パレスチナ評議会（国会に相当）選挙については」「ハマスに投票する」が46％、「ファタハに投票する」が31％でした。

　また、先のガザをめぐるイスラエル軍との戦闘でハマスが勝利したと回答した人は79％に。ガザ封鎖解除の条
件としてイスラエルが求めているハマスの武装放棄については、57％が反対を表明しました。前回調査では反対は33％でした。

==============================================

ソースの英文記事はこちら　⇒

Special Gaza War Poll（PSR）
2 September 2014​
http://www.pcpsr.org/en/special-gaza-war-poll

Gaza
War ends with a victory for Hamas leading to a great increase in its
popularity and the popularity of its approach of armed resistance: for
the first time since 2006, Hamas wins parliamentary and presidential
elections if they were to take place today while West Bankers support
transferring Hamas’ approach to the West Bank

These
are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center
for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
between 26-30 August 2014. The period before the poll witnessed the
eruption of the Gaza War which was preceded by the kidnapping and
killing of three Israelis. More than 2000 Palestinians, mostly
civilians, were killed during the war. About 70 Israelis, mostly from
the military, were killed during the war. Our fieldwork started on the
last day of the war and continued during the first four days of the
ceasefire.  This press release covers public perception of the war, who
came out a winner, the ceasefire agreement, targeting of civilians,
evaluation of the performance of various Palestinian actors during the
war, and war impact on reconciliation. It also covers Palestinian
elections, the internal balance of power, the June kidnapping and
killing of the three Israelis, and others. Total size of the sample is
1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations.
Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings
of this special Gaza War poll highlight dramatic changes in public
attitudes regarding major issues. It goes without saying that the war
was the major driver behind these changes. As expected, and as we saw in
previous instances during and immediately after Israeli wars with
Hamas, findings show a spike in the popularity of Hamas and its leaders
and a major decline in the popularity of Fatah and president Abbas. 
But, as in previous cases, these changes might be temporary and things
might revert in the next several months to where they were before the
war.

It
is worth noting that the size of the change in favor of Hamas is
unprecedented since 2006. Indeed, if presidential elections were to take
place today, Ismail Haniyeh would easily win over Abbas and Hamas would
win the largest percentage of the popular vote in parliamentary
elections. The overwhelming majority of the public views Hamas as the
winner and Israel as the loser in this war. Furthermore, a similar
majority views Hamas’ approach of armed confrontation with Israel as the
most effective means of ending Israeli occupation. Indeed, an
overwhelming majority of West Bankers wants to transfer “Hamas’ way” to
the West Bank and rejects the demand to disarm the Islamist group or to
disband the other Gazan armed groups. Findings also indicate that the
public see Iran, Turkey, and Qatar as the most instrumental in
supporting Hamas and helping Gazans remain steadfast against the Israeli
attacks. By contrast, Egypt’s role is seen as week and unhelpful.
Indeed, a majority believes that Egypt played a negative role in the
ceasefire negotiations.

Finally,
despite the fact that the Palestinian Authority, Abbas, and prime
minister Rami al Hamdallah received little positive evaluation for their
role during the war, a majority tends to give the reconciliation
government a big role in the affairs of the Gaza Strip in the post war
period. For example, a majority wants it to control border crossings and
to supervise police and security sector employees; the largest
percentage wants it to control borders with Israel and Egypt and to lead
the reconstruction process in the Strip.

(1) Gaza War:

• 79% believe that Hamas has won the Gaza War; 3% believe Israel came out the winner; and 17% believe the two sides were losers.
• 79%
  believe Israel was responsible for the eruption of the Gaza war; 5%
  believe Hamas was responsible; and 12% believe the responsibility lies
  with the two sides.
• 63%
  believe that the ceasefire agreement satisfies Palestinian interests,
  but 34% disagree with that. Moreover, 59% are satisfied with the
  accomplishment gained in the agreement compared to the human and
  material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip; 39% are dissatisfied with
  the accomplishment.
• An
  overwhelming majority of 86% support the launching of rockets from the
  Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.
• 60%
  say that Hamas does not launch rockets from populated areas, but 30%
  say it does. 49% think it is justified for Hamas to launch rockets from
  populated areas and 46% disagree with that. Percentage of those who
  believe that launching rockets from populated areas is unjustified
  increases to 59% among Gazans while standing at 38% among West Bankers.
• Only
  30% believe that Hamas should warn Israeli civilians in the specific
  targeted areas before launching its rockets; 68% believe it should not
  do so.
• 57%
  oppose disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip while 25% support such a
  measure after the ending of the siege and the conduct of elections; 13%
  support this measure but only after reaching a peace agreement with
  Israel. In our June 2014 poll, only 33% said it opposed disarming and
  dissolving armed groups in the Gaza Strip.
• Despite
  the current opposition to disarming Gaza groups, a majority of 54%
  support and 40% oppose Abbas’ position that argues that the
  reconciliation government must be committed to existing agreements
  reached between the PLO and Israel and rejects Hamas position that
  opposes Abbas’ argument.  In our previous poll in June, support for
  Abbas’ position stood at 59%.
• Yet,
  only 43%, compared to 53% last June, agrees with the statement that the
  inclusion of Hamas into the PLO means an implicit acceptance by Hamas
  of the PLO peace program and the existing agreements with Israel.
• About
  two thirds (64%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have
  given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli
  attacks and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war;
  only 9% believe Egypt too has contributed to that. Iran comes on top
  with 28%, followed by Turkey (21%) and Qatar (15%); 25% select other
  countries or actors.
• Moreover,
  only 25% describe Egypt’s role in the ceasefire negotiations as
  positive while a majority of 52% describe it as negative and 22% as
  neutral.
• 94%
  are satisfied with Hamas’ military performance in confronting Israeli
  forces; 78% are satisfied with its defense of civilians in Gaza; and 89%
  are satisfied with its media and communication performance.
• In
  an evaluation of the performance of the various Palestinian actors
  during the war, Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah comes at the bottom,
  with 35% giving him a positive rating. The PA comes next with 36%, Abbas
  with 39%, the reconciliation government with 43%, and the PLO with 44%.
  On top comes Khalid Mish’al with 78% approval and Hamas with 88%
  approval. The approval rating for Abbas rises to 49% in the Gaza Strip
  and drops to 33% in the West Bank. By contrast, Khalid Mish’al’s
  approval rating drops in the Gaza Strip to 70% and rises to 83% in the
  West Bank.

(2) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza after the war:

• Optimism
  about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split rises to
  69%; 28% remain pessimistic. In our last poll in June 62% were
  optimistic.
• Three
  months after its establishment, 46% are satisfied with the performance
  of the reconciliation government and 46% are dissatisfied. Indeed, 60%
  prefer to get rid of the reconciliation government and form a unity
  government in which leaders and politicians from all major factions
  would participate; 34% oppose such a step and prefer to keep the
  reconciliation government. The preference for a unity government drops
  significantly to 49% in the Gaza Strip and increases to 66% in the West
  Bank.
• A
  majority of 51% wants to place the reconciliation government in charge
  of the Rafah crossing, but 38% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control.
  In the Gaza Strip, 64% want to place the Rafah crossing under the
  control of the reconciliation government and only 25% want it under
  Hamas’ control. The same, with minor variation, applies to control over
  the crossings with Israel.
• 48%
  want the reconciliation government to control the border with Egypt and
  39% want it under Hamas’ control. The same, with minor variation,
  applies to the border with Israel; with 45% in favor of keeping the
  border under the control of the reconciliation government and 41% say
  they should stay under Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, 56% say
  borders with Egypt should come under the control of the reconciliation
  government and 49% say the border with Israel too should come under the
  control of the reconciliation government.
• 44%
  believe the responsibility for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip
  should be placed in the hands of the reconciliation government while 39%
  prefer to place it in Hamas’ hands.
• 83%
  want the reconciliation government to pay the salary of the Gaza public
  sector that served the previous Hamas government; 13% are opposed to
  that.
• 65%
  want the reconciliation government to be in charge of supervising the
  work of the employees of Gaza security sector who worked in the past
  under Hamas government; 29% disagree with that, wanting instead to keep
  these employees under Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, the demand for
  placing the security sector employees under the control of the
  reconciliation government rises to 72% and only 24% want them under
  Hamas’ control.
• Nonetheless,
  72% agree with Hamas’ demand that security and police should remain
  under its control during the next 6 months, up until the elections; 24%
  disagree with that. Two months ago 66% agreed with that.

(3) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• If
  new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated,
  Haniyeh, for the first time since we have started asking about his
  popularity about 8 years ago, would receive a majority of 61% and Abbas
  would receive 32%. Vote for Haniyeh stands at 53% in the Gaza Strip and
  66% in the West Bank. Abbas receives 43% in the Gaza Strip and 25% in
  the West Bank. Two months ago, Abbas received the support of 53% in the
  West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Haniyeh 41%. The rate of participation
  in such elections would reach 71%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas decreases from 50% two months ago to 39% in this poll.
• If
  presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the
  former would receive 45% and the latter would receive 49% of the
  participants’ votes. This is the first time in 8 years in which Haniyeh
  receives more votes than Barghouti. In our previous poll, Barghouti
  received the support of 58% and Haniyeh 38%. The rate of participation
  in this case would reach 77%.
• If
  presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan
  Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Haniyeh would receive 48% of the vote,
  Barghouti 29%, and Abbas 19%. The rate of participation in this case
  would reach 80%. In our previous poll in June 2014, Barghouti received
  36% of the vote, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 28%.
• If
  new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all
  factions, 78% say they would participate in such elections. Of those
  who would participate, 46% say they would vote for Hamas and 31% say
  they would vote for Fatah, 7% would vote for all other third parties
  combined, and 17% are undecided. Two months ago, vote for Hamas stood at
  32% and for Fatah at 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in
  this poll at 44% and in the West Bank at 47%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza
  Strip stands in this poll at 36% and in the West Bank at 27%.
• A
  majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months
  from today, 14% want them to take place after a year or more, and 12% do
  not want elections.

(4) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive
  evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 24% two months
  ago to 20% today, and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank
  remains almost unchanged at 32%.
• Perception
  of safety and security in the Gaza Strip drops dramatically from 64%
  two months ago to 22% in this poll. In the West Bank perception of
  safety and security drops from 51% to 47% during the same period.
• Findings
  show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to
  other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands
  at 20%.
• For
  the first time ever, Hamas’ official TV station, Al Aqsa, is the one
  with the most viewership (37%) in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
  followed by al Jazeera (21%), Palestine TV (16%), Ma’an-Mix (11%), and
  al Arabiya (5%).
• In
  the West Bank, 35% of the respondents expected economic conditions in
  their area to improve and a similar percentage (33%) expected them to
  worsen. But in the Gaza Strip 56% expected economic conditions to
  improve and only 20% expected them to worsen.

(5) Peace Process:

• Only
  47% believe the chances for the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli
  negotiations are medium or high; 51% believe the chances are low or
  non-existent.
• The
  public is divided over the two-state solution: 49% support it and 50%
  oppose it. In our last poll two months ago, 54% supported this solution
  and 46% opposed it.
• A
  majority of 53% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective
  means to establish a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Only
  22% believe negotiation is the best means to establish a Palestinian
  state and 20% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most
  effective route to statehood.
• 62%
  say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli
  settlement expansion and 35% think it is still practical. Yet, only 24%
  support the alternative one-state solution; 75% reject the one-state
  solution. These findings indicate a drop in the support for the
  one-state solution which two months ago stood at 31%.
• 81%
  are worried that they could be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or
  that their homes would be demolished and land confiscated. Only 19% are
  not worried.
• An
  overwhelming majority of 81% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration
  is to annex the land occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny
  them their political rights. By contrast, 63% believe that the long term
  aspiration of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO is to recover part
  or all of the land occupied in 1967.
• 57%
  of the public say that they supported the June 2014 kidnapping of the
  three Israelis in the West Bank when that incident took place. Support
  for the kidnapping reached 67% in the Gaza Strip and only 45% in the
  West Bank.
• Similarly,
  a majority of 54% supported the killing of the three kidnapped Israelis
  and 42% opposed it. Support for the killing reached 69% in the Gaza
  Strip and only 42% in the West Bank. 52% of the West Bankers opposed the
  killing of the three kidnapped Israelis.
• The
  public is divided over the identity of those who carried out the
  kidnapping and the killing of the three Israelis: 32% accuse Israel, 30%
  accuse Hamas, 21% believe a Palestinian acted on his own, and 2% accuse
  Fatah.
•  In
  the absence of viable negotiations, 85% support joining more
  international organizations; 84% support joining the International
  Criminal Court; 62% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance; 60%
  support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support a dissolution of the
  PA; and 24% support abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a
  one-state solution. It is worth mentioning that two months ago only 41%
  indicated support for a return to an armed intifada.
• 61%
  believe that massive popular demonstrations could contribute to ending
  the Israeli occupation. But a larger majority of 72% favors the transfer
  of Hamas’ armed approach to the West Bank. Support for emulating Hamas
  in the West Bank stands at 70% among West Bankers and 74% among Gazans.
• 82%
  say they participate in boycotting Israeli goods that have local
  alternatives and 18% say they do not participate in the boycott. An
  overwhelming majority believes that the boycott movement is effective
  and 11% believe it to be ineffective.
  

コメント
01. 2014年9月04日 10:47:28 : Iw2m5iJn52 テロ国家のイスラエルと対峙するにはハマスは必要不可欠って事です。 ホント、イスラエル及びそれを支持支援する米国・英国は無差別殺人国家だね、、、
02. 2014年9月04日 11:44:51 : 77Kno4ENaM 　イスラエル人とはユダヤ教徒である。 世界中に散らばっていて国家を持たなかった民が、戦後イギリスの勝手なまねで出来上がった国に帰還したのだから、民族的な同一性は厳密ではない。ただひとつ、ユダヤ教徒であればイスラエル人になれる。 　ユダヤ教徒の聖典はいわゆる旧約聖書である。（彼らには新約は無いから旧約という言葉も無いがキリスト教側から言うとこうなる。） 　旧約聖書によりユダヤ人が信じていることは、自分たちは唯一にして全てを創造した神によって選ばれた民であり、イスラエルの地は約束の地であるということ。旧約聖書にはエジプトを出てから約束の地へ入る次第が書かれている。それを読むと、その地は神がイスラエルの民に与えると決めたのだから、そこに住んでいる異邦人は殺し尽くせ、牛も馬も手当たり次第に殺せと命じている。イスラエルの民はそのとおりにした。聖絶せよ、というのが神の命令で、殺戮して根絶やしにするのが聖なる勤めなのだった。ホロコーストでも生き残りは居るし家畜まで殺しはしない。しかしイスラエルの民が約束の地を手に入れた歴史は、徹底的なホロコーストだったのだ。 　だから今、イスラエルがガザの住民にどれだけ犠牲者が出ても全く意に介さないのも、こんな歴史があるし、歴史というより聖典にある正しい行為と同じことをしている、という意識があるからだ。 　西欧の文明国なら戦争になったとき、国内に反対派が必ず出る。まして戦争でなく軍隊による民間人の殺傷となればいくら敵に対してだろうとヤメろという平和団体の声はあがる。 　イスラエルの場合、国民はガザに対して慈悲や反省や救いを全くあげようとはしない。ホロコーストが聖典に乗っているのだから。 　イスラエルはナチスによるホロコーストを責める資格はない。しかしイスラエルは自分たちは神の選民だから別だと信じている。選民にホロコーストは罪だというわけだ。
03. 2014年9月04日 16:58:53 : nJF6kGWndY 国民性や欧米への遠慮などもあるだろうが イスラエルのやり方は中途半端だったということだろうな http://chechennews.org/basic/whatis.htm#pagetop　 マスハドフ政権とその終焉 　第一次チェチェン戦争後の９７年に選挙によって樹立された政権。 この選挙は欧州安全保障協力機構（OSCE）などの選挙監視を受け、 民主的な選挙が実施されたとして、国際的な承認を受けた。また、ロシア政府も承認した正式なチェチェンの 政府である。大統領のアスラン･マスハドフは元ソビエト陸軍の砲兵大佐である。９９年の二度目のチェチェン侵攻以降、 ロシア側はマスハドフ政権に対抗して、親ロシア派の宗教指導者である アフメドハッジ・カディロフ行政長官を首班とする臨時行政府を設置した。 このカディロフ行政長官は2003年10月の選挙で「大統領」に選出されたが、 2004年５月にグロズヌイで爆殺された。その後は同じ親ロシア派のアルハノフ内相が大統領に就任した。 　マスハドフ政権はロシア政府に対し和平交渉をよびかけ、 アメリカ政府やOSCE、欧州評議会などが「チェチェン紛争の政治的解決」をロシアに要求する場合、 その交渉相手は第一にマスハドフを指した。 プーチン政権は９９年にチェチェン戦争を開始した時点で、「マスハドフは大統領として認めない」 という立場を示したが、これには具体的、法的な根拠がない。 　アスラン・マスハドフは、２００５年３月９日、ロシア軍特殊部隊に暗殺された。 ここではその背景と意味を述べたい。 ２月２日、マスハドフ大統領が、チェチェン側部隊に対して、ロシア軍に対する一方的な戦闘行動の停止を命じた。同時に、コメルサント紙のインタビューで、マスハドフは、この停戦がロシアを交渉に呼び込むための「善意の表明だ」と語る。これに対してプーチン政権側は何も反応しなかった。逆にコメルサント紙に対して「テロリストの発言を報じた」などと警告する。停戦は、予定どおり２月２２日まで続いた。停戦のねらいは、チェチェン側のゲリラ部隊のすべてがマスハドフに従っていると、ロシアと国際社会に示すことだった。実現すれば、交渉当事者としての資格が証明される。事実、これに呼応して、ロシアのＮＧＯ「兵士の母親委員会」のメリニコワ委員長らが、マスハドフの代理人であるザカーエフ文化相と、ロンドンの欧州議会代表部で会談した。これにかかった費用は、欧州議会が負担した。ここで「チェチェン戦争に軍事的解決はありえない」と明記した合意文書「チェチェンにおける平和への道」が採択されている。 　民主的に選挙されたマスハドフ大統領が和平交渉を提起していたのは、ロシア側にとって頭痛の種だった。ロシア政府には、国際機関や西側各国政府と市民団体からの圧力が常にあった。そこから逃れるためには、 マスハドフを消すしかなかった。 　マスハドフの死のあと、アブドゥルハリム・サドゥラーエフが新大統領となり、首相を兼任すると発表された。副首相にはロンドンのアフメド・ザカーエフと、野戦司令官のシャミーリ・バサーエフが任命された。この人事についての考察はチェチェンニュース Vol.05 No.23 2005.09.04を参照のこと。 http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%83%81%E3%82%A7%E3%83%81%E3%82%A7%E3%83%B3%E3%81%AE%E6%AD%B4%E5%8F%B2#.E7.8F.BE.E5.9C.A8
04. 2014年9月04日 21:59:28 : Wr5cvCffrE 赤旗っすか〜 ハマスってユダヤが作ったんでしょうが 共産主義もそう ここでギャグを一発 「宮本顕治君は山口県出身なんだよ！」 「岸も佐藤も安倍も菅も、みんなそうなんだよ」 「他にもいっぱいいるよ」 一発じゃなかったねｗ

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