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(回答先: ウォルフレンIIEA講演-概略（2010年4月30日IIEA/YouTube） 投稿者 okonomono 日時 2011 年 1 月 01 日 09:30:52)
ウォルフレンIIEA講演-英語テキスト（2010年4月30日IIEA/YouTube）
Karel van Wolferen on the 'Possible implications for the world of Japans new government'
30 Apr 2010 IIEA / YouTube
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPge6aaqs8Q
"Possible Implications for the World of Japan's New Government"
Karel van Wolferen
2010.04.30 Dublin
IIEA
[00:00 / 50:26] (Good afternoon. Mr. Ambassador, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,) I am pleased to see how Dublin has produced quite a lot of people who are interested in what is going on in Japan today. It's a subject that is almost entirely ignored, interest of the world, which is rather amazing because what is happening in Japan today is of great interest and I think will be of great interest in the future not only for Japan but certainly for the east Asian region and I think for the rest of the world.
[00:45] Now it's a complex subject. Japan, Japanese political system, is a conceptual challenge to understand it. It's taken me a long time and some times I wonder whether I really fathomed how it works, I think I have the illusion but I do a little bit, I know a little bit about it...
[01:30] ... To approach it, I think that I should tell two stories. It's two stories. They are interwoven and if you don't understand one, you can't really understand the other. One is the domestic, political story and the other one is a story of international relations, especially of the trans-pacific relationship, Japan and the United States. I think that because you are interested in international relations and your institute is really based on that, on the idea that people should understand international relations better, I begin there.
[02:10] There we have a trans-pacific relationship that is truly unique in history. If you can find for me another case like it, I'd be very happy, if you tell me, because I have not found any analogical situation to that of Japan and the United States.
[02:35] United States is the world's foremost industrial power. Japan has been number two for a very long time now. At some point people believed Japan would bypass the United States. So industrially they are on a par.
[02:50] Japan, of course, was defeated in the Pacific War in 1945 and that created the basis for the special relationship. But then it continued in a way that was very different from how the political heavyweights in 1945 in Japan had envisioned what the future might bring. But Japan, until very recently, until now, Japan was not so much an ally of the United States. It was treated by Washington as a protectorate and is still being treated as a protectorate. Although it's not quite the same as a protectorate but there is no generally accepted term that describes the reality of it. Japan is very much a vassal state and has been of the United States.
[03:55] The circumstances that attained with that relationship were quite profitable for Japanese planners in the 50s and the 60s and even the 70s because they could devote all their attention to economic expansion, to becoming an economic power. In 1945 there was a return to a situation that had existed in the early part of the 20th century after the Russo-Japanese War when you had two groups of policy thinkers in Japan; one said, "Japan should be a major power in the world through conquest and through having colonies the way Europeans used to do it", and the other group said, "No, let's not do this, let's just make our mark on the world economically." In 1945 that choice no longer existed, therefore, the other project of becoming a major economic power in the world was the obvious choice.
[05:15] It was wonderful because Japan could do a lot of things, as it were, shielded from geopolitical upside-downs, especially in the region, especially considering major changes in China turning Communist, especially because you had the biggest neighbor Russia, that's a neighbor of Japan. It was wonderful for the government, the planners, for everybody in Japan, to rest under the wings, as it were, of the trans-pacific evil. They made the most of it. I think that there has rarely been a story of industrial expansion that matches what Japan did and pioneered it in doing in the 50s and 60s and 70s.
[06:20] All the time Japan wasn't there on the map politically. It was described by foreign heads of states and by many commentators as an economic giant and a political dwarf. It did call some affliction because if you are that strong economically and if you have the power to wipe out industries in other parts of the world that of course is a political given, it's a political effect and it causes frictions and problems that require political measures to deal with.
[07:03] So Japan wasn't there in the eyes of people who tried to knock on the door. There was nobody ever there. I remember Henry Kissinger passing by Tokyo. He didn't really like that so much because in China, in Beijing, he could actually see and touch the people in power and in Japan he was saying all the time, "Take me to your leader". There didn't seem to be anyone.
[07:33] Diplomatically and politically Japan did not exist in the world or hardly existed. It was usually there if some idealistic projects that didn't have any bearing on any consequences for domestic, political relationships, then Japan would cooperate, fine, no problem at all. But whenever there were something needed that require the readjustment politically at home, you could not really find people to talk with in Japan.
[8:10] Japan didn't have a government in the normal sense of the word that people were used to. This was people felt comfortable in this way. It was odd. It was strange. But the rest of the world got used to it. Japan really did not participate in an international political game.
[8:45] This is going on for a very long time. Today we are seeing the first changes. Because today we see a new government put together by a party that is relatively young, actually it's not that young and I'll go into this in a minute, but it's only recently become a party that people have to count. This new government has actually said, "We want to be effector on the world stage. We want to be more active. We want to do something in the region." In its earlier initiatives are to improve relations with China, and indeed they were of course also thinking about that relations with Russia and South East Asia in general. There was also this notion of ASEAN +3 to which Beijing was most enthusiastic but also the Asian countries. Japan until very recently was the most reluctant entity in this +3 (Korea, Japan and China). But today that has changed, also the thinking around that has changed.
[10:13] Now, the problem is that Washington isn't really happy with these changes, with this new way of looking at the world by a government that has just come in. I will come to this in a moment because it becomes a very important part of the story.
[10:45] To take the domestic political story at this point, we must realize that even before this status of being a vassal of the United States, which meant that all those things by which a state is, externally recognized, looked after by American proxy, as it were, all those things .... United States would take care not only of Japan's defense strategic interests in general but even of its economic strategic interests, it would sort of help Japan exist in the world where the international arrangements to help stimulate free exchanges of economic activity. It helped Japan a great deal and Japan didn't have to do all that much to secure those.
[11:55] In other words, Japan didn't need a central government that could be a center of political accountability. That is how I have formulated, I consider, a fundamental problem with the Japanese political system. It's only a problem in an international context. Although of course it can be also domestically a problem, if you need a political measures to cope with social or economic problems that have begun to take on a political color, you need some center to be able to decide and to actually carry out the decisions made in order to cope with the situation. This is notoriously lacking in Japan.
[12:55] There are still people today who compare wartime Japan with wartime Germany. Of course wartime Germany you had a strong leader. There was no question about where the center of power existed in Hitler's Germany. But in Japan, it was of course ridiculous to compare Tojo with Hitler. He never came close to occupying that kind of position. In fact, you can argue and some historians in Japan have argued that World War II was essentially the result of an attempt to solve the differences between the Imperial Army and the Navy.
[13:39] This is too much history to go into here and these things are controversial, but you can say that what began the Pacific War, what began the Japanese militarism, military activities in the region essentially was the series of events caused by insubordinate officers and nothing coming out of Tokyo as such. The Tokyo authorities were not listened to by the military authorities. This is something to keep in minds because in other countries this sort of things is happening or is about to happen.
[14:25] You had a history that is very unusual because of Japan's isolation. During the two and a half centuries of Japanese isolation, “sakoku”, you needed not have a center of diplomatic activity in Edo. To deal with the rest of the world was not necessary. What you began to have at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century was an oligarchy that had created one of the most interesting revolutions from above, the Meiji Revolution. Restoration it's called but actually it was a coup d'etat that followed by a revolution, it began very interesting history that contains more lessons for us than is generally recognized.
[15:31] But that oligarchy did not replicate itself. It disintegrated in various groups, factions, fractions, power centers and each had their own plans, each had their own way of thinking about Japan's well-being and what it should be doing. The military were very important. Two military factions were very important in this scheme of things. The Ministry of Finance, which was another important entity, was scared of them. When the Army and the Navy went to the Ministry of Finance with their hands held out, the Ministry of Finance could only give in to their demands. This is very interesting part of the story because it is the beginning of a system that has the potential to go by itself. There's no longer any kind of control that can keep it from doing things that are in a long run counterproductive and disadvantages for itself.
[16:40] This is the situation that is built on a history that never saw an undisputed central leader. You had shogun in Edo and you had the daimyo who were bosses of their local provinces. They had an interesting relationship to the shogun because they were obliged to be hostage in Edo for half a year in Edo. If something happened in the provinces that challenged central rule, the hostages would prevent this from going too far because the daimyo families would not have survived.
[17:37] It meant that the fundamental problem of all countries of all states of who has the right to rule, in other words, political legitimacy, never developed. This development of political central rule, the political legitimacy, in Japan was arrested at some point. The Meiji oligarchy didn't solve it because they did not institute mechanisms to ensure a succession of relatively central government, that it is what caused the problem of Japan in the early part of the 20th century when you could have insubordinate officers, essentially Army officers because the Navy knew very well that in a war Japan would lose. Navy knew this because the boats have been all over the world and had seen the kind of power that they have to face. But the Army hoped that idea nationalistic, arrogant and also very unrealistic powerfulness.
[18:58] After World War II there should have been an attempt to create that central political accountability so as to ensure that the system would never be derailed again. This is very interesting story because a lot of what could go wrong was understood by Japanese thinkers and by Japanese people in responsible positions in the political system, was understood that it could go wrong. That political system devised a lot of interesting mechanisms to avoid that ever from happening again. This is an interesting thing to study and has hardly been studied by anybody, but it is the very thing I think also for power systems in the rest of the world to understand what kind of mechanisms can exist to make sure that excess does not grow into uncontrolled excess that'll undermine your long term interests.
[20:00] We have a Japanese political system. I've called it a system so as to distinguish it from a state. There are many different definitions of state but one thing that they have in common is they assume a center of political accountability. Some put it the analogy of the human body, a brain. You have to be able, if you have a state there is a point where you can address the state, where you can appeal to the state, where you can try to make a state see what is its long term interest. The display is called a central political accountability.
[20:45] After World War II, Japan was not only not encouraged creating one, it was discouraged from creating that because of that strange relationship with the United States. A relationship in which the various bureaucratic bodies in Japan that could not talk with each other because of their history were talking to each other via the American bodies that corresponded with the Japanese. This is the Japanese occupation. You had Foreign Ministry entities that had become very friendly with State department entities. That was addressing the problematic entities that had to do with the strategy with defense, etc, through Washington, not directly. It's very interesting part that also many Japanese have insufficiently stated. Japanese historians are interested in parts of the story and some of them ... I've not invented all these, I've read them also from Japanese histories, but it hasn't been common knowledge. The importance of the United States in encouraging political discussions in Tokyo.
[22:02] You never had a movement in Japan except in the very beginning with Kishi and even Ikeda, but on Prime Minister Sato things went so well under the conditions that had been created by the United States and an agreement between the bigwigs in Tokyo that had come mostly from bureaucratic entities but worked themselves up to political positions.
[22:38] What you got in Japan was a political system that in reality hardly resembled what it was on paper. What I'm describing had no correspondence to any constitutional rules and they did not reflect what was supposed to be true in the legal sense in Japan.
[23:10] We have here something that is known in other parts of the world. You have an official system, political system and then you have a real system. The real system hides in this official system and if you know your way around it, you're fine. All countries have this, but in Japan, the informal system of power is, as it were, institutionalized to a point where there need not be any connection whatsoever and you can't appeal, is very difficult to appeal to what should be because few people around you would understand what you are talking about. It would be very difficult to use that as a political weapon, although it has happened, it is done and sometimes also successfully, but it is not something that is done in any routine fashion.
[24:05] You have even a way of talking .... You have a official system, the way things are supposed to be, the way things in which most teachers teach their school children how things are. That is known as a "tatemae" reality. "Tatemae" is the official reality, "honne" is the true reality, substantial reality. "Tatemae" is the principal and "honne" is the reality. "Tatemae" is what you pretend and "honne" is the real you. This "tatemae" is used in general daily life in Japan. Interestingly, if you talk, for example, to one group of people active in an area, say, education, and you talk about "tatemae" and "honne", they immediately know what you are talking about. This is very useful because immediately you can address the kind of things that people in Japan are expected to be disingenuous about. And by being disingenuous about, actually doing the right thing, doing the socially desirable thing. It is interesting then to discover, I was talking about the teachers, that they are surprised. In other areas of life there's also this "tatemae" and "honne" difference, among politicians, etc.
[25:40] It's institutionalized, that informal system. It is so strong and it has so many mechanisms to ensure its survival, that anybody who comes around and says, "We want to change Japan into what it is supposed to be according to our Constitution and according to the rules that we have all agreed on", that person or group of people who decides to do that runs into a major problem as you can understand. .
[26:13] The biggest challenge to this unofficial political power system I have witnessed, and I've been in Japan since 1962, is the election and the formation of Minshuto. Minshuto is the Democratic Party in Japan and I'd like to refer to it as Minshuto because it covers what it is whereas Democratic Party in Japan you'd think matter of democracy and all. The Minshuto is the biggest challenge to this informal system that Japan has experienced in peace time.
[26:56] You can imagine what this means. When in early 2008 I returned to Japan after the longest absence ever since 62, since the first time I've got there, I'd only been ... in 2007, I'd only been in Japan for a couple of weeks, not by any design, just it happened to be that way. When I returned in January of 2008 I was talking with Japanese friends and Japanese journalists, etc. They were excited because they said, "This year we're gonna have really a big change, we're gonna have an election that is going to change the political map of Japan, finally we're gonna get a real government with Ozawa leading it". I said to them, "But what about the scandals that will bring Ozawa down?" because that was very predictable.
[28:05] The informal power system makes sure that excess in the eyes of the people that ..., in the eyes of what is generally understood to be the case, that excess is countered by penalty. Japanese scandals are very difficult to understand for outsiders because they are usually about things that are normally considered normal. Except not to the degree that they happen, except not if they affect too many people. Scandals exist to make sure that excess doesn't go too excessive and it saves the system in this way. I give you many examples of this. I've written about it at length also for books only meant for Japanese readership.
[29:25] And it was predictable that Ozawa was going to be broke down by the public prosecutor because you have a scandal when the public prosecutor joins with the media, especially the big newspapers. They decide to bring a particular politician who is too big for his boots to cut him down to size. This happened to Tanaka Kakuei, for example. It happens when an entrepreneur goes too far in creating a business that seems to threaten social stability. It happened with Ezoe Hiromasa and the Recruit scandal, which was in fact an attempt to create a labor market for salarymen, which would have destroyed the way or undermined the way in which Japanese salarymen are attached to the corporations and they can't really change the corporations after they have, what for them for two or three years it's still possible but after that it is no longer possible if they want to continue having the kind of level, pensions and everything, that they count on. Ezoe started by publishing a little magazines for part-time jobs. He branched out into much more than part-time jobs and he began to create a labor market. Couldn't happen. I give you many other cases but we won't have time for that.
[31:05] What happens when there is a threat that Minshuto may take over from the LDP is that the informal system in the shape of public prosecutor who is at the pinnacle of informal power, together with the newspapers, whose senior editors are essentially in bed with the senior bureaucrats, they have the same outlook of what is good for Japan, and their concerns are essentially public order. My luncheons with senior editors and senior bureaucrats, I've known many over the years, when they turn around the question of who should run Japan, should it have the cabinet centered government in which the ministers actually formulate policy and actually formulate how the budget should be divided and what priorities of Japan should be, this conversations used to come down to the worry that they shared that you couldn't really trust these politicians. You couldn't trust them with the harmony of the country, with the stability of society because they had no experience. Of course if you haven't given a chance to do it, obviously they have no experience.
[33:28] What I'm trying to say is that senior newspaper editors who create politiccal reality in Japan because they generally write the same thing in the editorials and they generally select those stories that conform to what they think things people ought to know and tell the public what public opinion is. So they create political reality. Together with those at the top of the informal power system, the public prosecutors, you could predict that the Minshuto government will have a very hard time.
[33:06] Let's look at Minshuto at the moment and what they're trying to do. If they succeed in what they say they want to do, this will be nothing short of revolutionary. What do they want to do? They want to have something that Japan has never had. A cabinet centered genuine government where political decisions can be made with an eye to longer term notions of what is good for the country.
[33:40] In the 60s, late 40s after the War when things had calmed down and in the early 50s, there was a general decision that Japan should become strong again, that should never caught again with ... down, as it were, and it could be done only by industrial expansion, but in a peculiar way, the expansion of productive ability, that was really the decision that was made, that has been Japan's national policy, expansion of productive capacity without regard to profitability, is a very important point to understand.
[34:24] Essentially the whole informal system with the Ministry of Finance has been geared to accomplishing of that goal, and what you see in the way of changes in policies usually serve to make sure that that direction of Japan can be maintained, compared to the little engines of a rocket that will correct the rocket's course if it's threatened to go off course. Those are Japan's decisions, they are not political decisions, they are administrative decisions. Japan has the world's most effective administrative decision making system. There is no question in my mind about that. Other countries in Asia have tried to emulate it, and some of them like Korea have been most successful in doing so. They actually, literally copied some of these elements. I know that because I knew the Koreans who were doing it at the time in the (50s and) 60s and 70s.
[35:34] So you have a system that is capable of very intricate administrative decisions allowing Japan to weather the storms, international economic crisis, etc. But it cannot plot a new political course and many people have long decided this is necessary for Japan because things got into a rot. It's far more prosperous than most people realize. And this talk about the lost decade is absolutely nonsense because in a decade that is supposed to be economically lost, you do not rebuild the capital. Tokyo has been rebuilt in the last 15 years and so has Osaka. If you know Tokyo but you haven't been there for 5 or 6 years you won't recognize it. The landmarks are gone. You can no longer orient yourself, moving around the city. That's not a lost decade.
[36:35] That's another story by the way, very interesting story that the world media have been completely wrong. The world media have been rather bad on the whole partly because there hardly any foreign correspondence left in Tokyo. They've all been withdrawn in center China. They are mostly American anyway. The American correspondence are forced to write about the countries in a way that the editors like to see. I know this from experience. I have many American correspondent friends.
[37:10] Today we have in Tokyo maybe New York Times sometimes has a story that in some ways is accurate about what the Minshuto is trying to do, what it might be able to accomplish. That's it. The Washington Post is terrible because it is writing news about Japan but there is nobody in Japan. There is a correspondence who is traveling around the area that I think is based in Seoul. They are writing about Japan on the basis of what the officials in Washington tell them what's going on in Japan. The officials in Washington that deal with Japan are except for one or two that I can identify all alumni of the Pentagon.
[37:58] How does Washington respond to these changes in Tokyo, you never believe this. Here we have this very strange relationship of dependency, interdependency, because without Japan's help the dollar would have ceased to be an international reserve currency. This is another long story. Of course they couldn't do it on their own. Chinese have joined for the last 10 years. Chinese and Japanese buying American treasury paper but not only that it is Japanese owned dollars that circulate in the American economy because if you repatriate that money, the yen would go through the roof. That has been a problem, the upward pressure of the yen ... The most successful generation of the international traders was Japanese. For decades they have accumulated huge amounts of dollars. They circulate in the American economy, help to keep the American economy going. If all that will change, that would be disastrous for the United States.
[39:05] You have a country that has normally done, almost always done what Washington ask it to do. And guess a new government. The new government says, "We really want to make a change. We really want to become an actor on the world stage", politically speaking, diplomatically speaking, it also means, "We want to be more independent". And what does Washington do? It continues to have Pentagon alumni determine policy toward Japan.
[39:50] Hillary Clinton, of course not a Pentagon alumna, she came in the late spring or early summer to Japan, she already understood that would be a different government. She said, "No matter what kind of government you're gonna have, you're still going to do what we have agreed on about those military, those marine bases in Okinawa. I hear today the marine bases in Okinawa are the pivot around which Japan-American relations revolve today."
[40:21] Media in Washington are telling the correspondents and editors, "Japanese don't know what's going for. They have this inexperienced government and they don't know what they want, ha-ha." They know very well what they want. They understand what they want. "But we have a problem because they are not grateful, we've always formed the defensive shield. Defense against Russia, China and whatever." The picture they paint is of ungrateful Japan that want to change the treaty which is essentially a base lease agreement within the United States and Japan, that was another piece of history, that was upon the contentions of early 60s.
[41:23] We have a Prime Minister of a new government of a very important country in Asia that has been absolutely, crucially important to the United States who wants to meet with Obama personally. He tries this several moments. He is rebuffed at the Washington side, but in a way he would hardly believe possible. The approaches are made diplomatically but the answers come in press conferences by minor officials that all interested in defense saying, "If Hatoyama wants to solve a problem in his own cabinet, he should not waste time of our new President." Obama is in Copenhagen for the global warming stuff and environmental stuff and Hatoyama is gonna be there, too. Again he tries to see Obama there, again rebuffed in a press conference, "No, we don't have time for this." But Hatoyama is given at a banquet a place to sit next to Hillary Clinton and they talk. He comes out of the dinner, the Japanese media all get around him and say, "Have you discussed the marine base issue in Okinawa?" Hatoyama said, "Of course, we did." "What's the result?" What he then says is what all Japanese Prime Ministers and all Japanese politicians would say on any circumstances, "They were sort of a positive response". They cannot say, "We didn't get any where." Subsequently, the Japanese ambassador in Washington is called to Foggy Bottom in Washington to the State Department. It's snowing, you have the Japanese media outside the snow shivering waiting for the ambassador to come down. He is told by Hillary Clinton that that was a lie. "We did not speak positively about the future of this thing. We do have to, we have an agreement, and we have to carry this out." What this agreement is about? The agreement was something that had been decided upon a move of a marine base in Okinawa, the southernmost group of islands. That plan was never put into practice by the LDP government which was defeated in the election that brought Minshuto to power, because it's not viable, it cannot be done. It's politically impossible without causing riots and uprising in Okinawa. If the Minshuto government would go ahead and do what is in the official plans, then that government would fall because it could not contain the unrest in Okinawa.
[44:34] A solution has to be found. Many Japanese, the senior Japanese political figures thought that at some point Washington will relent and sort of give this a rest because there are so many other things to talk about. The openings to China that have never be seen before. Ozawa, who is the secretary general of the party, has flown with two plane loads of people, especially ordinary people, artists, writers, etc, for people to people and party to party contact in China, breaking open that particular side. There are other things that are happening, that Washington and Tokyo ought to be discussing with each other. All they are discussing is moving a military base according to a plan that is not politically viable. At the moment situation is very interesting because Hatoyama has given...
[45:53] ... We have an American government that actually would like to go back to how things were before with the LDP doesn't really govern except in a very peculiar way. The LDP no longer exists. It’s split, gone. It's finished. It could not in an election. You would not have LDP vs. Minshuto anymore because that party no longer exits. You can't go back to that. What would happen if this government fell and if other elections will take place is a different story that might even create a worse situation than what you had before, but that's again another story.
[46:31] What we have is a Minshuto government that's beleaguered, from the outside by Washington that actually would like to see it fall, and from the inside by the public prosecutor that can't relent, the moment Ozawa problem was solved, they turn their attention to the next person, who by becoming the President of the party would become the Prime Minister, Hatoyama. They found something on Hatoyama. The public prosecutor can find something against anyone, including us if we have lived any time in Japan, because we have all done something that we didn't know was wrong but they decide, "OK, this was wrong". But politicians are wonderful because of the laws governing political donations. They are full of loopholes and politicians do what they can get away with normally. Understandably so because it costs fortunes to get elected and re-elected. All of a sudden, when they became prominent and stick out their heads, want to do something, the public prosecutors grab them to prick them down.
[47:48] The newspapers help in this respect. The senior editors of the newspapers and NHK, for example, NHK is the Japanese BBC type broadcasting. They go along with this because they are so used of flooring Japanese government. The last three Japanese governments under the LDP which was dying, slow death, were brought down every year. You had the musicalchairs of Prime Ministers, and the main people, the main entities that were creating the situation were the newspapers. ... They are trying to do the same thing that they are so used to do it all the time, all the while.
[48:40] I talked with them so I know what they think. All the while, some of the senior people are very aware of what is going on and what the Minshuto is trying to do. They ask me, "how long do you think Minshuto needs to stay in the saddle in order to achieve what we all want?" And they say, "Meiji Restoration, it took them so long, they don't have this long." And we discussed about the differences between Meiji Restoration and today. These are not stupid people, they are people who understand very well the long term interests. Nevertheless, when it comes down to the nitty-gritty, there are very few political courageous editors who say, "Let's cut this nonsense. Let this explain how things are the way we know they are", this is your problem if you are used to live in a "tatemae" and "honne" world for such a long time. You can lose your way and at the moment you don't have a sufficiently large group of Japanese thinkers, Japanese editors that can tell the public what this whole thing is all about.
[49:56 / 50:26] Now I've had to simplify. I've been looking at this watch I borrowed to make sure that I did not talk but now I think I've gone way over the limit, right? Needless to say, your questions or your disagreements, very welcome.
投稿者コメント：
この記事は、ＩＩＥＡというアイルランドのシンクタンクの主催で２０１０年４月３０日にダブリンでおこなわれたウォルフレン氏の講演をテキストに起こしたものである。ウォルフレン氏の英語はわかりやすいと思っていたのだが、一語ずつテキストに起こすのはかなりたいへんな作業だった。２０１０年１２月５日のウォルフレン講演会の動画をテキストに起こした人の記事をみて思いたち、少しずつ取り組んでいるうちに、とうとう年が明けてしまった。どうしても聞き取れない部分がかなり残ったし、あやしいところも多い。それでも、こうしたものがまったくないよりはましだと信じたい。ディクテーションの間違いの修正や不明箇所の補足をいただけるとありがたい。
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