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CIA元高官の暴露:2002年にブッシュ、チェイニー、ライスはイラクにWMDが存在しないことを知っていた
元CIA欧州支局長のTyler DrumhellerがTV番組で、2002年の秋にブッシュ、チェイニーそしてライスが、イラクがWMD(大量破壊兵器)を持っていないことを「個人的に」語ったことを暴露しています。また元CIA長官テネットもイラクにWMDが存在しないというイラク外相(米国のスパイ)の報告を受けていたことを語っています。
こういった暴露が次々と出てくることもまた興味深い現象ですが、それにしても、その米国大統領府の大嘘を下痢便のように垂れ流してイラク戦争を既成事実化したマス・メディア、それを有頂天になってはやし立てた各国の「知識人」やジャーナリスト、そしてその根源にある9・11の嘘デタラメを未だに垂れ流す世界各国のバカタレどもの責任が問われる日がいつやってくるのでしょうか。
以下にこれを報道するThink Progress紙と、TV番組の内容の文書記述を貼り付けます。(全て英文)
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60 Minutes: CIA Official Reveals Bush, Cheney, Rice Were Personally Told Iraq Had No WMD in Fall 2002
Tonight on 60 Minutes, Tyler Drumheller, the former chief of the CIA’s Europe division, revealed that in the fall of 2002, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and others were told by CIA Director George Tenet that Iraq’s foreign minister — who agreed to act as a spy for the United States — had reported that Iraq had no active weapons of mass destruction program. Watch it:
【ビデオ:Tyler Drumhellerへのインタビュー】
http://images1.americanprogress.org/il80web20037/ThinkProgress/2006/60min.320.240.mov
【以下にその内容の文書記録】
BRADLEY: According to Drumheller, CIA Director George Tenet delivered the news about the Iraqi foreign minister at a high level meeting at the White House.
DRUMHELLER: The President, the Vice President, Dr. Rice…
BRADLEY: And at that meeting…?
DRUMHELLER: They were enthusiastic because they said they were excited that we had a high-level penetration of Iraqis.
BRADLEY: And what did this high level source tell you?
DRUMHELLER: He told us that they had no active weapons of mass destruction program.
BRADLEY: So, in the fall of 2002, before going to war, we had it on good authority from a source within Saddam’s inner circle that he didn’t have an active program for weapons of mass destruction?
DRUMHELLER: Yes.
BRADLEY: There’s no doubt in your mind about that?
DRUMHELLER: No doubt in my mind at all.
BRADLEY: It directly contradicts, though, what the President and his staff were telling us.
DRUMHELLER: The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming, and they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy.
BRADLEY: Drumheller expected the White House to ask for more information from the Iraqi foreign minister. He was taken aback by what happened.
DRUMHELLER: The group that was dealing with preparations for the Iraq war came back and said they’re no longer interested. And we said, “Well, what about the intel?” And they said, “Well, this isn’t about intel anymore. This is about regime change.”
BRADLEY: And if I understand you correctly, when the White House learned that you had this source from the inner circle of Saddam Hussein, they were thrilled with that.
DRUMHELLER: The first we heard, they were. Yes.
BRADLEY: But when they learned what it was that he had to say, that Saddam did not have the capability to wage nuclear war, weapons of mass destruction…?
DRUMHELLER: They stopped being interested in the intelligence.
BRADLEY: The White House declined to respond to Drumheller’s account of Naji Sabri’s role, but Secretary of State Rice has said that Sabri, the Iraqi foreign minister-turned-U.S. spy, was just one source, and therefore his information wasn’t reliable.
DRUMHELLER: They certainly took information that came from single sources on uranium, on the yellowcake story and on several other stories that had no corroboration at all, and so you can’t say you only listen to one source, because on many issues they only listened to one source.
BRADLEY: So you’re saying that if there was a single source and that information from that source backed up the case they were trying to build, then that single source was okay, but if it didn’t, then the single source was not okay because he couldn’t be corroborated.
DRUMHELLER: Unfortunately, that’s what it looks like