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□ますます統一され，自信と連携を深めるスンニ派反政府勢力
・アメリカ軍は1日平均30回，2005年の1年間で10600回の路上爆弾攻撃を受けていく。
http://www.iraq-war.ru/article/79921
Report: Sunni Insurgents Increasingly Unified, Confident and Coordinated (Update: 10600 IED attacks in 2005)
By: Jim Lobe, CNN/Uruknet on: 16.02.2006 [22:46 ] (647 reads)
The 30-page report, based primarily on an analysis of the public communications of insurgent groups, as well as interviews and past studies about the insurgency, also concludes that rebel groups have adapted quickly and effectively to changing U.S. tactics ﾐ in both the military and political spheres.
February 16, 2005 article: 30 roadside bombings per day on average, 10600 in all
February 16, 2006
WASHINGTON ﾐ Despite reports of growing tensions and even occasional clashes between Islamists and nationalists, the predominantly Sunni insurgency in Iraq appears increasingly united and confident of victory, according to a new report released here Wednesday by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG).
The 30-page report, based primarily on an analysis of the public communications of insurgent groups, as well as interviews and past studies about the insurgency, also concludes that rebel groups have adapted quickly and effectively to changing U.S. tactics ﾐ in both the military and political spheres.
"Over time, the insurgency appears to have become more coordinated, confident, sensitive to its constituents' demands, and adept at learning from the enemy's successes and its own failures," according to the report, "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency."
"The U.S. must take these factors into account if it is to understand the insurgency's resilience and learn how to counter it," it added, stressing that the most effective responses include reining in and disbanding sectarian militias responsible for human rights abuses and repeatedly making clear that Washington has no designs on Iraq's oil resources or on its territory for military bases.
The report, which comes amid intense ﾐ but so far unavailing ﾐ efforts by the U.S. embassy to negotiate the creation of a new government in Baghdad that will place prominent Sunnis in key cabinet posts, is based mainly on what insurgents have themselves said on their Internet Web sites and chat rooms, videos, tapes, and leaflets since the invasion and how those messages have evolved.
While much of the rhetoric is propagandistic, according to the ICG, it also provides a "window into the insurgency" capable of informing the analyst about its internal debates, levels of coordination, its perceptions of both the enemy and its constituency, and changes in tactics and strategy.
Such a textual analysis, according to the ICG, yields conclusions that are substantially at odds with many of Washington's current, as well as past, assumptions about the insurgency. Indeed, "In Iraq, the U.S. fights an enemy it hardly knows," the report asserts.
The notion, for example, that the insurgency is divided between Iraqi nationalists and foreign jihadis, most prominently al-Qaeda's Organization in Mesopotamia (QOM) allegedly led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, appears increasingly questionable, according to the report, which notes that there has been a "gradual convergence" in the groups' tactics and rhetoric.
"A year ago, groups appeared divided over practices and ideology, but most debates have been settled through convergence around Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and Sunni Arab grievances," according to the report.
"Practically speaking, it has become virtually impossible to categorize a particular group's discourse as jihadi as opposed to nationalist or patriotic, with the exception of the Ba'ath Party, whose presence on the ground has been singularly ineffective."
During the first half of 2005, when reports of armed clashes between the two kinds of groups first surfaced, that was less true, but, since then and despite intense U.S. efforts to drive a wedge between them, the groups have largely harmonized their rhetoric.
In that connection, "recent reports of negotiations between 'nationalist' groups and the U.S. over forming an alliance against foreign jihadis appear at the very least exaggerated," according to the report. It noted that any such "duplicity" would almost certainly have been exposed and denounced by others.
Moreover, "no armed group so far has even hinted" that it may be willing to negotiate with the U.S. and Iraqi authorities. "While covert talks cannot be excluded, the publicly accessible discourse remains uniformly and relentlessly hostile to the occupation and its 'collaborators.'"
That does not mean that differences between the two kinds of groups do not exist and that there could be a day of reckoning ﾐ but only after Washington's withdrawal. "To this day, the armed opposition's avowed objectives have … been reduced to a primary goal: ridding Iraq of the foreign occupier. Beyond that, all is vague."
Meanwhile, the groups have become increasingly mindful of their image and the necessity of cultivating public opinion among Sunnis, other Iraqis, and the West, according to the report.
Thus, they promptly and systematically respond to charges that they are corrupt or target innocent civilians and even reject accusations, despite the evidence from suicide attacks, against Shi'ite mosques, that they are waging a sectarian campaign.
Similarly, they have abandoned some tactics that proved especially revolting to their various audiences, such as the beheading of hostages and attacking voters going to the polls. And "while they deny any intent of depriving the population of water and electricity, restraint does not apply to oil installations, which are seen as part and parcel of American designs to exploit Iraq."
According to the report, four main groups now dominate the communications channels of the insurgency and publish regularly through a variety of media: QOM; Partisans of the Sunna Army (Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna); the Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaysh al-Islami fil-'Iraq); and the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance (al-Jabha al-Islamiya lil-Muqawama al-'Iraqiya, or Jami).
QOM, whose operational importance has, according to the ICG, been exaggerated by U.S. officials, sought during the past year to "Iraqify" its image, in part by reportedly replacing Zarqawi, a Jordanian, with an Iraqi leader. Jami, according to some ICG sources, may be a "public relations organ" shared by different armed groups and tends to be somewhat more sophisticated and nationalistic in its rhetoric and communications strategy than the others.
Another five groups that take credit for military actions generally use far less elaborate and stable channels of communication, while four more groups appear to lack regular means of communication to produce occasional claims of responsibility for armed actions through statements or videos.
All groups appear to have become more confident over the past year, according to the report, which noted that their optimism is not only noticeable in their official communiqu市 but in more spontaneous expressions by militants and sympathizers on Internet chat sites and elsewhere.
Initially, according to the report, they perceived the U.S. presence as extremely difficult to remove, "but that no longer is the case."
"Today, the prospect of an outright victory and a swift withdrawal of foreign forces has crystallized, bolstered by the U.S.' perceived loss of legitimacy and apparent vacillation, its periodic announcement of troops redeployments, the precipitous decline in domestic support for the war, and heightened calls by prominent politicians for a rapid withdrawal," the report states.
Moreover, "when the U.S. leaves, the insurgents do not doubt that Iraq's security forces and institutions would quickly collapse."
http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=8555
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Iraqi insurgency more confident, coordinated
(CNN) ― A few large groups using sophisticated communications increasingly have come to dominate Iraq's insurgency, a report released Wednesday said.
The report from the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization that tries to solve conflicts, noted the insurgency "no longer is a scattered, erratic, chaotic phenomenon."
"Groups are well organized, produce regular publications, react rapidly to political developments and appear surprisingly centralized," the report said.
It noted the insurgency, a predominately Sunni Arab movement, has grown "more confident, better organized, coordinated, information-savvy."
"That it has survived, even thrived, despite being vastly outnumbered and outgunned, suggests the limitations of the current counter-insurgency campaign," the report said. It added that the insurgents' emergence "carries profound implications for policymakers."
The report, "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," used voluminous insurgent communications culled from Web sites, videos, tapes and leaflets.
Advice for U.S.
The study was critical of the United States fighting "an enemy it hardly knows," and called its labeling of insurgency groups as Saddamists, Islamo-fascists "gross approximations and crude categories."
It said U.S. and Iraqi forces must "reach out to the Sunni Arab community, amend the constitution and build a more inclusive policy."
Its release came a day after an Australian TV network broadcast previously unpublished images of apparent prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. (Details)
The report advised the United States and Iraqi government to listen to what the insurgents are saying and halt practices that harm the U.S.-led coalition's credibility and bolster insurgent legitimacy. Bad conduct plays into the hands of insurgents, it said.
"The harm from excessive use of force, torture, tactics that inflict widespread civilian injury and reliance on sectarian militias outweighs any military gain," the report said.
The United States also must hold the new Iraqi government accountable, stressing that relations "depend on disbanding militias, halting political killings and respecting human rights," the study advised.
The report also urged the United States to make "repeatedly clear at the highest level" that Iraqi's oil resources "belong to the Iraqi people and no one else," and that withdrawal will occur as soon as the new government requests it.
Sunni Arabs have opposed Kurdish and Shiite demands for autonomous regions, arguing that they won't be able to benefit from the oil riches in those areas.
Four main groups identified
The report identified four main groups behind the insurgency: al Qaeda in Iraq, led by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; Jaish Ansar al-Sunni; the Islamic Army in Iraq; and the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance. Two other less sophisticated levels were cited as well.
"Over time they have developed recognized, proficient and uninterrupted channels of communication through which, among other things, they regularly take responsibility for armed operations," the report said of the four groups.
From May 2003 to the present, three phases "in the evolution of the insurgents' discourse" emerged, the report said.
"Competition between groups for greater visibility generated increasingly bloody and controversial deeds, which in turn initiated vigorous internal debate from mid-2004 to mid-2005 and ushered in the current phase of apparent consensus on critical issues," it found.
The report said insurgents "have been effective at ... generating new recruits and mobilizing a measure of popular sympathy among its target audience."
Other trends cited:
A "gradual convergence around more unified practices and discourse and predominantly Sunni Arab identity."
"There is little sign of willingness by any significant insurgent element to join the political process or negotiate with the United States. While covert talks cannot be excluded, the publicly accessible discourse remains uniformly and relentlessly hostile to the occupation and its 'collaborators.' "
"The groups appear acutely aware of public opinion" and are "increasingly mindful of their image."
"The insurgents have yet to put forward a clear political program or long-term vision for Iraq."
"The insurgency is increasingly optimistic about victory."
http://www.kurdmedia.com/news.asp?id=11384
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IED's: 10,600 attacks in 2005
Truth About Iraqis
According to Sudha Ramachandran an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore who quoted Pentagon figures and military analysts,
"There were about 10,600 roadside bombings in 2005, nearly twice the number that occurred in 2004. This means that on an average, 30 roadside bombings are carried out per day across Iraq."
Thirty per day? Even I am baffled by this number. Does the US public know this?
This seems to lend further credence to my earlier blog posting from the International Crisis Group which said the resistance is not only growing in Iraq but becoming increasingly confident.
After three years, the US military has been unable to supress the raging resistance movement.
NB: The use of the term resistance here in no way includes elements of the religious extremist movement known as Al Qaida in Iraq, or the black ops operation known as Zarqawi.
Ramachandran also says: "Media reports citing US government sources say that while the number of IED attacks has grown over the past two years, US countermeasures seem to be working in reducing the number of fatalities.
Statistics give a different story, however. The number of fatalities from IEDs rose steadily all of last year, according to the Iraq index compiled by the Washington-based Brookings Institution. While the number of IED fatalities per month was in single digits in 2003, it surged in 2004 and grew significantly throughout 2005, averaging more than 30 deaths a month last year.
US government efforts to detect and neutralize IEDs have no doubt increased, but so has the ingenuity of the insurgents. Insurgents have refined their techniques with regard to construction, concealment and detonation of devices. The lethality and sophistication of IEDs have also improved.
http://uruknet.info/?p=m20689&hd=0&size=1&l=x
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http://www.asyura2.com/0601/war78/msg/476.html
投稿者 gataro 日時 2006 年 2 月 16 日 16:31:49: KbIx4LOvH6Ccw
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