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Crude Designs: The Rip-Off of Iraq’s Oil Wealth
By Greg Muttitt
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/oil/2005/crudedesigns.htm#5.1
上記論文の「要約」と「結論」の要約・抄訳です。
現在、イラク石油省と多国籍石油企業の間で、「生産シェア協定」（ＰＳＡ）が作成されつつあり、2006年早い時期の締結か目指されている。この協定によれば、未開発の埋蔵確認油田の大部分が多国籍石油企業によって開発されることになる。イラク新政府が弱く、占領下に置かれている間に進められているこの「協定」によれば、イラクが、石油産業をコントロールし計画する能力を否定。イラクは、将来にわたって巨額の石油収入を失うことになる。そして、将来、多国籍石油企業の利益に影響を与えるような立法措置がなされた場合も見据えて、その条項から多国籍企業が免責されることがあらかじめ含まれている。この「協定」は長期にわたって、25年から40年間、政府を拘束することになる。これに対するイラクからの異議は、国際仲裁裁判で処理され、イラクの国益や国内法は無視される。
イラク石油産業の「民営化」に着目する議論は、石油資源の法的所有に目を奪われており、真の問題、石油開発とその収入が公的コントロールに置かれるのか、私的コントロールに置かれるのかが見落としている。
イラク石油省の重要人物によって支持されているこのモデルは、１９６０年代後半から行われてきた「生産シェア協定」モデル（ＰＳＡ）である。これはきわめて政治的な目的をもっている。形式上は、政府所有の形にしながら、協定上の特権（免許）によって、事実上所有しているのと同じような結果をもたらす。
このＰＳＡモデルをイラクで実行することについては、03年イラク侵攻前に「イラクの将来プロジェクト」（the Future of Iraq project）と米国務省によって提案され、その後ＣＰＡ、暫定政府へ引き継がれた。イラク新憲法もあいまいではあるが、外国企業へのドアをあけるものとなっており、また、イラク新憲法が、石油資源についての分権化を示唆しているため、外国企業との交渉には交渉力の弱い地方政府があたることになる。
しかし、ＩＡＥＡによれば、ＰＳＡという形態は世界の石油資源の12％でしかなく、しかも小規模油田や、コストのかかる油田、埋蔵の不確定な油田での採用となっており、イラクの条件とは異なる。中東の有力生産者はこのような協定を結んでいない。結んでいるところも後悔している。ロシアでは90年代の民営化で、このようなＰＳＡを結んだ結果、数 十億ドルのコストが政府にのしかかっている。
この形態では、外国企業からの投資が義務付けられるか、それを越える収入を外国企業に与えることになる。
Executive Summary
While the Iraqi people struggle to define their future amid political chaos and violence, the fate of their most valuable economic asset, oil, is being decided behind closed doors.
This report reveals how an oil policy with origins in the US State Department is on course to be adopted in Iraq, soon after the December elections, with no public debate and at enormous potential cost. The policy allocates the majority (1) of Iraq’s oilfields – accounting for at least 64% of the country’s oil reserves – for development by multinational oil companies.
Iraqi public opinion is strongly opposed to handing control over oil development to foreign companies. But with the active involvement of the US and British governments a group of powerful Iraqi politicians and technocrats is pushing for a system of long term contracts with foreign oil companies which will be beyond the reach of Iraqi courts, public scrutiny or democratic control.
COSTING IRAQ BILLIONS
Economic projections published here for the first time show that the model of oil development that is being proposed will cost Iraq hundreds of billions of dollars in lost revenue, while providing foreign companies with enormous profits.
Our key findings are:
• At an oil price of $40 per barrel, Iraq stands to lose between $74 billion and $194 billion over the lifetime of the proposed contracts (2), from only the first 12 oilfields to be developed. These estimates, based on conservative assumptions, represent between two and seven times the current Iraqi government budget.
• Under the likely terms of the contracts, oil company rates of return from investing in Iraq would range from 42% to 162%, far in excess of usual industry minimum target of around 12% return on investment.
A CONTRACTUAL RIP-OFF
The debate over oil “privatisation” in Iraq has often been misleading due to the technical nature of the term, which refers to legal ownership of oil reserves. This has allowed governments and companies to deny that “privatisation” is taking place. Meanwhile, important practical questions, of public versus private control over oil development and revenues, have not been addressed.
The development model being promoted in Iraq, and supported by key figures in the Oil Ministry, is based on contracts known as production sharing agreements (PSAs), which have existed in the oil industry since the late 1960s. Oil experts agree that their purpose is largely political: technically they keep legal ownership of oil reserves in state hands (3), while practically delivering oil companies the same results as the concession agreements they replaced.
Running to hundreds of pages of complex legal and financial language and generally subject to commercial confidentiality provisions, PSAs are effectively immune from public scrutiny and lock governments into economic terms that cannot be altered for decades.
In Iraq’s case, these contracts could be signed while the government is new and weak, the security situation dire, and the country still under military occupation. As such the terms are likely to be highly unfavourable, but could persist for up to 40 years.
Furthermore, PSAs generally exempt foreign oil companies from any new laws that might affect their profits. And the contracts often stipulate that disputes are heard not in the country’s own courts but in international investment tribunals, which make their decisions on commercial grounds and do not consider the national interest or other national laws. Iraq could be surrendering its democracy as soon as it achieves it.
POLICY DELIVERED FROM AMERICA TO IRAQ
Production sharing agreements have been heavily promoted by oil companies and by the US Administration.
The use of PSAs in Iraq was proposed by the Future of Iraq project, the US State Department’s planning mechanism, prior to the 2003 invasion. These proposals were subsequently developed by the Coalition Provisional Authority, by the Iraq Interim Government and by the current Transitional Government. The Iraqi Constitution also opens the door to foreign companies, albeit in legally vague terms.
Of course, what ultimately happens will depend on the outcome of the elections, on the broader political and security situation and on negotiations with oil companies. However, the pressure for Iraq to adopt PSAs is substantial. The current government is fast-tracking the process and is already negotiating contracts with oil companies in parallel with the constitutional process, elections and passage of a Petroleum Law.
The Constitution also suggests a decentralisation of authority over oil contracts, from the national level to Iraq’s regions. If implemented, the regions would have weaker bargaining power than a national government, leading to poorer terms for Iraq in any deal with oil companies.
A RADICAL DEPARTURE
In order to make their case, oil companies and their supporters argue that PSAs are standard practice in the oil industry and that Iraq has no other option to finance oil development. Neither of these assertions is true.
According to International Energy Agency figures, PSAs are only used in respect of about 12% of world oil reserves, in countries where oilfields are small (and often offshore), production costs are high, and exploration prospects are uncertain. None of these conditions applies to Iraq.
None of the top oil producers in the Middle East uses PSAs. Some governments that have signed them regret doing so. In Russia, where political upheaval was followed by rapid opening up to the private sector in the 1990s, PSAs have cost the state billions of dollars, making it unlikely that any more will be signed. The parallel with Iraq's current transition is obvious.
The advocates of PSAs also claim that obtaining investment from foreign companies through these types of contracts would save the government up to $2.5 billion a year, freeing up funds for other public spending. Although this is true, the investment by oil companies now would be massively offset by the loss of state revenues later.
Our calculations show that were the Iraqi government to use PSAs, its cost of capital would be between 75% and 119%. At this cost, the advantages referred to are simply not worth it.
Iraq has a range of less damaging and expensive options for generating investment in its oil sector. These include: financing oil development through government budgetary expenditure (as is currently the case), using future oil flows as collateral to borrow money, or using international oil companies through shorter-term, less restrictive and less lucrative contracts than PSAs (4).
IN WHOSE INTERESTS?
PSAs represent a radical redesign of Iraq's oil industry, wrenching it from public into private hands. The strategic drivers for this are the US/UK push for “energy security” in a constrained market and the multinational oil companies’ need to “book” new reserves to secure future growth.
Despite their disadvantages to the Iraqi economy and democracy, they are being introduced in Iraq without public debate.
It is up to the Iraqi people to decide the terms for the development of their oil resources. We hope that this report will help explain the likely consequences of decisions being made in secret on their behalf.
Notes
1. The Iraqi government would be left with control of only the 17 fields that are already in production, out of around 80 known fields.
2. The precise terms of proposed contracts are obviously be subject to negotiation: our projections are based on a range of terms used in the most comparable countries, including Libya, which is commonly viewed as having some of the most stringent in the world. Multinational oil companies are pushing for lucrative terms by international standards, based on Iraq’s high level of political and security risk. These risks place the Iraqi government in an extremely weak negotiating position. The projections are given in undiscounted real terms (2006 prices). The contract duration is assumed to be 30 years as 25-40 years is the common length. The (2006) net present value of the loss to Iraq amounts to between $16 billion and $43 billion at 12% discount rate.
3. The terminology of PSAs labels the private companies as “contractors”. This report illustrates that this label is misleading because PSAs give companies control over oil development and access to extensive profits.
4. These might include buyback contracts, risk service contracts or development and production contracts
中略
• Conclusion
We have seen in the preceding chapters that, under the influence of the US and the UK, powerful politicians and technocrats in the Iraqi Oil Ministry are pushing to hand all of Iraq’s undeveloped fields to multinational oil companies, to be developed under production sharing agreements. They aim to do this in the early part of 2006.
The results for Iraq would be devastating:
• Iraq would lose an enormous amount of revenue (making it conversely highly profitable for the foreign companies);
• The terms of the contracts would be agreed while the Iraqi state is very weak and still under occupation, but be fixed for 25-40 years;
• PSAs would deny Iraq the ability to regulate or plan its oil industry, leaving foreign companies’ operations immune from future legislation;
• PSAs would shift decisions on any disputes out of Iraq into international arbitration courts, where the Iraqi constitution, body of law and national interest are simply not relevant.
Yet, Iraq has other options for obtaining investment in its oil sector, including:
• Direct financing from government budgets;
• Government/state oil company borrowing; or
• Less damaging contracts with multinational oil companies, such as buybacks or risk service agreements.
These decisions should be made with the full participation of the Iraqi people, not in secret by unaccountable elites. Care should be taken not to take major irreversible steps that would later be regretted.
Getting these decisions right is vital for the future of Iraq
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