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★阿修羅♪
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現在地 HOME > 戦争69 > 228.html
★阿修羅♪
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(回答先: イギリスの治安機関がイラクの兵器能力に関する情報の誤りを認める [IRIBラジオ日本語ニュース] 投稿者 white 日時 2005 年 4 月 09 日 23:38:59)
JIC(Joint intelligence comittee) 2002年９月報告書との相違点
「イラクは核兵器開発プログラムを進めている」
→「誤り」
イラクは核兵器開発プログラムを進めていなかった。
その野心があったことは間違いない。
「イラクはアル･フセイン弾道ミサイル２０機を保有している」
→「保有していなかった」
「イラクは科学物質の在庫を保有している可能性がある。2週間以内にマスタード（ガス）
を作れる程の量、サリンとVXを1ヶ月以内に作れる量、そしてVXについてはおそらく
すでに準備が整っているだろう」
→「いずれかの化学物質について製造可能な量を保持していたかもしれないが、あの
判断は立証されたものではなかった」
追加 イラクサーベイグループによると、サダムは国連が経済制裁を引き上げた時期に
化学兵器開発を再開しようとしていた。
「現在イラクは生物科学物質を保有している。数日内に製造可能である」
→ISGによるとイラクは開発再開していたが、「組織が判断した日数ではない。
また実際に製造に着手していたかを示す明白な証拠はない」
「サダムは同盟軍と隣国、そしてイラク国民に対し生物化学兵器（CBW）を使うだろう。
イスラエルが最初の標的となる可能性がある」サダムのこれまでの態度から「これは
妥当な判断と思われる」
→しかしこう主張したイラク人エージェントは、その後MI6に逮捕された。
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We got it wrong on Iraq WMD, intelligence chiefs finally admit
Richard Norton-Taylor
Friday April 8, 2005
The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1454998,00.html
Intelligence chiefs have admitted for the first time that claims they made about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction were wrong and have not been substantiated.
The admission is revealed in the annual report of the parliamentary intelligence and security committee which also sharply criticises the lack of communication between ministers and the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6.
It discloses that late last year the joint intelligence committee (JIC) reviewed key judgments on Iraq's WMD capability and programmes behind the government's now discredited dossier published in September 2002.
· The JIC claimed in 2002: "Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme." It now admits this "was wrong, in that Iraq was not pursuing a nuclear weapons programme". It says the claim was "correct on Iraq's nuclear ambitions".
· The JIC judged in 2002: "Iraq retains up to 20 al-Hussein ballistic missiles." It now admits: "This has not been substantiated."
· In 2002, the JIC judged: "Iraq may retain some stocks of chemical agents ... Iraq could produce significant quantities of mustard [gas] within weeks, significant quantities of Sarin and VX within months, and, in the case of VX may already have done so." It now admits: "Although a capability to produce some agents probably existed, this judgment has not been substantiated." It adds that the Iraq Survey Group found that Saddam "intended to resume a CW [chemical weapons] effort once [UN] sanctions were lifted".
· The JIC in 2002 said: "Iraq currently has available ... a number of biological agents ... Iraq could produce more of these biological agents within days". It now says that the ISG found Iraq could resume production, "but not within the time frames judged ... and [it] found no evidence that production had been activated".
· In 2002, the JIC judged: "Saddam ... might use CBW [chemical and biological weapons] against coalition forces, neighbouring states and his own people. Israel could be the first target." Based on Saddam's past behaviour that "would have remained a reasonable judgment", says the JIC. However, it notes that the Iraqi agent who made the claims was subsequently dropped by MI6.
The parliamentary committee notes that three MI6 agents were "withdrawn" after the invasion of Iraq. They included one - mentioned in 2002 to Tony Blair by Sir Richard Dearlove, then MI6 head - who claimed that Iraq was still making chemical and biological weapons.
The committee also referred yesterday to the Butler inquiry which described the MI6 agent behind the claim that Iraq could deploy chemical weapons within 45 minutes as open to "serious doubts" and "seriously flawed".
The committee says: "We are concerned at the amount of intelligence on Iraqi WMD that has now had to be withdrawn." It says that Mr Blair was not informed until a year later about an MI6 decision to drop an Iraqi agent he had earlier been told was potentially important.
It also points out that the ministerial cabinet committee on the intelligence services has not met since December 2003, and that that meeting was the first in more than seven years. That is disappointing, it says, as regular meetings would "enable collective discussion by ministers of intelligence priorities and developments". At the moment, it adds, "ministers discuss intelligence only in the context of crisis or single-issues meetings".
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