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★阿修羅♪
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陸上自衛隊第一三旅団（司令部・広島県海田町）からイラクへの隊員派遣に抗議し、被爆者や労組員たちが二十八日正午から、広島市中区の原爆ドーム前で二十四時間の座り込みを始めた。
七十人余りの参加者を前に、県原水禁の宮崎安男顧問や県被団協の坪井直理事長が「広島の地からの派遣は許せない。絶対に食い止める必要がある」などと訴えた。
平和・民主主義広島地区労組会議など四団体の呼び掛けで、労組員たちが交代で座り込む。二十九日正午、自衛隊の即時撤退を求めるアピール文を採択して締めくくる。
また、市民団体のピースリンク広島・呉・岩国は二十八日、同旅団に派遣中止を申し入れた。世話人の藤井純子さんらメンバー七人が海田市駐屯地の正門前で、「隊員の家族も心配している。何としてもやめていただきたい」と訴えた。申し入れ書は同駐屯地司令職務室長の荒木陽三佐が受け取り、「私は答える立場にない」と述べた。
【写真説明】自衛隊のイラク派遣に抗議し、原爆ドーム前に座り込む被爆者や労組員たち
http://www.chugoku-np.co.jp/News/Tn05012903.html
◇原爆ドーム前で座り込み
陸上自衛隊第５次イラク復興支援群の編成命令が２７日発令され、陸自第１３旅団（司令部・海田町）からも隊員約１０人が派遣されることが正式決定したため、広島市内では２８日、市民や被爆者らの抗議行動が相次いだ。派遣中止を求めて昨年末に発表した「ヒロシマ・ピープルズ声明」への賛同者は同日までに、約１９００人に上っているという。
市民団体「ピースリンク広島・呉・岩国」のメンバー８人はこの日、第１３旅団の海田市駐屯地を訪れ、編成命令の撤回や派遣中止を求める申し入れ書を、荒木陽・同駐屯地司令職務室長に手渡した。湯浅一郎・代表世話人は「５次隊から給水業務の隊員を減らし、警備要員を増やすというが、何のための派遣なのか。内容が、人道復興支援から逸脱している。米国追従の危険な選択だ」と批判した。
また、中区の原爆ドーム前では異例の２４時間の抗議の座り込みが続いた。企画した平和・民主主義広島地区労組会議の上畠順一議長は「被爆地から自衛隊が戦地に派遣される。黙っていられない」と話していた。【遠藤孝康】
毎日新聞 2005年1月29日
http://www.mainichi-msn.co.jp/chihou/hiroshima/news/20050129ddlk34040463000c.html
Still, one thing I would concede is that in forging ahead with postal privatization, Koizumi has at least provided the voting public with one specific frame of reference for comparing his administration's policy with that of Katsuya Okada's Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan).
But with regard to foreign policy and national security-matters that determine the very fate of the nation-the public has been effectively excluded from examining them.
Koizumi pronounced before the United Nations General Assembly that Japan was ready for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Earlier, he had made Self-Defense Forces troops join a U.S.-led multinational force, ostensibly to support Iraqi humanitarian reconstruction.
On both instances, we, the sovereign people, were not even asked what we thought. This is tyranny by the Cabinet, and this tendency has become particularly pronounced since the Lower House election last November.
This reminds me of a ``custom'' or mindset that prevailed under the old Meiji Constitution, instituted in 1889.
Many Japanese immediately associate this old Constitution with the ``prerogative of supreme command of the military.'' This notorious provision allowed the military-especially the Kwantung Army-to run amok and lead Japan into its dismal war with China from 1937 and later with the Allies.
But what many people apparently overlook is that, under the Meiji Constitution, the Cabinet was vested with full authority in the areas of diplomacy and national defense, and was therefore under no obligation to consult the legislature on these matters. Needless to say, the wishes of the public never entered the picture.
Postwar politics saw to it that the ``prerogative of supreme command'' should go out the window. Thankfully, it would be inconceivable today for the SDF to start an armed action in Iraq at its own discretion.
This renders the Koizumi Cabinet quite different from the prewar Cabinet of Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, although the two are often compared and likened to each other.
For instance, Koizumi's tough-talking intransigence on the Yasukuni Shrine issue and the four Russian-occupied northern islands is reminiscent of the arrogance with which Konoe ``refused to deal with the Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomingtang government.'' Another element common to both prime ministers is their popularity, won with their promises of domestic reforms.
Koizumi, however, has not yet faced the sort of imminent foreign policy crisis Konoe faced: A mere month after taking the helm, the Sino-Japanese War broke out, and his grand reform programs quickly deteriorated into mere wartime expediency measures.
This is not to say, though, that Koizumi will never find himself in a hot spot. For instance, there is no guarantee that the SDF troops in Samawah will never be attacked and suffer a heavy toll. Nor can anyone say with complete certainty that, after Koizumi realizes his dream of making Japan a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States and China will never come to a brink of war over Taiwan. How would Koizumi deal with a crisis like that?
Koizumi's promised structural reforms at home have made next to no progress, and yet the sovereign public has continued to close its eyes to this reality.
As a student of history, here is my read of the situation: The public seems to be hanging on to the slogan of domestic reforms because it wants to avert its eyes from the abrupt shift in the nation's foreign policy that is now taking place, as exemplified by the recent dispatch of troops to Iraq.
The so-called Lukow-kiao (Marco Polo Bridge) incident of July 1937 triggered Japan's all-out war with China. But only two months before that incident, the Social Masses Party (Shakai Taishu-to) had won landslide victories in general and local elections. Freedom of speech and other civil liberties were allowed to a certain extent.
However, the great majority of Japanese never even imagined that the Lugou Bridge incident would be all it took to cleanly obliterate this incipient trend.
Whenever a general election is fought over ``war'' and ``reform'' as twin issues, the latter invariably brings in more votes. By this token, the majority of Japanese voters pinned their hopes on Koizumi's ``reforms'' and helped his Cabinet retain high approval ratings-although they did not necessarily believe Koizumi would deliver.
Koizumi has been lucky so far, but the obvious question is how long his luck will hold. I worry that when his shift in postwar diplomacy ceases to be just talk, there is no guarantee that it will happen while the Diet is in session or just before a general election.
Perhaps it is now time for us, the sovereign people, to start calling for referendums on crucial issues, or seriously consider something like a ``mass demonstration of 1 million people'' to assert ourselves through direct action.
* * *
Junji Banno is a historian and University of Tokyo professor emeritus. He has formerly served as the head of the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo and taught at Chiba University, specializing in the political history of modern Japan.(IHT/Asahi: October 22,2004) (10/22)
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