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May 19, 2003
A Letter to Kofi Annan
The Missing Evidence
by Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity
http://www.counterpunch.org/vips05192003.html
The Honorable Kofi Annan,
Secretary General The United Nations
(via fax)
Dear Mr. Secretary General,
We are former intelligence officials who have served many years at senior
levels of the US intelligence community. As the role of intelligence on Iraq
assumed critical importance over the past several months, we established
Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) as a collegial body to
monitor the unfolding of events. Our first analytic paper was a same-day
commentary on Secretary of State Colin Powell's performance at the UN
Security Council on February 5. Six papers on related subjects have now been
issued, three of which have taken the form of Memoranda for the President.
We have had no response from the White House.
We turn to you now because it has become inescapably clear that the issue of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq remains a most urgent one. We see no
viable alternative to renewed UN involvement if this key issue is to be
dealt with effectively. This letter is an appeal to you and Security Council
members to pursue that objective with a renewed sense of urgency.
As we applied the rigorous evidentiary standards of professional
intelligence analysis over recent months, we were inclined to place reports
of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in the "unconfirmed" category.
However, the assertions of President George W. Bush and his senior advisers
were so categorical--and their assurances so insistent--that it seemed
reasonable to assume that they were in possession of more compelling
evidence than that which had been made public, and that prudence therefore
dictated giving them the benefit of the doubt. In doing so we found
ourselves in step with most Americans, including some who are highly
experienced in these matters--former UN inspectors David Albright and
Jonathan Tucker, for example.
We find it deeply troubling, therefore, that two months after US and British
forces invaded Iraq no weapons of mass destruction have been found.
Statements by those close to the Bush administration have served to compound
the confusion. On April 10, for example, Defense Policy Board member (and
former Deputy US Representative to the UN), Kenneth Adelman, predicted that
such weapons would be found "pretty soon, in the next five days." He now
concedes that the situation is "very strange," and suggests that Saddam
Hussein may have launched "a massive disinformation campaign to make the
world think he was violating international norms, and he may not have been."
US Gen. Tommy Franks has said the search for weapons of mass destruction may
take a year. We assume that the international community will find this
unacceptable.
It became painfully obvious in the weeks following the invasion of Iraq that
the US did not know the location of any weapons of mass destruction. Nor, at
the outset, was the US able to pinpoint and take into custody those Iraqis
who do know. This has now changed. A former chief UN inspector for weapons
in Iraq noted last week that the US now has in custody four top Iraqi
officials who "know exactly what the facts are," adding, "We need to know
what they are saying."
Intelligence analysts rarely confess to being perplexed. We confess. We are
perplexed at the US refusal to permit the return of UN inspectors to Iraq.
From an intelligence point of view, Washington's decision to bar the very
people with the international mandate, the unique experience, and the
credibility to undertake a serious search for weapons of mass destruction
defies logic. UN inspectors know Iraq, know the weaponry in question, know
the Iraqi scientists/engineers who have been involved, know how the
necessary materials are procured and processed; in short, they have
precisely the expertise required. Barton Gellman's detailed account of the
abortive two-month search by US forces in Iraq ("Odyssey of Frustration," in
yesterday's Washington Post) should remove any lingering doubt that the US
needs all the help it can get. We are particularly troubled by reports of
looting and thefts at Iraqi nuclear facilities.
UN prerogatives regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq offer a way
out of this mire. Security Council resolutions requiring that UN inspectors
certify that Iraq is free of such weapons before economic sanctions can be
lifted can continue to play an important role. Indeed, it would be folly to
attempt to resume normal economic activity while weapons of mass destruction
remain unaccounted for. Just last week the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, warned that such weapons may still be in the
hands of Iraqi "special units."
The draft Security Council resolution being promoted by the US, however,
makes no reference to the mandated UN role in weapons certification. Thus,
at the Security Council deliberations this week, the stakes--for the UN, for
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, for the international community
as a whole, and for the Middle East in particular--could not be higher.
It is understandable that you and other senior UN officials are unwilling to
take at face value the intelligence reporting offered by the US on Iraq,
particularly since the detailed assertions by Secretary Powell on February
5, by and large, have not withstood close scrutiny. Particularly distressing
to us as intelligence professionals has been the revelation that some of the
most important evidence cited by Secretary Powell, and by the president
himself, was based on forged documents.
You will agree, certainly, that this is a starkly different state of affairs
than that which obtained during the Cuban missile crisis 41 years ago. Then
war was averted through peaceful means partly because of widespread trust in
the integrity of US intelligence collection and analysis. Trust is a fragile
commodity. The success of diplomacy leans heavily on it. If trust is
squandered, all suffer.
Today, as veteran intelligence officials, we cannot stand by in silence as
US credibility is in danger of being frittered away. This will be the
inevitable result if previous US government assertions based on "solid
intelligence" concerning the existence of serviceable weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq remain without credible substantiation.
Only the return of UN inspectors to Iraq can determine on behalf of the
entire international community the credibility of the intelligence upon
which the US/UK invasion of Iraq was based. Accordingly, we strongly
encourage you to continue working toward that end. The restoration of an
internationally sanctioned inspection and verification regime would be a
giant step toward resolving lingering ambiguities. Equally important, it
would ensure a stable foundation for the security of the next government in
Iraq.
We have found it somewhat awkward to write you in this vein, but the urgency
of the situation leaves us no alternative. We take no joy in sharing our
confusion over our government's policies.
We appreciate your efforts and those of other member states to carry out the
UN's mandate on Iraq and to assert UN prerogatives. The long-term
credibility and role of the UN will be strengthened as you redouble your
efforts to meet this formidable challenge.
We shall fax copies of this letter to the current members of the Security
Council, including the US delegation.
Respectfully yours,
Kathleen McGrath Christison, Santa Fe, NM
William Christison, Santa Fe, NM
David MacMichael, Linden, VA
Raymond McGovern, Arlington, VA
Steering Group Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity
The VIPS can be reached at: vips@counterpunch.org
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