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(回答先: 米国は一年前からイラク攻撃プランを立てていた。 投稿者 在欧 日時 2003 年 3 月 23 日 11:06:59)
Bush had Iraq in his sights before he became President
By Mary Dejevsky
21 March 2003
How the American administration moved, after 11 September 2001, from its pledge to hunt down Osama bin Laden "dead or alive" to launching all-out war on Iraq is one of the imponderables of international diplomacy. According to new inside accounts, the rout of the Taliban in Afghanistan was less a prelude to war on Iraq than a temporary distraction from it.
George Bush arrived in the White House with Iraq already in his sights. The United States Congress had set "regime change" in Iraq as an objective, but Mr Clinton had neither the desire nor the opportunity to act on it. He spent the last months of his presidency vainly trying to bring peace to the Middle East.
Mr Bush, who came to office with an "ABC" policy ("anything but Clinton"), wanted as little as possible to do with the Middle East, which he saw as intractable. But Iraq became a preoccupation. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon confirmed his view that the greatest threat was where terrorists and a "rogue" regime came together. Iraq was back in the frame.
When Tony Blair visited Washington days after 11 September, he found Mr Bush determined to strike not only al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan, but Iraq as well. Mr Bush was persuaded that Afghanistan should be tackled first and only then should planning turn to Iraq. Consequently, after the Taliban were overthrown, Mr Bush's attention swung back to Iraq.
The White House was divided over the wisdom of seeking international support for this venture, but by August 2002 Mr Bush had decided to take the United Nations route on Iraq. The one remaining question was whether he should call formally for a UN resolution that authorised the eventual use of force – and then whether there should be just one resolution or two. Only 24 hours before Mr Bush addressed the UN General Assembly, British officials were confident that their argument – for a single UN resolution – had prevailed.
Mr Bush makes his decisions, apparently, rather like a diner contemplating a sushi restaurant conveyor belt. He watches as the options are paraded before him, then grabs one that matches his view, and another, and perhaps another, even if they are not necessarily compatible. The 28th draft of his speech was what Mr Bush delivered at the UN on 12 September 2002. The crucial sentence relating to the resolution, though, was missing from his autocue. Knowing it should be there, he improvised, with one crucial error. He called for "UN resolutions", in the plural.
What seemed a tiny distinction took on huge importance in talks over the resolution that became 1441. France and Russia insisted on two resolutions – one to get weapons inspectors into Iraq; the second to authorise military action, if necessary. That same dispute, essentially, is what finally scuppered UN diplomacy.
British diplomats felt they understood Mr Bush and enjoyed his trust. And, in fact, most of the post-Clinton relationships have worked well, except for one of the most crucial, that between Britain's urbane Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, and the swashbuckling Pentagon chief, Donald Rumsfeld.
Their non-comprehension was finally buried on a flight between Washington and Brussels. The secret of dealing with Mr Rumsfeld, one insider said, was not to allow yourself to be intimidated, to get straight to the point. But understanding between the two is still not perfect, as was shown by the public difference last week over whether British troops would go into battle without UN or British public support
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=389193
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